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The research examines three aspects of incomes policy: 
its measurement; its appropriate incorporation in an aggregate 
model of wage inflation; and the empirical explanation of 
changes in incomes policy. A continuous quantity measure of 
policy is derived which incorporates the various pieces of 
information and attitudes regarding policy. Inclusion of the 
policy variable in a real wage resistance model of wage inflation 
finds a statistically significant policy influence but considerable 
average slippage between ex—ante and ex-post policy influence. 
Significant incomes policy catch-up effects are also found but 
these are weaker the longer the length of preceding policy. The 
most important policy effects on wages identified are in the wage 
freezes of 1966 and 1972 and during the policy of 1975-77.
The stance of incomes policy is reasonably successfully explained 
by changes in the inflation rate and by deviations of employment 
from a moving trend of unemployment so that a persistently high 
level of unemployment is discounted for policy purposes. However, 
there is considerable inertia in the setting of incomes policy.
The overall implication of the wage and policy model developed 
is that changes in policy can either magnify or dampen exogenous shocks 
to the wage-price sub-sector and thus policy feedback is not 
inherently stabilising.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objectives of the thesis
"Incomes policy .....  constitutes an attempt to solve
a politically created economic policy problem by political 
means. The evidence of past experience along these lines 
is overwhelmingly negative; but it is a characteristic of 
political animals that they have the infinite self-confidence 
that is born of solipsism and the disregard of past and 
others' experience as irrelevant, which is expressed in the 
view that past failures are attributable to the lack of 
determination or the lack of astuteness of others than 
oneself".
H.G. Johnson (1972, pp.269-70)
The above quotation leaves little room for further analysis 
of incomes policy. The main aim of this thesis is to argue that 
incomes policies have been inadequately modelled so that any previous 
judgement on the past (or future) efficacy of incomes policies is 
at best premature.
The typical approach towards estimating and modelling the 
effects of incomes policy has been one of treating incomes policy 
in the manner of a shift in economic behaviour and as a nuisance 
which complicates the estimation of the underlying structural 
parameters of the system. However, the frequency and variety of 
incomes policy has been regarded as appearing out of the blue, like 
some deus ex machine, rather than as a conscious decision of the 
economic authorities related to other economic developments.
This thesis attempts to remedy these defects by providing 
a more general framework whereby incomes policies can be included 
in a formal representation of the macroeconomic system. Since, 
however, incomes policy is not an homogeneous economic policy instru­
ment, as say income tax rates, there are some limits to the extent 
of generalisation possible. By concentreting on three specific erees 
this thesis sims to extend the existing eree of modelling of incomes
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policy at the macroeconomic level.
The first specific area developed concerns the measurement 
of incomes policy itself. Traditional analysis has treated incomes 
policy as discontinuous and has >made little attempt to quantify the 
variations in incomes policy over the past. By using some of the 
available information on incomes policy over the period the thesis 
is able to generate a continuous and quantifiable measure of incomes 
policy which can be used to assess the ex-ante pressure of policy, 
something which is not possible using the approaches hitherto applied 
to UK economic policy.
The second area of work relates to the specification of incomes 
policy within aggregate wage equations. Empirical estimation of 
wage equations has tended to treat incomes policy as a temporary 
irritant to the wage determination process whereas the frequency and 
scale of policy intervention requires modelling incomes policy as an 
integral part of the wage determination process. In addition, issues 
such as the timing of policy and expectational elements havealso 
been virtually ignored by the previous economic literature.
The third area of concern relates to the explanation of 
the imposition and strength of incomes policy over the period. Not 
only does the assumption of exogeneity of incomes policy have implic­
ations for simulations with macroeconomic models (since such 
simulations can never predict the introduction of incomes policy) 
but it may also bias the parameters of the wage equation itself.
1.2 Outline of the research
In order to achieve some of the aims of this thesis, 
notably that regarding the measurement of incomes policy, it is 
essential to decide upon an appropriate definition.
Although there has been some general agreement in the 
literature on specific instances of incomes policy, for example the
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pay freeze of 1966, a consensus does not emerge so clearly for some 
of the other policy episodes of the 1960s and 1970s. In particular, 
there is some divergence in the empirical literature (see Table 1 • 1) 
over the exact ending of particular policies. Further, there has 
tended to be some dispute over the classification of certain policy 
episodes which have been more implicit than explicit (for example 
the 'n-1' policy of 1971-2). The following section of the thesis 
is therefore devoted to discussion of the issues regarding the 
definition of incomes policy and their appropriateness for economic 
modelling.
In the second chapter of the thesis the previous treatment of 
modelling of incomes policy is examined and its limitations explored. 
This is followed by some discussion of the empirical estimates of 
incomes policy on aggregate wages derived from previous 
studies.
In the third chapter of the thesis the proposed general 
approach to modelling incomes policy is discussed together with its 
relationship to previous work in the area. Quantitative ex-ante 
measures of incomes policy are derived using the "pressure" approach 
modified by a more subjective indicator representing the political 
stringency of the policy from both the government side and from 
general trade union reaction. The "pressure" approach emphasises 
the impact of incomes policy on real wages and uses information from 
announced wage norms or guidelines and exceptions to these norms. 
This approach then produces a quantity variable which indicates 
variations in policy pressure. However, an ex-ante strength 
indicator needs to be applied to this measure before we can use it 
as a comparative measure of policy strength since the same policy 
might be applied to different degrees by government or opposed to a 
different extent by trade unions. Hera the case study element as
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Notes:
denotes end of estimation period
AN denotes announcement dunmy
CA denotes catch-up dummy
The numbers in brackets signify the different policy periods 
di s tingui shed.
Sources:
N.B.P.I. (1968)
Lipsey and Parkin (1970) 
Smith (1968)
Parkin (1972)
Parkin et al. (1976) 
Henry et al. (1976)
Sheriff (1977)
Henry and Ormerod (1978) 
Sargan (1980)
as opposed to the general economic modelling part of the thesis 
is relevant. The approach to explaining different policy strengths 
is that of an extension and modification to the reaction function 
approach to economic policy.
Problems in producing a continuous, rather than discrete, 
measure of policy are also discussed in Chapter 3 and this 
discussion is particularly relevant to the generalisation of 
incomes policy in the aggregate wage equation which follows upon 
an approach first applied to Canadian data by Reid (1979) but which 
adopted a discrete approach to the modelling of incomes policy.
A description of the development of incomes policy over the 
period under consideration is given in Chapter 4 in order to high­
light the differences in the form of policy. The setting of 
incomes policy against the underlying macroeconomic environment is 
also discussed and this is particularly relevant for the area of 
research concerned with the endogeneity of policy.
The following chapter is concerned with the derivation of 
quantitative indicators of policy using the basic "pressure" 
approach. Derivation of these indicators also tales account of the 
severity with which the policy was intended to be applied and the 
extent of TUC opposition to it. Problems of implicit wage norms 
are discussed and timing problems are also incorporated into the 
indicators. Having derived some measures of policy, these can then 
be applied to an empirical model of wage behaviour. The form of 
wage equation chosen is the real wage resistance model 
since the empirical record (eg. Henry et al., 1976) 
suggests that this is one of the better empirical descriptions 
of aggregate wage behaviour. In obtaining empirical estimates 
problems of expectations and wage catch-up are dealt with and the 
results also reveal differences between wage models based on the
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exogeneity of incomes policy and those models which assume it to 
be simultaneously determined.
The problems of policy endogeneity are dealt with in 
Chapters 7 and 8. The former gives an outline of the general 
literature relating to policy reaction functions and its limitations 
whilst Chapter 8 applies a modified version of the reaction 
function based on the piece-wise quadratic function of Friedman 
(1975) to the incomes policy measure. In order to estimate 
these reaction functions the issue of structural constancy is 
discussed.
Having obtained a measure of policy, a description of 
policy formation through the reaction function approach and 
an empirical estimate of the effect of incomes policy on wage 
behaviour, the results are applied through the use of a small 
scale simulation model.*
1.3 Definition of incomes policy
Problems in defining incomes policy have bedevilled 
much of the empirical literature on incomes policy which 
have tended to characterise policy as either "on or "off".
For example, Parkin (1972) regards policy as "on" between 
1961(3) and 1969(1) whereas Parkin at al.(1976) regard policy 
as "off" between 1962(3) and 1966(2) and after 1967(2);
Henry et al. (1976) treat policy as "on" from 1972(A) to 1973(A) 
whereas Henry and urmerod (1978) regard it as "on" until 197A(1). 
Periods of wage freeses such as that of 1966(3) - (A) and 
1972(A) - 1973(1) are fairly consistently regarded as
policy "on" periods (see Table 1.1)but decisions on the status of 
policy in other historical periods are determined by no clear rule. 
Often, in fact, the procedure is to follow the example of some 
previous author (eg. Smith, 1968) whose own procedure has no 
precisely stated criteria. It is clear that to model and evaluate 
incomes policy requires some general understanding of what is meant 
by incomes policy. Clegg (1979) defines incomes policy as 
"... an attempt - usually by a Government - to alter the national 
level of wages and salaries", (p.345).
However, this definition overlaps incomes policy with other 
economic policy instruments, notably monetary and fiscal policies, 
since these can also be seen as operating on the level of wages, 
whether through the level of unemployment, through real wages or 
through expectations. By incomes policy we must therefore mean 
some policy action designed to influence wages through some direct 
influence on wage determination. Even if other policy changes have 
the effect on wages as their principal aim, this is achieved initially 
through markets other than that of labour. For example,
increasing real incomes by reducing direct taxation operates 
initially through fiscal policy and the goods market. A suggested 
topology for incomes policy is as follows:
(i) short term intervention in the wage determination 
process, such as by temporary wage controls or wage 
freezes;
(ii) educational and informative action designed to
influence the labour market. These measures might 
include the preparation and publication of "expert" 
reports which outline the implications for the economy 
of alternative rates of growth of money wages. The 
aim of these measures would be to achieve some 
consensus on the acceptable growth of money wages;
(iii) the setting of mandatory or voluntary guidelines on
wage growth, regardless of whether there is accompany­
ing price control or profit restraint. Thus price 
controls are neither a sufficient nor necessary condition 
for the existence of an incomes policy;
(iv) the operation of some co-ordinated system of wage 
determination, with or without direct government 
intervention, or through some form of compulsory 
arbitration procedure;
(v) long-term measures such as institutional engineering.
These might include facilities for mediation, sanctions 
against unofficial disputes, etc.
The discussion of policy in Chapter 4 reveals that most of 
the policies followed by the UK Government between 1962 and 1979 
fall into (i) and (iii) although in the early part of the period 
some attempts were made to operate via category (ii) and various 
attempts have been made to establish some co-ordinated system of 
wage determination through the introduction of the National Board 
for Prices and Incomes in the mid-1960s and the Pay Board in the 
early 1970s. However these bodies degenerated rapidly into super­
visory bodies concerned with overseeing policies which fall into 
class (iii). Although arbitration procedures have been an important 
element in sorting out individual wage problems there has been no 
general arbitration system as an integral part of the wage determination 
in the manner recently suggested by Meade (1982). Long-term 
measures as defined by (v) have been notable by their absence.
The definition of incomes policy given by the above 
classification includes implicit policies as well as explicit 
policies. Many of the measures included under (ii), (iv) and (v) 
might well be regarded as an implicit rather than explicit policy.
The existence of a wage norm or guideline is not therefore a 
necessary condition for an incomes policy to exist although its 
absence does complicate the construction of a quantitative index of 
policy.
It should be noted that the topology of incomes policy does 
not include measures aimed at restraining cost pressures in specific 
sectors. Thus, holding back wage increases in the baking industry.
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say, if unaccompanied by comparable action in other sectors is 
not designated as incomes policy. In practice, of course, wage 
negotiations are sequential rather than simultaneous so that it 
slight be argued that controlling wages in some particular sector 
could be construed as incomes policy if wages in other sectors 
were expected to be influenced by wages in this leading sector. 
Although post-war governments have been well aware of the comparab- 
ility issue in wage determination and have often comsienced any 
intervention on wage settlements in the initial phase of a wage- 
round in order to influence wage settlements later on, there is 
little evidence that they have taken the leading sector theory of
wages seriously enough to limit their intervention to one or
. 2 two major settlements.
One of the problems in the suggested classification is 
an extension of this sectoral case and concerns the treatment of 
the public sector. It has frequently been argued that since the 
Government must always take some view as to the acceptable level 
of renumeration in the public sector then it must always be 
operating an incomes policy. However, Clegg's definition clearly 
states incomes policy as relating to the level of national wages 
and salaries. Both because of the size of the public sector 
(accounting for over one-quarter of employment in 1981) and because 
of the interdependence between public and private sector pay 
through comparability issues, public sector incomes policy must be 
seen as a form of national incomes policy applied to a large but 
not complete section of the labour force. However, this does not 
mean that incomes policy is therefore always seen to be "on" as the 
criteria for defining incomes policy still stand. Thus decisions 
over public sector pay must be seen to follow a clear general 
strategy rather than applied case by case to parts of the public
1.11
sector. Similarly, a public sector expenditure policy operating 
through the imposition of cash limits but with no view as to the 
mix of real expenditure and inflation does not constitute an instance 
of incomes policy. Rather it is a form of fiscal policy.
The analysis of policy since 1962 suggests that, using the 
above criteria, there has almost always been some form of incomes 
policy in operation, the main exception being the very first few 
months of the Conservative administration in 1970. The main issues 
that arise therefore are not whether policy was "on" or "off", 
since it was nearly always "on", but the extent to Which it was 
applied in different periods.
r i ’i
* ■
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Footnotes to Chapter 1
This work concentrates on incomes policy and its impact on 
wage determination. It does not consider the independent 
role of any prices policy which, in any event, has been rare 
over the period.
The work by Elliott (1976) shows that there is no regular 
wage-round in that settlements tend ,not to occur in the same 
sequence in each year although there is some support for 
the idea that settlements which occur early in the pay-round 
(which probably begins in September/October of each year) do 
strongly influence succeeding wage demands in other sectors.
•'J
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CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL TREATMENT OF
INCOMES POLICY IN WAGE EQUATIONS
As noted in Chapter 1, the exact classification of periods 
of economic history as being periods of policy "on or "off" has 
been subjective rather than being based on a set of objective 
criteria. Some (eg. Parkin et al., 1976) have included only 
periods with zero norms backed by legislative powers ("freezes") 
whilst others (eg. Henry and Ormerod, 1978) have included periods 
of "voluntary restraint".
2.1 The real wage resistance model
For the purposes of the research in this thesis a real wage 
resistance model of money wage determination is adopted. This is 
based on the original paper by Sargan (1964) which was updated and 
popularised by Henry et al. (1976). Usually in the literature the 
real wage resistance model has been postulated as emerging from a 
bargaining framework where trade unions are assumed to strive for 
a given real wage in the light of expected price developments. Thus 
following Henry et al. we have the target money wage, from the union
X
....(2.1)
where W refers to money wages, P to prices, e denotes the expected 
value of a variable and d its desired value. The employers' reaction 
enters the real wage resistance framework by the inclusion of a 
demand variable, usually the level of unemployment, although this 
may also be interpreted as an indicator of union bargaining strength. 
Adding the unemployment term and taking logarithms gives (2.2).
side, as given oy: 
W ■ Wt
Wt- l - < p / ? . 1 >
W/p
t-l
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value of a variable and d its desired value. The employers' reaction 
enters the real wage resistance framework by the inclusion of a 
demand variable, usually the level of unemployment, although this 
may also be interpreted as an indicator of union bargaining strength. 
Adding the unemployment term and taking logarithms gives (2.2).
side, as given Dy:
W “ W t - l . ( P / * > W
W/p
t~l/p
t-1
2.2
log W - log W , - log (Pt )e + X log (W/P)d - log pt-l/p >
t-1 t-1
+ 9 log U *—  .... (2.2)
where U refers to the level of unemployment.
The formulation of (2.2) implies that, for a given level of
expected price inflation and unemployment, any deviation of actual
W/ dreal wages from their desired level ( 'P) must eventually be 
made up. In other words, the formulation is that of partial 
adjustment to any given desired or target level of real wages.
We can now see that if X, the partial adjustment of actual 
to desired real wages,is zero, then the real wage resistance model 
(RWR) collapses to the familiar augmented Phillips curve 
(Friedman, 1975):
Thus,
log “ log (pe/pt;0  + 9 log u
Thus the fact that some of the previous empirical work (eg.
Lipsey and Parkin, 1970) has used the augmented Phillips curve 
whilst others (eg. Henry et al., 1976) have used the real wage 
resistance model does not prove a problem for our taxonomy of models 
since the augmented Phillips curve (APC) can be seen as a specific 
form of the more general real wage resistance model (RWR).
In both the RWR and APC outlined as (2.2) and (2.3) the 
term in expected price inflation has a unit coefficient. Whilst this 
has often been justified by an appeal to money illusion (eg.
Friedman, 1975) it has been seen by some as an empirical question, 
especially in cases where some proxy (often actual past price 
inflation) has been used for expected price inflation.1 In addition, 
Artis and Miller (1979) have shown that a unit coefficent on price 
inflation is not a necessary condition for absence of money illusion 
under the real wage resistance model.
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Therefore, more general versions of the real wage 
resistance model and the augmented Phillips curve can be written 
as (2.4) and (2.5)
Real wage resistance (RUR)
log (“/ ^  ) - B log <pe/Pt_]) ♦ ^ |log(M/p)d - log(Wt-l/p )j
+ 9 log U ......(2.4)
Augmented Phillips Curve (APC)
log (w /w ) - 6 log (pe/p ) + 9  log U .... (2.5)t-1 6—1
One of the major problems with the real wage resistance 
model concerns the determination of the desired or target real 
wage. Henry et al. (1976) assume that it grows at some constant 
rate, y, so that we can write (2.4) as:
log (W^ t - 1 ) “ 8 log (Pe/p ) - X log (Wt-1/D ) + 9 log U
t-1 /pt-l
+  y A T  ♦ y  x  ........................... ( 2 . 6 )
where T ■ a time trend
and where log(W/p )d ■ y ♦ y T
or log (W/ ) - aQ + a, log (P P^ .)♦ a, log(Vt-l/p )
t-1 c 1 t-1
♦ a ^ log U + a ^ T  ............  (2.7)
where aQ * y x
al m 6
a2 - - X
a3 ■ e
a4 ■ y A
and minus the ratio of the parameters on lagged real wages (c^) and 
on the time trend (a^) gives y , the trend rate of growth of 
desired real wages. In Sargan'a original formulation real wages 
were defined as pre-tax wages whereas following Henry et al. (1976) 
real wages have generally been taken to be post-tax real wages.
If these are defined to be the product of real wages and the ratio 
of post-tax to pre-tax wages (the 'retention ratio') (2.7) can be re­
written as:
lo8<W/W,-i * °o + “l 108 (P*/pt-]> + a2 lo8(rW/P)t_1 
+ a^ log U ♦ T ......... (2.8)
where r is the retention ratio
and is now y'X , i.e. related to the trend growth of
the post-tax target wage.
Criticisms of the RWR model have often centred on the 
apparent immutability of this target real wage and the empirical 
support for RWR runs into problems in the late 1970s when the 
equations apparently shift (Henry and Ormerod, 1978). This apparent 
shift in the relationship has sometimes been attributed to the 
success of the incomes policy of 1976 and 1977 in reducing real 
wages, in which case one might expect the original equation to 
reassert itself once these effects have passed. Alternative 
explanations have been along the lines that general economic events 
and in particular the slow-down in the rate of growth of product­
ivity had convinced trade unions that the previous desired rate of 
growth of real wages was now unobtainable and therefore that the relation­
ship had shifted permanently. Other explanations are possible but 
the general problems relating to the use of the time trend make 
any firm conclusion almost impossible.
2.5
Although the most common background to RWR is the 
bargaining approach it has been argued that the model is consistent 
with alternative theoretical and empirical backgrounds. In 
particular, Parkin (1979) argues that the model is indistinguishable 
from an excess supply model of real wages since the presence of 
high real wages would, according to neo-classical theory, lead to 
a downward pressure on wages through excess supply. He argues that 
this is supported empirically by an inverse relationship between 
real wages and wage inflation. Kuh (1967) has advanced a similar 
explanation whereby the post-tax real wage represents the supply side 
of the labour market and the time trend average productivity growth 
and the demand side. The standard form of RWR does not distinguish 
easily between the excess supply approach and the bargaining approach. 
The most that one can say is that it is a reduced form of labour 
market adjustment which may be consistent with more than one 
theoretical model of labour market behaviour.
2.2 Taxonomy of policy effects
The major routes by which incomes policy might be thought 
to affect wage inflation are as follows:
(a) dummy shift approach. Here policy operates by 
changing the intercept term (a ) so that the entire 
equation shifts uniformly for the duration of the 
policy. Estimates of the size and significance of 
the dummy variable are then interpreted as a measure 
of the influence of policy.
(b) dummy slope approach. Here policy may change some 
or all of the remaining parameters (a., i»l....n) 
with estimates of these coefficients again being 
used to evaluate the influence of policy.
(c) simulation approach. This is not a modelling device
as such since it is based on using an equation estimated 
in periods of policy "off" to simulate wage inflation 
in periods of policy "on". The policy "on" model is
not defined and Che impact of controls is measured 
as the difference between the actual and simulated 
values.
(d) on-off approach. This is a generalisation of (a) 
and (b) where different equations are estimated 
for periods of policy "on" and policy "off" but 
with identical sets of explanatory variables.
Structural differences between the models ere used 
to indicate the significance and impact of controls 
under the assumption that the policy "off" model is 
the true wage model.^
(e) difference in variable approach. Here the effects 
of the explanatory variables are allowed to change 
under policy "on". Note however that our definition 
of incomes policy requires this to be a direct effect 
on the labour market so that we are concerned with, 
say, the implications of different price expectations 
under the imposition, or anticipation of imposition, 
of wage controls rather than the fact that incomes 
policy may enable the economy to be run at a higher 
level of activity and hence unemployment may be 
lower during policy "on" periods. If the target real 
wage itself is influenced by policy,however, then this 
is a'true’ policy effect.
(f) new model approach. This is an extension of the 
"on/off" approach of (d) but where a different set 
of explanatory variables may appear in the policy 
"on" equation. As with (d) estimates of the 
significance of controls are given by the difference 
between the two models.
(g) general model approach. This is an extension of the 
new model approach (f) where the "on/off" equations 
are unified into a single formulation of aggregate 
wage determination where the values of some of the 
variables in the general equation indicate the strength 
of incomes policy. This continuous approach then drops 
the distinction between policy "on" and "off".
Most empirical assessments of incomes policy in the UK have 
been based on methods (a) to (d) (see Table 2.1). The dummy shift 
approach has been most comnon and has been used by Smith (1968), 
Parkin et al.(1976). and Henry et al. (1976) amongst others. The 
dummy variable generally takes on the value of unity in policy "on" 
episodes and zero in periods of policy "off" (an exception is 
Smith ,1968) where the variables are scaled in proportion to the 
length of policy period). The "on/off" approach (d) has been used 
by Lipsey and Parkin (1970) and by Sargan (1980).
2.7
With the exception of Sargan (1980), who uses the 
instrumental variable estimation technique, all the previous 
UK studies have treated incomes policy as exogenous in their 
analyses of aggregate wage determination.
A recent study by Lawson (1982) which has been developed 
in parallel but independently of the present study attempts to quantify 
incomes policy by a similar real wage pressure method as this study 
but using annual data. However the measure of policy derived 
is not continuous (for example it ignores the 1972/3 experience); it 
has no separate role for the intensity of policy; the incomes policy 
variable merely enters as an additional influence; and policy is treated
as exogenous.
2.8
2.3 Limitations of the existing treatment
The almost continuous presence of incomes policy in the 
1960s and 1970s limits the ability to estimate a policy "off" 
model and hence precludes the on/off approach (d) as well as the 
simulation approach (c). It is a common feature of some of the 
previous studies that the techniques used could, with some ingenuity, 
distinguish between different periods of policy and could 
therefore provide some ex-post evaluation but these models are 
unable to give any reasonable guidance to the ex-ante effects of 
incomes policy. Modelling treatment based on these approaches are 
therefore not feasible unless policy "on" periods are relatively 
rare.
Thu dummy variable approach ((a) and (b)) can deal more 
easily with differences between policies whereas the policy "on'V'off" 
approach treats all policy "on" periods as implicitly of the same 
strength.
The dummy shift approach has been used by Henry and Ormerod 
(1978), amongst others, to distinguish between different phases of 
policy by specifying different dummy variables for each distinct 
phase of policy. Even so it is inevitable that certain policy periods 
are either lumped together (with the corresponding homogeneity 
assumption of policy imposed) or ignored altogether in order to make
3the estimation tractable. To generalise the approach to distinguish 
finely between policy episodes runs the problem of spurious results 
since the coefficients on the dummy variables will not only measure
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any policy effect but will also capture any influence from
unidentified factors and random errors within the wage equation.
Even the more limited approach of Henry and Ormerod (1978) poses 
particular problems for ex-ante estimation of policy effects, since 
if more than one phase of policy is distinguished, which is the most 
relevant for future policy evaluation ? Problems with timing effects 
bedevil both the dunmy variable and the policy "on/off" 
approaches. In the simple case where there are no timing effects 
from policy itself the presence of serial correlation in the 
residuals will invalidate the sample separation.
Suppose the policy "off" model is defined to exist until 
period t and to recomnence in period t + n with the policy "on" 
model existing between periods t + l t o t  + n - 1 .  If there is 
serial correlation of order i in the underlying wage model then an 
extra i observations should be excluded from both the policy "on" 
and policy "off" periods which are then defined as policy "on" from 
t + i + l t o t + n - 1  and policy "off" from t + n + i 
considerably reducing the already small number of degrees of freedom. 
Similar considerations apply if the true policy "on" and "off" 
models differ and the policy "off" model contains lagged variables. 
Pre-announcement or anticipation of controls and possible catch-up 
after controls also make separation of the sample period into 
different policy regimes somewhat complex. Prior announcement 
can relate either to the imposition of controls or to their ending.
Whilst the former has been rare in the UK the latter has occurred 
frequently. This then gives an incentive to shift wage bargains 
from the period of controls into the post-control era.^ The possible general 
anticipation of tighter or looser controls implies that 
attempts to estimate a policy "off" model without allowing 
for the possible resultant bunching of wage settlements will lead
4
Co misleading conclusions regarding the efficacy of the particular 
policy episode. Thus, if wage settlements were brought forward 
in time in order to avoid a period of tighter wage controls one 
would observe a relatively high rate of wage inflation prior to 
the controls and a relatively low rate during the period of 
tighter controls, leading to the conclusion that the tightening 
of policy had been successful in reducing wage settlements even 
if the true result were that policy had merely shifted the pattern 
of wage settlements through time.
Similar considerations apply to the ending of a relatively 
severe phase of policy. Here again the conclusions regarding the 
success of policy may merely relate to the shifting of settlements 
over time.** Of course, it is also possible to confuse the 
shifting of settlements due to policy with genuine policy catch­
up. By policy catch-up is meant some form of compensation in wage 
settlements for a lowering of wages during the policy. Henry and 
Ormerod (1978) include dummy variables in an attempt to measure policy 
catch-up and their work is therefore subject to the criticisms noted 
above.
The general criticism of both the sample separation approach 
(policy "on/off") and the dummy variable approach concerns the 
inability of these methods to deal with the timing problems of 
policy without either reducing the already scarce (if not non­
existent) degrees of freedom for policy-off analysis or causing 
an explosion in the number of dummy variables introduced with 
consequent danger of spurious results. If one adds the observation 
that the time period over which policy catch-up might be spread is 
probably an empirical matter rather than one that can be decided 
upon a priori the case for an alternative approach is strengthened.
Such an alternative approach is described in Chapter 3. It
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is based on a more general approach to policy measurement which 
avoids the proliferation of dummy variables but also stresses 
the case-study element of incomes policy in dealing with timing 
problems. At this point it is necessary to make some further 
elaboration of the modelling of policy catch-up factors in the 
real-wage resistance model.^
In the standard RWR model the desired real wage is
exogenously set. The basic presumption of this thesis is that
incomes policy, if effective, operates through reducing real
wages at least initially since empirical work on pricing behaviour
(e.g. Godley and Nordhaus, 1972) shows that prices respond only
8with a lag to a reduction in wage costs. Recognition of these 
facts explains the general unease with which trade unions hold 
incomes policy although fears of losing their right to bargain freely, 
and hence one of their historically important roles, may also be 
relevant to this position.
The picture may be clarified a little by the use of a 
simple algebraic model comprising a wage equation (omitting the 
real wage resistance terms at first) and a price mark-up equation.
" 90 W t + 9i V 02 w t-2 + $ c.
where dots signify percentage rates of change ; pt is price inflation; the term ir
ct reflects cost changes other than wages and y is an exogenous
shock.
Allowing for wage-price feedbacks,the first period impact of an exog­
enous shock on wages of y is y / ) whilst the impact on
prices is y  . 0Q/(1- a ^ g )  with a consequent effect on real wages
of y (1-6q )/ (l~a^6g). The smaller the first period weight on wage 
costs in the price equation (0Q) the greater the effect on real 
wages and in the limit where 6q “ O, i.e. current wage costs have 
no effect on prices, then the change in real wages is identical 
to the exogenous shock. For non-zero values of 0Q the smaller the 
feedback from prices to wages (i.e. the lower the coefficient a^) 
the larger the impact on real wages of a given exogenous shock.
Now consider the longer run results.
2
The long-run effect on wages is Y/(l-a.E 0.) and 10. can be
xi-0 1 1
interpreted as the share of labour costs in total output. Given the 
existence of other costs £0^ will be less than unity. The long- 
run effect on prices will be y£0.y (l-a^O^), and the consequent 
real wage impact Y(l-£0^)/(l-a^£0£ ) ?  The effects are illustrated in 
Table 2.2 using alternative sets of plausible parameter estimates 
for 0q , the weight on wage costs in the price equation for the 
current period, and for a^, the wage response to a change in prices.
The table shows the importance of a^, in magnifying the wage-price 
and real-wage response for the given exogenous shock, both in the 
short-run and over the long-run. Increasing the weight on the 
current period’s wage costs does not of course affect the long-run 
results but does imply a smaller change in real wages in the short 
run following the shock.
These results are dependent on the assumption that other 
cost factors (e.g. indirect taxes and import costs) remain unchanged. 
Artis and Miller (1979) consider the case where only wage and import 
costa enter the price equation and where the exchange rate floats 
to compensate exactly for changes in domestic price inflation. The 
terms of trade changes implicit in the results can no longer occur.
This additional assumption is equivalent to treating £0^ as equal
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to unity. Clearly there is no real wage consequence now in the 
long run but if the coefficient a^ equals unity wage inflation 
accelerates. In practice of course, the presence of other costs 
(like indirect taxes) will mean that 10^ will still remain below 
unity even when the exchange rate floats in such a manner. In 
addition, however, one must note that the empirical evidence on 
exchange rate behaviour suggests that full compensation for changes 
in domestic inflation takes some considerable time, if full compen­
sation occurs at all (see the contributions in Gltis and Sinclair, eds.,
1981).
Now let us introduce a real wage element into the basic 
wage equation.
w t “ a0 + al pt + a2 ut + Y + a3 ^ P J t - l  + a4 T
With only real wages entering the wage equation in a lagged form
the implication of an exogenous shock for wages and prices in the
first period is equivalent to that derived using the augmented
Phillips curve above. However in the second period there is an
additional influence on wages as wages increase in order to restore some of the
earlier loss in real wages below the exogenously set target (T).
The extent of real wage catch-up depends on the 
absolute magnitude of the coefficient a^ since this is in effect 
an adjustment coefficient relating the level of real wages to its 
target.
As in the case of the augmented Phillips curve the equilibrium 
real wage properties of the wage equation depend on the magnitude 
of the coefficient on price inflation (a^). If it is less than unity 
the wage equation implies that higher price inflation continuously 
lowers real wage growth. A permanent shift in y can lead to 
different real wage growth but a temporary shock will be eroded by
2.15
Table 2.2 Effect on Wages and Real Wages of a once-for-all 
10 per cent shock to Wages
Augmented Phillips Curve
Wages Real Wages
short-run long-run short-run long-run
E 0 . - O . 8  E 0 . - 1 . O  E 0 . - O . 8  E 0 . - 1 . O
V 0 -2 ■)
al * °  J 10.0 10.0 1 0 .0 8 .0  2 .0  0
90-0.2 1
* 1 - 0 . 5  J 1 1 . 1  1 6 . 7 20 .0 8.9 3.3 0
90 - 0 . 2  1  
a j - 1 . 0  ( 1 2 . 5 50.0 10.0 10.0 0
V o -5
aj^-0.5 1 3 . 3 1 6 . 7 20.0 6.6 3 . 3 0
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the integral adjustment due to the lagged real wage term.
Under circumstances where the exchange rate fully compensates 
for changes in domestic inflation, however, even permanent 
shifts cannot change real wages although attempts to do so may 
lead to ever-accelerating inflation (see Artis and Miller, 1979).^ 
The implication of these results is that there is a built- 
in element of wage catch-up within the wage equation following 
an exogenous shock, such as the imposition of an incomes policy.
It is therefore inappropriate to include additional catch-up
terms in empirical analysis unless it is wished to test one or other
of the following hyptheses.
(a) that wage catch-up following an incomes policy has 
a different adjustment profile to ordinary real wage 
catch up, in which case the parameter a^ should be treated 
as variable.
(b) that wage demands following an incomes policy react 
to nominal wage demands and not just real wage demands 
so that all lost nominal wage increases under the policy 
are made good irrespective of the extent to which real 
wages were affected. This hypothesis therefore rests 
uneasily within the real wage resistance framework.
Catch-up dumnies were used by Henry and Ormerod (1978) in their
study of wage inflation. However, their results (discussed in
further depth in section 2.4) have often been misinterpreted.
In the terms of their analysis a positive catch-up dummy of
similar order of magnitude to the original policy effect does
not imply that nominal wage growth accelerates in order to restore
the level that would have been attained under conditions of policy
"off", as has often been concluded in summaries of-the Henry/Ormerod
study. Rather, since their analysis was in terms of the rate of
acceleration of wage growth, significant dunsny variables merely
imply that wage growth reverts to its underlying policy "off" level.
Use of additional dummies to represent so-called "wage
catch-up" is therefore fraught with difficulties. Not only may they
measure timing effects which are legitimately part of policy 
(i.e deferred settlements) but they are incapable of distinguishing 
between hypotheses such as those noted above. In addition, they 
are not required within a real wage resistance framework in order 
to allow for real wage catch-up. To these criticisms of dummy 
catch-up variables must be added the observation that timing effects 
may operate and the extent to which they deviate from the built-in 
effects are often likely to vary from policy to policy. However, 
whilst the case-study element in estimating these effects is 
important they can be set into a more general framework. The 
major problem with the dumny variable approach, whether it is 
applied to policy effects or policy catch-up effects is that 
it is either too specific (by including a multiplicity of dummy 
variables) and therefore loses any generality or it is too general 
(by including relatively few dumny variables) and therefore loses 
useful information relating to different policy episodes. The 
dummy variable approach is also highly subjective both in its 
assessment of which periods were "on" or "off" and in the relative 
strength of some phases of policy relative to others.
Wage settlements
A common criticism of aggregate wage studies concerns the 
measurement problem. Pencavel (1982) argues that "where the time 
pattern of wage settlements differs across sectors of the economy, 
and where no account is taken of this non-synchronoua pattern, then 
aggregate quarterly wage change equations will be plagued with 
aggregation bias". He goes on to argue that.... "under these 
circumstances, the coefficients of these aggregate wage change 
equations should not be expected to display any stability with 
respect to the additions or deletions of observations". Problems
measure timing effects which are legitimately part of policy 
(i.e deferred settlements) but they are incapable of distinguishing 
between hypotheses such as those noted above. In addition, they 
are not required within a real wage resistance framework in order 
to allow for real wage catch-up. To these criticisms of dummy 
catch-up variables must be added the observation that timing effects 
may operate and the extent to which they deviate from the built-in 
effects are often likely to vary from policy to policy. However, 
whilst the case—study element in estimating these effects is 
important they can be set into a more general framework. The 
major problem with the dummy variable approach, whether it is 
applied to policy effects or policy catch-up effects is that 
it is either too specific (by including a multiplicity of dunany 
variables) and therefore loses any generality or it is too general 
(by including relatively few dummy variables) and therefore loses 
useful information relating Co different policy episodes. The 
dummy variable approach is also highly subjective both in its 
assessment of which periods were "on" or "off" and in the relative 
strength of some phases of policy relative to others.
Wage settlements
A common criticism of aggregate wage studies concerns the 
measurement problem. Pencavel (1982) argues that "where the time 
pattern of wage settlements differs across sectors of the economy, 
and where no account is taken of this non-synchronous pattern, then 
aggregate quarterly wage change equations will be plagued with 
aggregation bias". He goes on to argue that.... "under these 
circumstances, the coefficients of these aggregate wage change 
equations should not be expected to display any stability with 
respect to the additions or deletions of observations". Problems
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of aggregation are often related to the differencing procedure 
in estimating wage equations and the study by Rowley and 
Wilton (1974) outlines some of the implicit assumptions involved. 
Since aggregate wage statistics incorporate two main influences, 
the level of settlement and the period between settlements (the 
contract length), changes in average wages will be influenced by 
the number of workers settling in each period and Ashenfelter 
and Fencavel (1975) and Johnston and Timbrell (1973) attempt to 
incorporate this variable explicitly into their models. However, 
Elliott and Dean (1978) point out that this factor can be swamped 
by the behaviour of large groups such as engineering workers where 
settlements may only be minimum entitlements and thus do not reflect 
changes in the pay position of engineering workers. Elliott and 
Dean therefore propose a new index of wage rates based on settle­
ments and this is described in Elliott and Shelton (1978). A 
similar argument is presented by Coutts et al. (1976) who have 
also constructed an aggregate wage index relating to settlements. 
However, it should be noted that both indices relate only to the 
pay of manual workers who now only represent one-half of all 
employees. It does appear important, at least in principle, to 
attempt to distinguish between the extent of settlements and the 
interval between settlements since policy has often been expressed 
in these terms. However, it is also important to measure the 
effectiveness of policy in terms of wages actually paid, i.e. 
earnings, rather than wage rates,as a policy expressed as 
successful in terms of its impact on wage rates may be seen in 
another light in terms of actual earnings. It is important to note 
that whilst there are inevitable problems with using an aggregative 
approach to deal with issues such as incomes policy there are also
genuine
advantages over a more microeconomic approach especially when 
concerned with modelling methodology in a macroeconomic framework
Expectations
Expectations elements in the modelling of incomes policy 
enter in two main ways. First there is the possibility, referred 
to earlier, that expectations relating to the imposition of a 
tighter period of controls, or to the easing or dismantling of 
controls may influence wage settlements. The earlier analysis 
suggests that the operation of these effects may lead to erroneous 
conclusions regarding the efficacy of the policy by either 
bringing forward settlements into the pre-policy stage or by 
deferring them to the post-policy era.^ Second, there is the 
issue concerning the measurement of price expectations in the 
wage equation. A standard device has been to proxy expected
inflation by past or current price inflation or to model them
12adaptively. Some attempts have been made to measure price 
. 13expectations by survey data whilst others have attempted to 
model expectations rationally (Ormerod, 1982). Most 
methods of measuring price expectations have been mechanical.
It is argued here that the lack of ^ rationality ' in the form­
ation of price expectations in the context of aggregate wage 
equations is not a great deficiency since the labour market is 
perhaps the sector of economic activity where rational expectations 
are least likely to be formed. However, it seems logical to admit 
that the formation of price expectations may be influenced 
to some degree by the imposition of incomes policy.
2.20
Endogeneity
Most studies of incomes policy at the aggregate level have 
treated the imposition of incomes policy as exogenous. However, 
as Wallis (1971 )comments
".... the decision to impose an incomes policy is not 
independent of the values of the variables in the model 
and .... policy itself must surely also become a jointly 
dependent endogenous variable. The relationship between the 
rate of price and wage inflation and the imposition of a 
policy of restraint is equally a feedback relationship.
The division of the sample period into policy-on and 
policy-off periods is not arbitary, but is related to 
actual or expected rates of inflation".
Similar criticisms apply to the dummy variable approach
where the variables are estimated on the assumption that they are
exogenous variables.14 The standard econometric result from
this simultaneous equation bias is that the parameter estimates
of the equation are biased and inconsistent. The extent and
direction of bias will depend on the true relationship between
incomes policy variables in the basic wage equations and the
decision to impose policy. In a simple model where wage inflation
depended on an incomes policy variable and where the value of the
incomes policy variable itself depended proportionally on wage
inflation then bias would be positive and the coefficient on the
incomes policy term in the wage equation would be biased towards
zero, i.e. it would understate the true influence of incomes policy.^
Even were the extent of bias in the single equation estimates of
the wage equation small then omitting the potential feedback between
expected price inflation and the decision to impose or tighten an
incomes policy could lead to possible misleading results from
forecasting and simulation analysis of the full macroeconomic system.
For example, the existence of a policy feedback would make the
likelihood of a wage and price explosion less, likely whereas such
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a situation is not precluded by some of the existing UK macroeconomic 
16models.
2.4 Results from the empirical literature
The spirit of the empirical literature on the effects of 
incomes policy on wage determination in the UK has been to make 
a global assessment as to whether incomes policies are effective 
or not. This is particularly prevalent in studies which use the 
"on /off" methodology such as Lipsey and Parkin (1970). In this 
approach all incomes policies are treated as homogeneous. The most 
frequently used approach in the recent empirical literature has 
been the intercept dummy variable approach and although this can 
and has been used to test for differences between alternative 
phases of incomes policy the interpretation of results has been 
one which classifies incomes policies in general as effective or 
otherwise. However, one might expect a very much smaller effect 
from a mild incomes policy which was applied very weakly compared 
with a severe incomes policy which had considerable statutory 
backing. To attempt to conclude from evidence from the range of 
policies implied by these two extremes that incomes policy was an 
effective policy instrument or not is misleading.
In many instances in the literature the reader is left to 
interpret the effects of incomes policy from the statistical 
estimates of the wage equation, with little attempt by the author 
to derive incomes policy estimates. In some cases (e.g. Henry and 
Ormerod, 1978) this has led to some misinterpretations of the results.
In Table 2.3 estimates of policy influence from past studies 
are presented. Those studies which use the "on/off" approach derive 
policy '.effects by using policy-off equations to predict wages in 
policy-on periods and then comparing these predictions with the actual
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behaviour of wages. The conclusions of Lipsey and Parkin (1970) 
were that incomes policies had no restraining effect on wage 
inflation in the period post-1961 (although the Cripps' incomes 
policy of 1948-50 was found to have reduced wage inflation by
1.8 per cent per annum on average). The study by Parkin (1972) 
using a similar methodology again found no restraining influence 
in either the period between 1961 and 1964 or between 1964 and 1968.^  
These two pieces of work, together with those of NBPI (1968), Smith 
(1968) and Parkin et al.(1976) cover the first generation of incomes 
policies up to 1968/9. The studies by Smith and Parkin et al. use 
the dummy variable approach but whereas Smith identifies four 
separate periods, Parkin et al.only include the period of the pay 
pause (1961(3) - 62(2)) and the period from 1966(3) to 1967(2).
Parkin et al. use dumny variables taking either the value of unity 
(policy-on) or z e r o  (policy-off) whereas Smith also experiments with 
dunsay variables which are scaled in proportion to the length of 
the policy. He finds that weekly wage rates were reduced significantly 
in 1961 and 1962 by over 1$ percentage points in contrast to the 
'perverse' effect derived by Parkin et al.. Smith finds, however, 
a perverse influence from incomes policy between 1962 and 1964 but 
statistically significant influences of 1 per cent per annum and 
1| per cent per annum between 1965 and 1966 and between 1966 and 
1967 respectively. Using proportional dummies makes very little 
difference to these estimates but policy influence is much less 
marked when hourly wage rates are the dependent variable in the wage 
equation. No statistically significant effects emerge in the post- 
1961 era with the policy estimate for 1961-2 reduced to under 2 per 
cent compared with over 1} per cent on weekly wage rates and that 
on the period 1966-7 reduced from 1{ per cent per annum to 2 per 
cent. However use of the regular or proportional dunmy now makes
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a difference with the policy effect for 1961-2 increasing to 
1 per cent and that for 1966-7 to over 2 per cent.
The study by the NBPI (1968) uses annual data and distinguishes 
between tight and moderate policy; 1965 being classed as the 
latter and 1961-2 and 1966 as the former. The estimated policy 
effects are not statistically significant but the coefficients are 
almost identical at around 1 per cent. The study by Parkin et al. 
(1976) includes only two dummy variables; the first covering the 
pay pause of 1961-2 and the second the period 1966(3) - 1967(2). 
Neither policy dummy proves statistically significant, the estimate 
for the first policy phase being positive whilst the second phase 
has a coefficient of the expected negative sign which implies a 
reduction in wage inflation of just over 1 per cent.
All the studies cited so far use the Phillips curve as the 
basic form of wage equation. However, despite regular resuscitation, 
confidence in the Phillips curve as an empirical description of 
wage behaviour was low in the 1970s and the study by Henry et al. 
(1976) turned to the real wage resistance model. Henry et al. (1976) 
also use the dummy variable approach and extend the estimation period 
to 1974. They distinguish between two periods of policy after 
1961, the wage-freezes of 1966 (1966(3) - 1967(2)) and of 1972
(1972(4) - 1973(4)). Only the former policy period emerges as 
statistically significant with an effect of over 1 per cent.
Sheriff (1977) uses a neo-classical model of wages whereby 
wages depend on output, employment, prices and time. The model is 
applied to manufacturing industry using the intercept dummy 
approach. However, Sheriff goes one step further than many of 
the other studies by identifying fourteen separate dummies, of 
which one-half refer to announcement effects. A price equation is
also specified and the model estimated simultaneously over the 
period 1959(1) to 1973(4). Two of the announcement dumnies are 
significant - those for the freeze of 1966(3) and for the freeze 
of 1972(4). However, whilst the coefficient on the former is 
negatively signed that on the latter is positive. Sheriff explains 
this result by differences in the timing of the policy announcement 
within the quarter. However, Sheriff's definition of the announce­
ment effect is perhaps ambiguous. Whereas one interpretation
of the announcement effect would be that effect on wages which 
occurs between declaring the intention to apply the policy and 
actual commencement of the policy, an alternative interpretation used 
by Sheriff is whether the impact effect on wages differs from the 
continuous effect. Both the significant announcement effects 
have comparable magnitudes of response, namely 3 per cent. Of the 
seven continuous dummies, three are statistically significant: 
those covering the period 1962(3) — 1964(4); 1966(4) - 1967(1); and 
1968(3) - 1969(4). Two of the announcement dummies are almost 
identical in magnitude to the succeeding continuous dummies (1961(3) 
and 1966(3)). It is difficult to see why the period between 1967(2) 
and 1968(2) was excluded from the analysis since a tighter policy 
was clearly in operation then than in the following eighteen months. 
Although the Sheriff approach is less restrictive in its coverage 
of policy it does lead to the problem of multiplicity of dummies 
referred to earlier. For example. Sheriff uses three separate 
dunsny variables in 1973 to cover only four observations with the 
consequent problem that the implied policy estimates will also 
include random errors.
Henry and Ormerod (1978) also use a real wage resistance 
model and include observations from 1961 to 1977(2). However the 
form of the equation that they prefer is a differenced form of
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also specified and the model estimated simultaneously over the 
period 1959(1) to 1973(4). Two of the announcement dummies are 
significant - those for the freeze of 1966(3) and for the freeze 
of 1972(4). However, whilst the coefficient on the former is 
negatively signed that on the latter is positive. Sheriff explains 
this result by differences in the timing of the policy announcement 
within the quarter. However, Sheriff’s definition of the announce­
ment effect is perhaps ambiguous. Whereas one interpretation
of the announcement effect would be that effect oh wages which 
occurs between declaring the intention to apply the policy and 
actual commencement of the policy, an alternative interpretation used 
by Sheriff is whether the impact effect on wages differs from the 
continuous effect. Both the significant announcement effects 
have comparable magnitudes of response, namely 3 per cent. Of the 
seven continuous dummies, three are statistically significant: 
those covering the period 1962(3) - 1964(4); 1966(4) - 1967(1); and 
1968(3) - 1969(4). Two of the announcement dummies are almost 
identical in magnitude to the succeeding continuous dummies (1961(3) 
and 1966(3)). It is difficult to see why the period between 1967(2) 
and 1968(2) was excluded from the analysis since a tighter policy 
was clearly in operation then than in the following eighteen months. 
Although the Sheriff approach is less restrictive in its coverage 
of policy it does lead to the problem of multiplicity of dummies 
referred to earlier. For example, Sheriff uses three separate 
dummy variables in 1973 to cover only four observations with the 
consequent problem that the implied policy estimates will also 
include random errors.
Henry and Ormerod (1978) also use a real wage resistance 
model and include observations from 1961 to 1977(2). However the 
form of the equation that they prefer is a differenced form of
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Notes to Table 2.
For general methodology see Table 2.1.
* denotes statistically significant policy effect.
NBPI (1966) uses an annual model; and distinguishes between types 
of policy. 1961-2 and 1966 are regarded as tight and 1965 as loose.
Smith (1968). Results quoted are for the regular dummy variable and 
its effects on weekly wage rates.
Sheriff (1977) uses announcement dummies and continuous dummies, 
see Table 1.1.
Henry and Ormerod (1978): preferred equation from Table 9.
Effects are on the rate of acceleration of wage inflation. Estimates 
marked t are catch-up estimates.
Sargan (1980): details are taken from an earlier version of this 
paper as they are not given in the final version. Figures in 
brackets refer to instrumental variable estimates.
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that used by Henry et al. (1976) and consequently the dependent 
variable is defined as the rate of acceleration of wage inflation.
The policy effects estimated should therefore be interpreted in this 
way, as should the policy catch-up effects which Henry and Ormerod 
allow for (but see the discussion earlier in the chapter). In 
addition to the standard policy and catch-up dummies Henry and 
Ormerod also include a shift dummy after 1975(2) to prevent the 
model from breaking down. Even so it should be noted that only three 
of the thirteen coefficients in their equation are statistically 
significant at the conventional level (and one of the coefficients is the 
first-order serial correlation coefficient). Henry and Ormerod are 
not able to distinguish between alternative hypotheses regarding this 
additional shift dummy. It is not clear therefore whether it can 
be attributed entirely to incomes policy. The two significant policy 
episodes are the period 1967(3)-1969(2) (but not the preceding freeze) 
and the catch-up variable for this period. Although many of the 
values of the catch-up effects are similar to those of the relevant 
policy estimates no conclusion about catch-up effects is possible 
given the lack of statistical determinacy.
All the studies referred to have treated incomes policy as
exogenous. An exception is the study by Sargan (1980). He uses
both the policy on/off and the dummy variable approach and in the
latter treats the dummy variables as endogenous variables within
estimation. Sargan finds that the policy on/off approach leads to
18marginal significance of policy using the standard Chow test.
Using duimay variables he finds significant downward pressure on 
wages between 1961(1) and 1965(A) and 1966(1) and 1969(4) when using 
ordinary least squares but this significance disappears when 
instrumental variables are used (although the point estimate of policy 
between 1961 and 1965 is unchanged). The period between 1972 and the
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end of 1973 is never of Che expected sign and is significant
under ordinary least squares but not under instrumental variables.
However, the choice of the period is a little odd since it
overlaps a period of implicit policy aimed at the public sector
('n-1') with the wage freeze of late 1972 and early 1973, together
with subsequent phases of policy in 1973.
The provisional results of Lawson (1982) who moves towards
a quantity measure of policy treats 1965-9 and 1976-7 as the main
19policy periods using an annual real wage resistance model.
Since the periods are combined there is one coefficient to be 
estimated and this is of the order of 0.2 suggesting that, 
for 1965 and other years outside the main policy periods above, 
policy was just sufficient to offset the trend 2 per cent per annum 
growth of real earnings. The index of policy is equal to unity
in these years whilst the effect in 1968/9 is just 1 per cent; in 
1976 it is 5 per cent and 5j per cent in 1977.
2.5 Summary and conclusions
This chapter has outlined the real wage resistance model 
and its properties. This model forms the basis of the wage 
equation around which the modelling of incomes policy is discussed.
The augmented Phillip's curve is seen to be a special case of the real 
wage model.
From the taxonomy of effects of incomes policy it is shown 
that existing approaches have concentrated very much on the dummy 
shift approach and the inadequacies of this treatment are explored. 
Empirical estimates of policy effects are presented. Examination 
of this material shows that there is clearly no consensus regarding
the impact of incomes policy on wages since 1961. However, much 
of the conflict over estimates appears to be related to differences 
in the choice of policy periods and it is almost impossible to 
unravel this in order to compare policy estimates more accurately.
The conclusion from the empirical literature therefore appears to 
be, not that there is wide disagreement regarding the impact of 
incomes policy, but that there is wide disagreement regarding the 
choice of periods when policy operated. Even if there were greater 
accord regarding the choice of policy periods the lack of an 
attempt to distinguish between the relative strength of different 
policy periods would make any general conclusion about incomes policy 
at best unhelpful. The assumption that the decision to impose 
policy is independent of other variables in the system may not only 
bias estimates of policy but may imply implausible macroeconomic
outcomes
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Notes to Chapter 2
Though note that the logic of the real wage resistance 
framework implies that expected inflation is the correct 
concept since catch-up for past inflation is already 
incorporated in the real wage mechanism.
This procedure provides exactly equivalent coefficient 
estimates to combining (a) and (b). However, if the 
error terms in the policy "on" and policy "off" equations 
do not have the same variance the t-ratios of the 
coefficients will differ between the two approaches.
See Stewart and Wallis, 1981, pp.175-7.
For example, Henry and Ormerod (1978) omit certain periods 
when policy was felt, a priori, to be weak.
In the extreme case where each time period during which policy 
was in operation is allowed a dummy variable the model becomes 
equivalent to the policy "off" equation (but see note (2)).
It is because of the anticipation effect of controls that the 
U.K. Government has usually attempted to impose the more 
severe phases of policy without prior warning.
In some cases this shifting of settlements may be a deliberate 
act of policy when policy has either deferred settlements 
or allowed previously agreed settlements to be implemented 
at a later stage.
7. A very recent study .by Lawson (1982) uses a similar approach 
to that developed here, namely an attempt to quantify incomes 
policy by real wage pressure. Policy is still treated as 
exogenous however. Differences between the Lawson model and 
the model developed here are discussed in further chapters.
8. A policy which operated simultaneously on wages and prices 
might of course avoid this initial reduction in real wages 
but then this is equivalent to operating both a wage and 
prices policy. This thesis is concerned only with the former.
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9. If is not unity the wage equation has the property 
that real wage growth depends (negatively) on price 
inflation (Cbrrie, 1981).
10. The result whether inflation accelerates at a constant 
rate or at an accelerating rate depends critically on 
the parameter on the price inflation term in the wage 
equation (a.).
11. Most aggregate studies of incomes policy have ignored 
this expectational element. An exception is Sheriff 
(1977).
12. As noted earlier, the real wage resistance model already 
includes compensation for past price inflation.
13. e.g. Carlscn and Parkin (1975).
14. Sargan (1980) allows for endogeneity to policy dumnies
by using the estimation method of instrumental variables.
15. If w - a + 61 + G + e
is the wage equation where I is the policy variable 
and G represents other exogenous influences on wages 
and policy itself is determined by a relationship such 
as:
I “ w + z ♦ q
where z are other exogenous influences on I, the parameter S 
would be biased in a positive direction.
16. Particularly the Cambridge Economic Policy Group's model 
which uses a form of the real wage resistance equation.
17. Both studies find a significant statistical difference 
between the policy "off" and the policy "on" models.
18. However, he argues that the dependence on the asymptotic
approximation required by the presence of lagged endogenous 
variables; the possible presence of simultaneous equation 
bias and the lack of uniformity of income policy effects 
make the evidence for a significant effect inadequate.
19. Although Lawson accepts that policy was operative between
1972-4 he ignores the period in his formal analysis although 
a 'dummy' is incorporated for 1972 to reflect "non-systematic 
wage-push" factors .
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CHAPTER 3 THE GENERAL APPROACH
The previous chapter gave an account of the treatment of 
incomes policies in the empirical literature. From this account 
it was clear that some of the controversy over the effects of 
incomes policies upon wage inflation have resulted from inadequate 
measurement of the strength of incomes policy. There has also been 
little attempt to integrate incomes policy into the wage equation 
other than in an ad-hoc fashion or to formally treat incomes policy 
as an endogenous variable within the wage-price system. In the 
first part of this chapter a general approach is outlined which 
incorporates incomes policy into the wage model and which derives 
the pure policy-off wage model as a limiting case of this model 
and where policy reaction is explicitly incorporated. The model 
outlined requires the presence of a quantitative indicator of 
policy and this chapter describes how the"pressure!'approach can 
be used to develop such an indicator.
3.1 The model in outline
The basic approach assumes that there are two main sets of 
forces. The first comes from the Government in attempting to 
establish a restraining influence on wages. The second, and 
opposing force, comes from trade unions or workers in general in 
attempting to resist wage controls and to minimise the effect of 
controls on wage settlements. This resistance partly stems from 
the threat to the operation of 'free' collective bargaining but 
more importantly from the impact of wage controls on real wages.
The discussion of Chapters 4 and 5 reveals the extent and 
variation of trade union opposition to incomes policies in the
past. Thus union response can be seen as the extent to which they 
facilitate or hinder the force of controls emanating from the 
government.
Figure 3.1 Figure 3.2
Effective Controls The Supply of Nominal Controls
Let us assume first that the decision to impose a certain 
level of wage controls by policymakers is related to deteriorations 
in macroeconomic performance. This is shown in Figure 3.2 where the 
supply curve of wage controls (SS) is related positively to 
adverse economic developments (E). At point Eg, for example, the 
extent of controls is WNq , The slope of SS reveals the sensitivity 
of policy response to macroeconomic developments, a steeper slope 
representing a higher marginal response in terms of wage controls 
when economic circumstances worsen. Figure 3.2 therefore can be 
classed as the policy reaction and the form of the relationship SS 
is discussed fully in Chapter 7. WNQ is correctly interpreted as 
part of the ex-ante measure of controls, measuring as it does the
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authorities' desired strength of incomes policy. It may, of course 
be influenced by the current or expected outcome for wage 
inflation without controls. SS is drawn as a linear relationship 
for convenience but in fact there are strong reasons for 
prefering non-linear forms of relationship (see Chapter 7).
Figure 3.1 translates the desired level of controls by the 
authorities into the effective measure of controls via the net effect 
of government stringency and trade union resistance (function RR).
If RR is a 45° line then there is no net resistance to controls at 
the institutional level and the effective extent of controls is given 
by IPQ . If, however, trade union resistance dominates, then RR is 
steeper than 45° and the amount of effective controls is given by IP^, 
which is less than IPQ . If government stringency dominates RR will 
have a shallower slope than 45°. If RR is perfectly inelastic then 
the response to controls is the same whatever external conditions. 
Generally, however, the extent of net resistance to controls will 
be positively related to the magnitude of the authorities' desired 
strength of controls so that RR will have a positive slope. Unlike 
bilateral monopoly models (e.g. Johnston and Timbrali, 1973) it is 
assumed that government controls and trade union reactions are independent 
of one another. It must be admitted that this is a very restrictive 
assumption.
The measure IP is then the appropriate measure for the 
strength of incomes policy in the wage equation. It does not 
measure the final (ex-post) effectiveness of controls. The methods 
used in the empirical literature confuse ex-ante and ex-post 
effectiveness of policy. Because they are unable to measure the 
ex-ante effect of policy they are obliged to resort to often 
arbitary distinctions about the strength of incomes policy. They are 
therefore unable to correctly assess the effect of any given strength
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of incomes policy upon wage determinations. By incorporating as 
much a priori information into the estimation of the relationships 
SS and RR the appropriate parameter on the incomes policy variable 
in the wage equation measures the average degree of slippage 
between institutional controls and the actual outcome.
It is highly probable that many of the variables which 
determine the shape and positions of the RR and SS relationships are 
not quantifiable other than ordinally or by binary variables. In 
addition, some factors may only be measured subjectively. In 
the case of WN one of the main indicators is the nominal wage norm. 
This needs to be modified for general exceptions to the norm (such 
as provision for equal pay) and for exceptions in specific cases 
(for example, previously agreed settlements).
Factors influencing the net resistance function are likely 
to be more complex. One important element is the extent to which 
the norm is backed up by various enforcement mechanisms (for 
example, the same nominal wage norm was administered more severely 
during 1968-9 than 1969-70). Measures of the toughness of policy 
are therefore highly relevant. Toughness may be measured by 
voluntary/legislative indicators but clearly involves 
much more than this. In terms of union response, the 
movement may be more sympathetic to a Labour government 
than to a Conservative one. Institutional response may 
also be affected by the extent to which controls limit trade 
unions'; authority in determining wages under collective bargaining. 
Economic factors may also play their part however. The degree of 
acquiescence might be related to changes in the level of real 
earnings; the degree of pressure exerted on existing settlements 
by controls; and by current and expected developments of the economy.
particularly those relating to inflation and unemployment.
The nominal wage norm is one possible 
component of WN; However, the same value
of wage norm will have quite different implications for the 
pressure on wages if the underlying rate of inflation is 6ay 
4 per cent per annum or 14 per cent per annum. Certainly some 
scaling is required to produce a useful indicator of policy pressure 
and relating the wage norm to the rate of underlying wage inflation 
would be one way of achieving this. However, a more attractive 
proposition would be to determine the measure of incomes policy 
strength by its potential impact on real wages. From the 
discussion of incomes policy effects in Chapter 2, it emerged that 
in a world where prices are determined as a mark-up on costs of 
production and where this process is subject to lags, then any 
reduction in wage inflation following the imposition or increasing 
strength of controls will also reduce real wages in the short run.
Thus whilst it may not be the authorities' intention to reduce real 
wages in the medium term, any slowdown in wage inflation will produce 
at least a temporary reduction in real wages.^ The implication of 
this approach is that if the impact effect of incomes policy on real 
wages is greater than the continuous effect then the pressure of 
incomes policy is seen to decline throughout the policy. The 
traditional approach implicitly treats policy pressure as constant through­
out any chosen policy period. Thus the supply of controls 
by the authorities is given by:
s s
WNt - wi£ - pt_j (3.1)
where WN^ is the real wage pressure and
where wn( is the nominal wage norm (appropriately adjusted for
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exceptions) and is the rate of price inflation in the previous
period. One possible criticism of this measure of real wage pressure 
is that it implies equal pressure when trend real wages are 
growing relatively rapidly and when trend real wages are growing 
relatively slowly. An alternative measure of real wage pressure 
might therefore be:
WNt *  wnt - Pt_1 -( r.w/p) (3.2)
where (r.w/p j is a measure of trend real wages. Incorporation of the 
term in trend real wages raises questions regarding the incomes policy 
pressure variable and its relationship to the desired real wage 
growth in the real wage resistance equation. This issue is discussed 
later in this chapter when the specifications of the incomes policy variable 
in the wage equation are dealt with.
We can now write down an algebraic outline of the general 
model in equations (3.3) - (3.8 ):
W.Nt - f t  ( E it*5 (3.3)
WNt ■ wnfc - P f l (3. A)
WN“t ■ wnt - Pt-1 ) (3.5 )
IPt - (GPSt - TPSt).WNt (3.6)
IPt -  f 2 ( z . t> (3.7)
w  - f 3 ( x i t * IPt> (3.8 )
Equation (3.3) gives the form of government reaction to external 
developments ( E ^ ) f including price developments, and determines
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exceptions) and Pt_^ is the rate of price inflation in the previous 
period. One possible criticism of this measure of real wage pressure 
is that it implies equal pressure when trend real wages are 
growing relatively rapidly and when trend real wages are growing 
relatively slowly. An alternative measure of real wage pressure 
might therefore be:
WNt »  wnt - Pt_x - (  r.w/p) (3.2)
where (r.w/p j is a measure of trend real wages. Incorporation of the 
term in trend real wages raises questions regarding the incomes policy 
pressure variable and its relationship to the desired real wage 
growth in the real wage resistance equation. This issue is discussed 
later in this chapter when the specifications of the incomes policy variable 
in the wage equation are dealt with.
We can now write down an algebraic outline of the general
in equations(3.3) - (3.8 ):
WNt - fx (E.t.) (3.3)
""t " " t  “ Pt-1 (3.4)
wirt - wht - pt-1 - ( ¿ ^  ) (3.5 )
IPt - (GPSt - TPSt).WNt (3.6)
IPt " f2<Zit> (3.7)
« - f3<Xi f  IPt> (3.8 )
Equation (3.3) gives the form of government reaction to external 
developments (E^), including price developments, and determines
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the stance of policy (WNt) given by the pressure on real vage6.
Equation (3.6) translates the authorities' pressure on real 
wages into effective controls by incorporating government stringency 
(GPS) and trade unibn response (TPS). The construction of the 
measure of GPS is based on historical interpretation and GPS is therefore 
only measured as an ordinal index. GPS is determined by the form of 
policy (eg. voluntary/mandatory) and by the enthusiasm with which 
policy is pursued. Two alternative approaches to modelling
TPS are used. In the first ''TPS is defined by historical study in 
a similar way to GPS and is therefore only an ordinal index of 
resistance. The main criteria in deciding upon values for TPS are 
the form of policy (for example, the union leadership may be less 
antagonistic towards voluntary policies), the state of union 
militancy, the degree of pressure on controls and the general 
economic environment (for example, attitudes may be 
'softer* in economic crisis situations). The second option is to 
proxy the variable TPS by measures such as strikes and then 
formally explain this proxy by the same set of variables used to 
determine the unobservable TPS. This alternative does imply, however, 
a movement away from the institutional concept of TPS.
Finally, we have equation (3.8) which specifies the 
influence o'f the effective incomes policy measure (IP) in a model of wages.
Derivation of measures for GPS, TPS amd WN is 
explained in Chapters A and 5. Chapter A gives a general analysis 
of policy over the period and Chapter 5 deals with details of the 
construction of these variables. Application of equation (3.3) is
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discussed in Chapter 7 and applied empirically in Chapter 8 whilst 
the form of equation (3.8 ) which deals with the specification of ip 
within the wage equation is described in the remainder of this Chapter 
and is empirically applied in Chapter 6.
3.2 Specification of incomes policy within the wage equation
Most examples of modelling incomes policy in the empirical 
literature offer an ad-hoc approach. The model proposed by Reid 
(1979) however sets out a more general model where the policy"off" 
model becomes a special case of the general model.
The basis of the Reid model is as follows: 
the standard 'underlying' wage equation (which he takes as an augmented 
Phillips curve) is:
proposed by Reid the parameter k is used to give a measure of the 
effectiveness of policy so that if k ■ 1 then the wage equation
are completely ineffective, however, k ■ 0 and equation (3.10)
Si
collapses to the policy 'off* equation (3. 9).
It is possible to combine the 'on' and 'off' equations to give 
a general formulation of wages under controls as:
(3.9 )
and the behaviour of wages under controls is:
(3.10;
C • Kwhere is wage growth in periods of control and is the indicator 
of the strength of controls. In the model
*c **under control becomes a horizontal line at w£ ■ wfc. If controls
w® - aQ (l-k) ♦ a1(l-k)Ut ♦ a2(l-k)pt ♦ kw* ♦ (l-k)et (3.U)
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This equation now differs from the controls "off" equation (3.9 ) 
in that the incomes policy term appears with a coefficient k and 
the remaining variables have coefficients of (1-k) times their values 
under period when controls are absent. Reid measures the strength 
of policy by the wage norm and the distinction between policy "on" 
and "off" is therefore given by the presence or otherwise of a wage 
norm. Whilst the Reid model is a step forward in using a quantitative 
index of policy it still requires a choice to be made between policy 
"on"and policy "off" periods. For the reasons given in section 3.1 
the wage norm alone does not appear to be the best quantitative index 
of policy strength and the model is unable to distinguish between 
vigorously and weakly applied policies. One way out of the dilemma 
is to make (3.11) a general explanation of wage growth by replacing 
w£ by w £ and incorporating values for w £ for each period of history.
This involves calculating an implicit value for ex-ante policy 
effectiveness even when no explicit policy existed. In instances 
of genuine policy "off" periods wfc could be set by wfc_j (i.e. 
without any policy influence or variation in the other determinants 
of wage growth, wage inflation would be influenced solely by past 
rates of wage inflation)emphasising the comparability element in 
wage determination. In fact 'pure' policy "off" periods are rare so 
that this is not a critical assumption. As the policy ■
influence is measured in real terms (WN) the real wage pressure term will
collapse to lagged real wage inflation in the absence of a policy.
If we rewrite (3.11) in the form of the real wage resistance
'c ’model described in Chapter 2 and also replace w£ by w( we obtain:
wfc - a0(l-k) ♦ a1(l-k)Ot ♦ e2(l-k)^ t ♦ a3(l-k) <*%>*_! ♦ 
aA(l-k)T ♦ k(wnt -. pt-1) +nt (3.12)
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where r refers to the retention ratio and where a^ “ -X, the adjustment 
coefficient on lagged real wages. The parameter a^ » X6 where 6 reflects the 
desired long-run growth of real wages. With six coefficients to be 
estimated and with six structural parameters the equation is just 
identifiable.
One of the problems in modelling incomes policy is in 
drawing out implications of the 'effectiveness' of incomes policy 
in general and of the effects of specific phases of policy. Even 
if w  the policy measure is captured by real wage pressure then we would 
expect the parameter k to vary considerably during the period under 
consideration. Equation (3.12) should therefore be re-written as:
wt - bQ (l-kt) + b1(l-kt)Ut + b2 (l-kt)pt + b 3 (l-kt)(rw/p)t_ 1
+ b4 (l-kt)T- + k t (wnt- pt_ 1) + <l-kt)et (3.13)
Since wage inflation now depends non-linearly on the time profile 
of k (3.13) cannot be estimated directly treating k £ as unknown.
The earlier discussion implies however that factors such as 
government stringency and trade union reaction are useful proxies 
for k t.
We can write kt “ YIPSC (3.14)
where IPSt is a linear function of the measure of government stringency (GPS) 
and the measure of trade union reaction (TPS). The parameter y  can be interprete 
partly as a scaling factor but it also measures the significance 
of policy and its average effectiveness. Equation (3.13) can now
be written as:
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w fc - b0 (l-YlPSt) + b1(l-YlPSt)Ot ♦ b2 (l-yIPSt)pt
♦ b3(l-YlPSt)(r.w/p)t_1 + b4(l-rlPSt)T + YlPSt(OTt-^t_1) (3.15)
Ua now have six unknown parameters: y ,  b^b^, b2> b^, b^ and six 
coefficients to be estimated.
This model is estimated in Chapter 6 alongside the less general formula­
tion where the incomes policy variable (IPSt(wnt - pt_^))is merely included 
as an additional variable in the wage equation without the corresponding 
weighting of the other variables.
The restricted version of the wage model assumes that the 
observed response coefficients of the principal determinants 
of wage inflation vary systematically according to the strength of 
incomes policy. It is therefore quite closely related to the 
general class of variable parameter models. One alternative 
specification would be a switching regression model (Judge et al.,
1982) where distinct regimes apply at different parts of the 
sample. In the case in point the model could switch between 
policy "on" and policy "off", close to the spirit of the Reid (1979) 
formulation. Application of this approach would result in a 
generalised dummy variable treatment such as described earlier.
However, the fact that policy has been so pervasive means that this 
is not a practical proposition . An alternative version of the 
variable parameter model which is related more closely to the model 
outlined earlier is that of the more general systematically 
varying parameter model.
If we write ¡rt ■ 6{ t ■ 1 .... T
as the basic equation with
st - V  ♦ vt
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where Z is a k x m matrix , k. is the number o£ observations 
and m the number of variables. Z£ 'explains' the variation in 
Bt; y is an m  x 1 vector of coefficients and vfc is a vector of 
random disturbances.
Now yt - x£ 8t - x^ <ZtY ♦ vfc) - x^ Zfcy ♦ x^ vf - w^y + et
• i 'where w fc - xfc Z£ and et “ xfc vfc
If v satisfies the usual least squares assumptions the 
least squares estimator of y is best linear unbiased but if it 
has non-zero contemporaneous covariance between variables it is 
heteroslcedastic.
In Chapter 2 there was a discussion of how incomes policy 
might affect the structure of the wage equations. This discussion 
distinguished between the treatment of incomes policy where the 
values of the parameters varied under policy 'on' and where 
more general changes in the equation occurred. In particular 
we might classify the main routes for incomes policy as follows:
(a) changing the value of aQ (the dumsy shift approach)
(b) changing the coefficients on a. and a. (the dummy slope 
approach)
(c) through influencing the rate of adjustment of real 
wages to its target level (X)
(d) through changing the target level of the desired real wage
(e) by changing the state of price expectations
(f) by eliminating some of the variables in the equation and 
by introducing new variables
The formulation adopted here incorporates (a) - (d) through the 
general weighting system (k). The model chosen implies a
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common effect on all the coefficients but this is a product of the 
approach which specifies how the policy-on coefficients relate to 
those in the underlying equation. This is not accomplished by 
empirical estimates based on using dumny variables to "allow" for the 
effects of policy. Routes (d) and (e) are also incorporated through 
the parameter weighting since this is equivalent to a parameter change. 
The parameter effect is constant for all policies however whereas 
it is possible that different forms for policy might have different 
implications for real wage targets and for price expectations, 
depending, for example, on whether policy was expected to be 
permanent or temporary. Problems in allowing for these effects 
however reflect more on inadequacy of their general representation 
within the wage equation rather than in specifying their sensitivity 
to incomes policy. For example, desired real wages are usually 
taken to be a constant time path and price expectations proxied 
by past price inflation. There is some empirical evidence 
(e.g. Coutts et al., 1976, and Henry and Ormerod, 1978) 
that wage determination can be viewed more as a form of compensation 
behaviour than one based on future expectations. However, incomes 
policy can still play a role through shifting the pattern of 
settlements over time.
Finally, route (f) is accommodated via the inclusion of an 
additional term in .the real wage pressure and intensity of policy.
In one of the two alternative formulations of policy trend real 
wages are used. This raises the issue of the relationship of the 
policy variable to the general real wage trend embodied in the 
underlying equation via the time trend. If the latter really 
reflects some idea of a flexible target (as for example stressed
by Coutts et al., 1976) rather than the immutable target
as suggested by empirical implementation and if the target can be 
represented by a moving-average process the same term appears in 
the underlying equation and as part of the wage controls variable. 
Writing (3.12) in full with this substitution gives:
wt - aoa-k) + axCl-k)Ut + a2Cl-k)bt + a3(l-k) (IW/p)t_1
+ n t (3.16)
where ir ■ (r.w/p) - trend real wages
+ a^( l-k)ift + k IPS.t w^nt - * -1 " V
Collecting the last two terms and expressing a^ in structural terms 
we have:
X(l-k)ift
If IPSt is normalised to unity then the terms in irt become
*t
This chapter outlines ways in which information about incomes 
policies can be translated into an overall index. The main features 
of such a measure are the wage norm, the degree of government 'toughness' 
and trade union reaction. The final measure of incomes policy is 
set in terms of the pressure on reel wages since any incomes policy 
resulting in a slowdown in wage inflation is likely to reduce real 
wages at least in the short run.
The chapter sets out a general model of wages which includes 
a role for incomes policy and discusses the problems of drawing out 
the effectiveness of incomes policy in general against the affects 
of specific phases of policy. Two possible wage models are set out.
In one all Che parameters of Che standard real wage resistance 
equation vary with policy "toughness" whilst real wage pressure 
enters as a separate variable. In the other the coefficients 
are fixed but policy "toughness" and real wage pressure enter 
jointly as a separate variable.
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In one all the parameters of the standard real wage resistance 
equation vary with policy "toughness" whilst real wage pressure 
enters as a separate variable. In the other the coefficients 
are fixed but policy "toughness" and real wage pressure enter 
jointly as a separate variable.
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Notes to Chapter 3
1. Longer run effects will depend on both the parameters of 
the wage equation and the nature of any exchange rate 
adjustment, see the discussion in Chapter 2.
2. In addition, there is the problem of dynamic effects, 
see Chapter 2.
3. The empirical work described in Chapter 6 also uses a 
moving-average target for real wages.
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CHAPTER 4 POLICY ACTIONS AND THE GENERAL
MACROECONOMIC BACKGROUND
The first section of this chapter describes the general setting of 
macroeconomic policy and its economic background over the period in question. 
This provides a framework for Chapter 8 which deals with the 
endogeneity of policy. It also puts the varying role of incomes 
policy into a more general perspective. Decisions related to the 
strength and imposition of incomes policy are described in the 
following section of the chapter.
It is not intended to give a blow-by-blow 
account of policy actions over the period. Detailed descriptions 
of this sort are provided by Blackaby (ed., 1978) for the period 
up to 1974 whilst more politically oriented discussions are given 
in Stewart (1977) and Keegan and Pennant-Rea (1979) .
Table 4.1 sets out the main macroeconomic indicators over the 
period whilst Table 4.2 gives a summary of economic conditions and 
the general nature of policy response. Figure. 4.1 gives a graphical account 
of some of the main objectives of economic policy over the period.
4.1 Overall view
The 1960s were characterised by the search for new policy 
instruments as dissatisfaction grew about the UK's economic 
performance, and in particular the growth record. In retrospect 
the evidence from the 1960s makes it appear a much more satisfactory 
period when contrasted with the problems of the economy in the 
following decade. The unemployment rate averaged under 2 per cent 
(only a little higher than the lj per cent of the 1950s) whilst 
inflation and growth performance were comparable to the record of the 
previous decade (inflation averaged 4 per cent per annum and growth 
was a shade under 3 per cent per annum). The dissatisfaction at the 
time reflected more the fact that UK economic performance was
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Table 4.1 Macroeconomic Indicators 1959-79
Unemployment 
* thousands Inflation X p.a. Growth Z p.a. BalancePayments
1959 468 1.1 3.4 172
1960 368 3.3 4.6 -228
1961 339 4.2 3.6 47
1962 454 2.0 0.9 155
1963 539 3.2 4.1 125
1964 394 2.5 5.4 -358
1965 338 4.8 2.7 -30
1966 353 3.9 2.1 130
1967 547 2.4 2.6 -269
1968 574 4.8 4.5 -244
1969 566 5.4 1.7 505
1970 602 6.3 2.0 823
1971 776 9.4 2.5 1,124
1972 855 7.3 1.3 247
1973 611 9.1 7.7 -981
1974 600 16.0 -0.8 -3,273
1975 929 24.2 -0.5 -1,521
1976 1,274 16.5 3.7 -881
1977 1,378 15.9 1.3 -41
1978 1,376 8.3 2.6 939
1979 1,307 13.4 1.1 -863
Mote«:
Unemployment: wholly unemployed, excluding school-leevere. 
Infletion: Index of retail price«
Growth: GDP, expenditure meeeure 
Balance of payment!: currant account.
Source:
Economic Trend« Annuel Supplement
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relatively weak and that many other Western economies could 
demonstrate superior performance. Criticism of 'stop-go' demand- 
management policy where expansion was regularly halted by balance of 
payments crises was given strength by the evidence of the study by 
Dow (1964). He argued however, that although a steadier demand 
policy would have smoothed over some of the fluctuations in output 
and the balance of payments, the balance of payments constituted a 
major obstacle to sustained economic growth.
Dissatisfaction centred on the application of policy as the 
main cause of poor growth, despite Dow's conclusions that a steadier 
demand management policy would not have resulted in an appreciably 
superior performance on average. Policy-makers in the early 1960s 
seemed to be arriving at the conclusion that fiscal policy could 
not produce satisfactory growth without an unmanageable balance of payments 
position or without unacceptable inflationary results. The work of 
Phillips (1958) and Paish: (1962) leant support towards the idea of 
a trade-off between inflation and unemployment (eventually to be 
christened the Phillips curve) and Paish concluded that a rate of 
unemployment of per cent was required for price stability. One of the 
problems of policy therefore was to shift the. Phillips curve in order to make 
this trade-off more appealing to sustained rapid economic growth 
and this obviously required new instruments. By improving UK 
international competitiveness at all levels of output such a shift 
would help the balance of payments and aid the possibility of export-led 
growth policy supported by Beckerman (1966) and Kaldor (1966). The role of 
monetary policy was limited in the early 1960s by the influence of 
the Radcliffe Committee(H.M.Treasury, 1959) and by the need to maintain 
a fixed parity for sterling so that the main instruments of monetary 
policy used alongside interest rates were hire purchase controls, 
special deposits and bank lending requests.
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Figure 4.1 Price and Wage Inflation, Unemployment and
Real Wage8
(i) Price inflation (ii) Wage inflation
Note: (a) Defined as wages tines retention ratio divided by price level.
For definition of variables see Appendix B. Unemployment and 
real wages are seasonally unadjusted.

Notes:
(a) Abbreviations are as follows:
SD Special Deposits
BR Bank rate
PE Public Expenditure
HP Hire purchase
IT Indirect taxes
IP Incomes Policy (commencement of series of phases)
BL Bank lending constraint
DT Direct taxation
DEV Devaluation
IMP Import restrictions
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The search for new policy instruments led to the introduction 
of several institutional and planning devices. In 1961 the National 
Incomes Commission was set up to help with the inflation problem. 1964 saw 
the formation of a new government department, the DAE, which was charged 
with promoting economic growth. The DAE produced the 'National Plan' 
designed to accelerate the growth rate of the economy. Early in 1965 the 
Labour Government set up the National Board for Prices and Incomes (NBPI) 
as a successor to the National Incomes Commission (NIC).
In 1962-63 the Conservative government made a dash for growth, 
which was halted by a large balance of payments deficit in 1964.
Towards the end of 1964 the Labour Government was elected and inherited 
not only this large deficit but also accelerating inflation with the 
rate of inflation some 4} per cent per annum by the last quarter of 1964.
The Labour government intended to operate a long-term plan using the 
National Plan and a voluntary incomes policy (the Statement of Intent 
signed by the Government, TUC and CBI) to accelerate growth without 
the attendant balance of payments crises and inflation problems whilst 
refusing to lower the exchange rate. As an additional instrument the 
Government imposed an import surcharge of 15 per cent on manufactured 
goods in October 1964.
Although the current account of the balance of payments showed 
some improvement in 1965 and 1966 capital movements continued to be 
very adverse and the Government was forced to adopt short-term restrictive 
measures on demand to prevent the problem of the balance of payments 
escalating. Meanwhile, inflation remained high and output growth was 
slowing. In 1966 following the seamen's strike, the government was forced 
to bring in a very restrictive Budget and to introduce a six-month 
standstill on wages with statutory backing. This was followed
by further periods of severe restraint but with some allowance for pay 
increases. Although inflation did slow down in 1967 to around 2 per cent
per annum unemployment was rising strongly and passed the 4 million 
mark early in the year. Capital movements continued to be extremely 
adverse however, and at the end of 1967 the Government was eventually forced 
to devalue the pound. This effectively brought to an end the National 
Plan and thus the main role of the DAE and the period after 1967 was 
devoted to an attempt to ensure that devaluation worked. Policy was 
accordingly very restrictive as both fiscal and monetary instruments 
were operated in tandem and in 1968 the import deposit scheme was 
introduced in order to ameliorate some of the adverse J-curve effect of 
devaluation on the balance of payments (whereby the balance of payments 
initially deteriorates following a devaluation as trade volumes 
respond with a lag to the change in trade prices). Any unemployment 
target the Government might have had was therefore abandoned and the 
level of unemployment remained well above 550 thousand between 1967 and 
1969 (and was destined never to fall back to this level again).
The balance of payments improvement after devaluation proved 
to be a long time in coming and the current account did not move into 
surplus until the beginning of 1969. In addition, speculative pressures 
in sterling continued so that there was a substantial capital outflow 
in 1968. However, when the improvement in the current account did 
occur it was quite dramatic and in 1969 as a whole the current account 
surplus was £505 million, compared with the deficit of £244 million in 
1968.
Some easing of incomes policy stance occurred after devaluation 
with increases of up to 3) per cent per annum allowed. However, this 
placed great strain on the policy as the effects of devaluation fed 
through to prices and although the inflation rate had fallen to under 
21 per cent for 1967 as a whole, it accelerated to around 5 per cent in 
1968 and in 1969. In 1969 the Government's commitment to the incomes 
policy faltered as it strove to gain support for its industrial
relations legislationCIn Place of Strife’) and in the Budget of 1969 
the Government announced that it would not be seeking to renew its 
powers over prices and incomes when they expired at the end of the year.
The improvement in the balance of payments continued into 
1970 although the rate of inflation and the level of unemployment 
were rising together by then. Mid-1970 saw the election of a new 
Conservative Government pledged to operate through market forces and 
determined to limit the scale of any intervention. The revival of 
the now discredited Phillips curve by Hilton Friedman (1968) which now 
became known as the 'augmented Phillips curve' provided a means by which 
the Conservative Government hoped to curb inflationary tendencies.
It was accepted that this would require some abandonment of a low 
unemployment target, at least in the short term.
The NBPI was abolished by the new Government but the search 
to improve economic performance by institutional reforms continued with 
the introduction of changes to the banking and financial sectors 
through the new competition and credit control arrangements. This 
showed new interest in the money stock as such and followed the domestic 
credit expansion (DCE) target set in 1968 leading to the move away 
from traditional devices such as hire purchase controls (abolished in 
1971) and restraints on bank lending. A more thorough review of the 
changes in monetary policy implied by the new arrangements and their 
effects is given by Tew and by Artis in Blackaby (ed., 1978).
The Phillips curve approach towards limiting inflation proved 
to have little success in 1970 and 1971 however, and the rate of 
price inflation continued to accelerate whilst unemplojment levels 
rose. This led to measures specifically designed to combat inflation
and the CBI agreed to operate a form of price restraint whilst the 
nationalised industries held>'their prices down with the help of
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subsidy finance from Che Government. The Government also started to 
operate directly on wages by applying the 'n-1' policy to the public 
sector whereby each public sector pay award was intended to be 1 per cent 
lower than the preceding one. Whilst the rate of inflation did show 
signs of abating in early 1972, the level of wholly unemployed had 
exceeded 900 thousand (and the crude unadjusted level of unemployment 
1 million) and the Government changed its priorities away from inflation 
towards reducing unemployment. The dash for growth began in 1972 
against a background of a balance of payments surplus and in June 1972 
the exchange rate was floated. The decision to float the exchange rate 
was largely influenced by the breakdown of the Bretton Woods international 
system but it was also seen as an attractive development by the 
authorities since it was hoped that it would prevent continued 
expansion from being prematurely halted by a balance of payments 
problem (with the implication that a lower exchange rate would be 
beneficial for output and employment). The dollar exchange rate did 
in fact fall by nearly 10 per cent between the second and last quarters 
of 1972 and the current account surplus was rapidly transformed into 
deficit. This also reflected the very expansionary Budget of spring 
1972 where the Chancellor openly stated his intention of ensuring a growth 
rate of 5 per cent (or more) between the second half of 1971 and the 
first half of 1973. This growth rate was actually achieved and the 
level of unemployment was reduced to under 600 thousand. However 
following a failure to achieve an agreement on a voluntary incomes 
policy in the summer of 1972 the Heath government announced a 90-day 
standstill on wages and prices to begin in November 1972 (later to be extended 
by a further 60 days). This was followed by two further stages of the 
policy which allowed for some increases in wages. In the final stage 
of the policy (Stage 3) an allowance was made to index wages to the 
cost-of-living index after a certain point (the 'threshold' arrangement).
New institutions to monitor pay policy were also set up, the Fay Board 
and the Prices Comnission. Unfortunately Stage 3 coincided with 
both a falling exchange rate and an explosion in world commodity 
prices so that the rate of inflation accelerated to over 10 per cent per 
annum by the end of 1973. Late 1973 also saw a curtailment of OPEC 
oil supplies and a dramatic increase in the price of oil. This brought 
growth in the world economy to an abrupt halt as the non-OPEC world 
sought to ease the inflation effects of the oil price rise and to 
deal with the resultant enormous balance of payments deficit. The 
Government was forced to bring in a restrictive Budget in late 1973 
but then a conflict with the miners in early 1974 over their pay award 
led to the introduction of a 3-day working week and eventually to a 
general election, at which the Government was defeated and the Labour 
Party returned to power.
The new Government allowed the threshold provisions of the 
Stage 3 pay policy to continue to operate but otherwise abandoned 
the operation of the policy. They also eventually removed the Pay 
Board replacing it with a voluntary arrangement with the TUC 
(the’Social Contract'). The basis of this Social Contract 
was compensation for increases in the cost-of-living but it was not 
clear whether this was intended to apply to past increases or expected 
future increases. Usually the most favourable interpretation was adopted. 
Fiscal policy was restrictive and the world economy was in deep recession 
with the result that unemployment rose sharply in tha first half of 
1975. The rate of inflation was at an unprecedented high level (24 per 
cent in the second quarter) and the current account deficit in the first 
half of 1975 was nearly E800m (the deficit for the whole of 1974 wee over 
£3 billion). However, there was a substantial inflow of capital to 
that the fall in the exchange rate was only modest. The level of output 
was falling and 1974 and 1975 were the first years to record an
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overall decline in GDP in the post-war period. The Government then
introduced a voluntary but more rigidly defined incomes policy in
August 1975 and this was followed by further annual phases of policy
in 1976 and 1977. In an attempt to stimulate growth the exchange
rate was 'talked down' in 1976 but the consequent slide in sterling
was much greater than the authorities had intended and they were
forced to obtain assistance from the IMF in order to support the pound.
The conditions of this loan were fiscal and monetary restraint and this
led to the introduction of monetary targets. The Government itself,
whilst prepared to aim at these targets, principally by slowing
down the rise in public expenditure, did not appear to accept the
monetarist view of the economy that they implied. Indeed, Dennis
Healey, the Chancellor, appeared to have adopted a cost-push view of
wage inflation and to have accepted the real-wage resistance
hypothesis as the basis for policy since he attempted to trade off
wage inflation for reductions in taxation. However 1976 did see the
year of anti-reflationary doctrine and this is best illustrated by
a quote from James Callaghan, the Prime Minister, who stated:
'We used to think that you could spend your way out 
of a recession, and increase employment by cutting 
taxes and boosting Government spending. I tell you 
in all candour that this option no longer exists, and 
that insofar as it ever did exist, it only worked by 
injecting a bigger dose of inflation into the economy, 
followed by a higher level of unemployment as the next 
step.'
J. Callaghan, Labour Party Conference, 28 September 1976.
With the end of the threshold effects on wages and the impact 
of the new incomespolicy the rate of inflation did slow down after 1975 
and was down into single figures in 1978. However, this was at the 
cost of a steady rise in the level of unemployment to around lj million.
The election of the Conservative Government under Mrs. Thatcher 
in May 1979 saw a radical shift in approach yat again. Policy making
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was to place more emphasis on monetary considerations for 
sterling M3 the centre-piece of economic strategy. The declared 
intention of the Government was to restrain inflation and the level 
of unemployment became again a secondary issue. The stress on the 
market approach to the economy left no role for incomes policy and 
emphasis was to be placed on stimulating the supply-side of the 
economy by reducing direct taxation. An even more radical change 
in view was that relating to exchange rate policy. A rising exchange 
rate was now seen as virtuous for its effects on inflation(and the 
exchange rate rose by 7 per cent in 1979) whereas the prevailing view 
in the early 1970s had been that a falling exchange rate was the most 
attractive option because of its benefit to output and employment.
This change of view was very much related to the interpretation of the 
empirical evidence to suggest that there was no long-run trade-off 
between unemployment and inflation. The new Government was also 
attracted by the rational expectations revolution, and such was this 
attachment to monetarist thinking that they were prepared to increase the 
rate of VAT and to allow the Clegg Commission awards on public pay to be 
fulfilled. In the event inflation accelerated again, partly due to the 
VAT influence and partly due to a further strong rise in world 
comnodity prices, especially oil.
4.2 Conduct of policy and the use of policy instruments
Throughout the 1960s and the early 1970s fiscal policy was 
used extensively to alternatively expand or restrict the level 
of economic activity. Monetary policy became more ascendent in 
the middle to late 1970s when the main policy instruments used 
were the PSBR and interest rates. Earlier the main weapons of 
monetary policy had been interest rates (mainly short rates) 
and measures such as special deposits, restraints on bank lending
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and hire purchase controls. The change in emphasis towards
monetary targets in the mid-1970s diminished the role for these
measures and relegated fiscal policy to be subservient to
monetary policy instead of being relevant in its own right. Although
the changes in the operation of the monetary system, introduced in
1971 (Competition and Credit Control), were intended to remove controls
and to emphasise competition and market forces policy since 1971
was far from non-discriminatory and advances requests and hire purchase
controls were re-introduced. In addition, a new control, supplementary
special deposits (known as the ’'corset') were introduced and not
abandoned until 1980.
It is extremely difficult to choose an appropriate indicator 
of the tightness or otherwise of monetary policy (the so-called 
indicator problem, see Artis, 1978) and the assessment of policy made 
in Table 4.2 is a fairly sutgective interpretation based on the 
movements in the main instruments of monetary policy.
Estimating the strength of fiscal policy is in some ways 
more straightforward but there are still problems. For example, the 
size of the public sector borrowing requirement reflects the 
cyclical position of the economy as well as policy measures and for 
this reason the full-employment, or cyclically-adjusted, financial 
surplus/deficit is often used. This measure has been occasionally 
produced by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research and 
is described in Price (1978). However, it does depend critically 
on the assumptions made regarding the "full employment" level of 
unemployment, the growth of productive potential and the elasticities 
of tax receipts with respect to income. In fact the estimates 
available do have a break in them around 1973 when the full employment 
level of unemployment was revised upwards, and the rate of growth 
of productive potential revised down (see Table 4.3). However, the
Table 4.3 Monetary and Fiacal Policy 1960-79
Fiscal Policy Monetary Policy Bank rate Bank lendingWeighted full-employment Hire purchase special no. of maximumbudget surplus - Z of GDP index deposits changes change
1960 -7.33 23.3 1,1 up x 2 
down x 2 1 -1961 -6.75 22.2 1 up X 1 
down x 2 2 1.01962 -6.11 22.2 -l.-l.-l down x 3 1 1.25
1963 -7.87 22.2 down x 1 1 -
1964 -8.00 22.2 up x 2 2 -
1965 -6.53 25.7 1 down x 1 1 1.0
1966 -6.67 35.2 1 up x 1 1 1.75
1967 -7.02 35.8 down x 3 
up x 3 1) 1.251968 -4.27 36.9 down x 2 l 1.5
1969 -1.58 42.5 up X 1 1 2.0
1970 -2.52 M.S J.l down x 2 1 1.25
1971 -3.61 21.25 -3} down x 2 1 0.5
1972 -5.23 1.2 down x 1 up x 3 1 -1973 -6.30 -9.3* 1,1 down x 7 up x 3 4 0.251974 -10.4* 36.1 -1,-1, down x 6 1 1.0
1975 -9.0* 36.1 down x 10 
up x 3 1 0.251976 -7.7* 36.1 down x 6 
up x 3
2
1977 -5.8* 36.1 down x 19 1 1.0
1978 -5.8* 36.1 -1J,-1,-1,1,1 down x 1 
up x 5 21 1.01979 -5.1* 36.1 “2,-1,2,-11, down x 2 3 -
1.1 up x 3
Note«: Weighted full employment budget surplus:
Source: Blackaby (1978) end Nil* (reb.1930)
Figurât to 1973 aaauae full employment ie at 1960 level and that productive potantial grove at 3.2Z p.a. 
Figurât narked * aasune full employment it at 1973 level and that productive potantial grove at 2)Z p.a. 
All eetímate» are for financial yeara.
Hire purchaee inde» : h ■ d ♦ (100-d)/a where d • deposit rate and a - repayment period in months.Both aeaauree are for cara.
Special deposite: rata of call
Bank rate: number of changes with direction and maximum sign of change
Banklendlngi Index of restriction, sarò » nona, 1 • aild, 2 ■ severe, taken from Blackaby (197fl)p.262
pattern of change, apart from at such break points, is still 
useful. An additional refinement to this measure of fiscal stance 
is the weighted full-employment financial surplus where items are 
given weights reflecting their demand content so that changes in 
public current expenditure on goods and services, for example, have 
a greater effect than capital transfers. (See Artis, 1972 and Price, 
1978.) This is the measure adopted in Table 4.3.
Fiscal changes over the period were not concentrated in the 
annual Budgets and the experience of the 1960s and early 1970s was 
one of frequent and large discretionary changes with substantial 
policy actions taken between Budgets and although fiscal policy 
became less active in the late 1970s the trend towards more frequent 
adjustments to taxes and public expenditure plans was continued 
(see Table 4.2). The main fiscal instruments used were
income tax rates and allowances, indirect tax rates, and changes in 
public expenditure. Changes in company taxation and in investment 
incentives were also used but customarily without any great expectations 
as to their impact. To assess the impact of changes in tax allowances 
it is necessary to make some adjustment for fiscal drag 
(i.e. the tendency of the real value of the allowance to change with 
inflation). Adjusted figures are shown in Table 4.4. Similar 
considerations apply to specific duties such as those on drink,a 
tobacco and petrol and probably the most comprehensive measure of the 
overall indirect tax burden is the overall indirect tax rate 
(less subsidies) as a percentage of GDP. This is also shown in 
Table 4.4 alongside estimates of personal taxation which allow for 
discretionary changes. It is much more difficult to distinguish 
the impact of changes in policy towards public expenditure. In the 
first place changes in policy usually refer to changes in future
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(i.e. the tendency of the real value of the allowance to change with 
inflation). Adjusted figures are shown in Table 4.4. Similar 
considerations apply to specific duties such as those on drink,a 
tobacco and petrol and probably the most comprehensive measure of the 
overall indirect tax burden is the overall indirect tax rate 
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discretionary changes. It is much more difficult to distinguish 
the impact of changes in policy towards public expenditure. In the 
first place changes in policy usually refer to changes in future
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plana, and in the second place there is often a wide divergence 
between intentions and the actual outcome (see Price, 1978). Actual 
out-turns for public current expenditure are given in Table 4.4 
and from this it is evident that, whether intended or not, public 
current expenditure was expansionary in 1961 and 1962, 1967, 1971-73, 
and 1975 and contractionary in 1963-64, 1968-70, and 1976-77.
Major policy instruments other than fiscal, monetary and 
incomes policy used over the period include import restrictions 
(the import surcharge of 1964, the deposit scheme of 1968), and 
devaluation in 1967. The selective employment scheme (SET) was 
introduced in 1966 and abolished in 1971.
Specific institutional changes, other than those associated 
with prices and income policy were the formation of the DAE in 1964, 
the change to new methods of monetary control (Competition and 
Credit Control) in 1971, the floating of the exchange rate in 1972 
and joining the EEC in 1977. Other changes of note were the 
introduction of the unified income tax system in 1973 and the change 
from purchase tax to value-added tax also in 1973.
The conclusion regarding policy in Blackaby (ed. 1978) is that 
for long periods economic policy followed the principle of one 
thing at a time and one idea at a time and that policy decisions 
were often reactions to circumstances with particular issues 
dominant at certain times. Keegan and Pennant-Rea (1979) emphasise 
a cycle of influence in economic policy beginning with the election 
of a new government. In the early stages they see political 
influences as most powerful as political parties attempt to apply 
their manifesto aims. Gradually, however, the official party 
machine gains more influence but a final stage is often the influence 
of financial markets and outside bodies (eg. IMF) as various crises 
emerge. Wass (1978) in turn concentrated on the growing uncertainty
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over the period and especially the uncertainty with regard to 
policy trade-offs.
Whilst some of these conclusions do appear to fit the 
history of macro-economic policy in the last twenty years they 
do not rule out the possibility that policy-making has been 
systematic and in Chapter 8 ways of reconciling these conclusions 
with a quantitative explanation of policy are given.
4.3 Description of Incomes policy 1961-79 
The Pay Pause
1961 saw the introduction of the 'pay pause' 
by the Conservative Government (July 25). It introduced a 
basic framework which lasted until 1970 and was then re-established 
in 1973. This framework consisted on a wage 'norm'; a set of 
criteria on which to judge claims and deviations from the norm; 
and an independent body to review the claims. No new institutions 
were set up in fact at this time, instead the Government relied on 
the existing Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes (which was 
a 3-man body) to review changes in prices, productivity and incomes.
They had no powers and did not report on specific cases, having a 
mainly educational role. The Government proposed a zero norm for 
pay with no exceptions. There were no powers to enforce the powers 
and the proposal met with trade union opposition. The main emphasis 
of policy in practice was through the Government itself in its role 
as public sector employer. Existing commitments were honoured in the 
public sector but new claims were delayed 'until circumstances 
permitted'.
A civil service pay increase was delayed for seven months but by May 1961 
printing workers had achieved a settlement of 5J per cent plus a
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40-hour week showing Chat the private sector was not following 
the example of the public sector and in June teachers were granted 
a 15 per cent increase to become effective in January 1962. In 
November the Electricity Council broke the guidelines of the 
pay pause.
Guiding Light
In February 1962 a new White Paper (Cmnd.1626) - ''Incomes 
Policy: The Next Step' - changed the policy from 'pay pause' to 
'guiding light' with a consequent change in norm from zero to 
2-2J per cent per annum. Now exceptional increases in productivity 
were allowed to result in increases above the norm. Low pay, labour 
shortage and the restoration of differentials were additional reasons 
why pay settlements might be allowed to exceed the norm. The pay 
pause itself ended in March. After the teachers' award and up to the 
end of the pause other settlements in the public sector were 
moderate but outside the zero norm. Railway workers, the miners 
and lower-paid university workers were all granted increases of 
around 3 per cent as were the electricians in April and local 
authority workers and busmen in May. Thus the early stages of the 
guiding light saw no noticeable change in the pace of pay 
settlements in the public sector. The private sector continued 
to experience higher settlements and bank workers, for example, 
received an award of between 5 and 8 per cent in April.
Pressure was put on several wage councils in April 1962 
to reconsider their awards but they refused to lower them. The 
increase in wage settlements gained some pace in June when non­
industrial civil servants were awarded a 4 per cent increase, 
this was followed by a comparable settlement to Post Office workers. 
After August the pace accelerated again in the public sector with 
7} per cant given to nurses in September (backdated to April)
and 6 per cent to railway workers, Post Office engineering workers and 
the police in November. This brought the public sector -closer into 
line with the increases being granted in the private sector where tanker 
drivers, for example, had received 5j per cent in September.
In November 1962 the National Incomes Commission was 
established. This had no substantive powers and it was opposed by 
the TUC and received no co-operation from any trade union. Its 
terms of reference were to review pay where the cost was met from 
the Exchequer or to examine retrospectively private or public sector 
settlements referred to it by the Government. It took one reference 
under the first criteria and three under the second. In all it 
produced five reports on the four references. The norm for settlements 
remained at 2-2} per cent with the exceptions identical to those 
outlined in Cmnd.1626. In February it was announced that the norm 
of 2-2J per cent for pay would last for at least one year and in April 
a new norm of 3—3J per cent was set for the period after October 1963. The 
NIC considered the national agreements in 1963 of engineering and 
shipbuilding workers (who received an increase of up to 10 per cent); 
Scottish builders; heating,ventilating and domestic engineers. It 
condemned these cases but acquitted the Scottish plumbers' agreement.
It also recommended salary increases well above the norm (10 per cent) 
for university academic staff - an award described by Clegg (1971) 
as the most generous that they have (sic) ever received. There were 
no further major innovations in incomes policy in 1963 although the 
TUC General Council reports did note the "need for policies to ensure 
that money incomes, wages, salaries, profits as a whole rose substantially 
lass rapidly than in the past". It also passed 
a motion in council, however, which declared complete opposition to 
any form of wage restraint. The magnitude of settlements in 1963 was
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of the order of 4 - 5 per cent, well above the norm with 5 per cent 
becoming the going rate towards the end of the year. There were 
marked divergencies between the pace of private and public sector 
wage increases.
Moves towards a permanent voluntary policy - the Declaration of Intent
Pay settlements accelerated a little further in the first 
half of 1964 and average earnings were growing by some 6J per cent per 
annum. In June a Court of Inquiry recommended increases for 
electricity supply manual workers of between 5-12} per cent. Following 
this busmen and post office workers were granted rises well above 
the guiding light. The TUC had moved a little towards acceptance of 
incomes policy in general but not with any attempted imposition of 
policy which had as an aim, restraint of wages and salary 
increases. In October the Labour Party came to power already committed 
to an incomes policy. In December they issued a 'Declaration of 
Intent' which indicated their aims and which had support from the CBI and 
TUC . Among these aims were the need to keep under review the 
general movement of prices and of money incomes and to examine 
particular cases in order to define whether or not the behaviour 
of prices or wages, salaries or other money incomes was in the 
national interest as defined by the Government in consultation with 
management and unions.
In Table 5.5 we can see that the increase in wages over 
the 'guiding light' period was between 4 and 6 per cent per annum 
depending on the precise measure adopted. There is some indication 
of wage drift with earnings rising more rapidly than basic rates.
In February 1965 the Government proposed the establishment of a 
National Board for Prices and Incomes (Cmnd.2577 -'Machinery of 
Prices and Incomes Policy')and this became operational in April 1965
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and it received its first three references in May. A White Paper in 
April (Cmnd.2639 -'Prices and Incomes Policy' )set out the basic 
policy. There was to be a norm of 3-3i per cent (as under the 
guiding light). Three main exceptions to this norm were allowable 
productivity, redistribution of manpower and low pay. These 
exceptions were to remain until the disbandment of the Board in 1970.
The provision of the productivity exception was to promote 
incentives for improved efficiency with the aim of increasing the 
rate of economic growth. The definition adopted was that exceptional 
productivity was'where the employees concerned, for example, by 
accepting more exacting work or a major change in working practices, 
make a direct contribution towards increasing productivity in a 
particular firm or industry. Even in such cases some of the benefit 
should accrue to the community as a whole in the form of lower 
prices'. In practice the productivity exemption was used increasingly 
over the period to 1970 and was often used by the Board to prevent 
over-reliance on the other two criteria. The second criterion was 
labour shortage 'where it is essential in the national interest to 
secure a change in the distribution of manpower (or to prevent a 
change that would otherwise take place and a pay increase would be 
both necessary and effective for this purpose.' This was not used much 
by the NBPI since it raised too many problems of comparability . There 
was also a danger with the low pay criterion ('where the pay of certain 
groups of workers has fallen seriously out of line with the level for 
similar work') especially as there was no clear definition of what 
constituted low pay. The TUC however who endorsed the establishment 
of the NBPI attempted to use the policy much more effectively to the 
benefit of the low paid and in 1967 the TUC general committee introduced 
its own criteria for low pay which included a clear definition of a
move to a minimum rate of £15 per week.
The background to policy was an assumption of stable prices if 
the norm was adhered to. Therefore there were no additional measures 
on prices, only that prices were not to be raised unless productivity 
could not be increased sufficiently to prevent an increase in prices 
or unavoidable increases in non-labour or capital costs. The NBPI 
itself had no powers and had merely an advisory role on the cases 
referred to it, relating to the prices charged for goods; claims, 
settlements, questions relating to pay or other conditions of service or 
employment and questions relating to other money incomes. It became 
clear very soon that many wage and price increases were not according to 
the criteria and so in October 1965 the Government arranged for a 
voluntary "early-warning" system for reporting significant increases 
to the Board. The Board could now impose delays until after it had 
reported, usually between 2 - 3  months. This was finalised in November 
(Cmnd.2808) - 'Prices and Incomes Policy - An Early Warning System').
The TUC and CBI co-operated voluntarily in the early-warning system and 
the TUC agreed to vet claims itself. The Government had earlier 
announced that it would seek statutory powers to enforce the proposals 
although in the end it took no powers.
At the same time the National Plan was announced and the 
incomes policy was seen as an integrated part of this plan. The 
clear intention was that incomes policy would remain as a permanent 
device and that it would be voluntary.
The move to a statutory policy - the 1966 freeze
Wage pressure was mounting however with earnings increasing by 
6J per cent in the second half of 1965 and by 7j per cent in the 
first half of 1966 and with speculative pressures on sterling 
accumulating the Government ended the voluntary phase of incomes policy 
in July with the introduction of the Prices and Incomes Act (Cmnd.3073 - 
'Prices and Incomes Standstill') which gave the Government the power 
to delay pay or price increases.
Under the statutory powers of the 1966 Prices and Incomes Act 
the Government had the power to delay wage Increases by 1 month and 
if the settlement were referred to the NBPI the increase could not 
be implemented until after the report was published. The policy 
allowed for genuine promotion and increments and allowed existing 
commitments to be honoured after a delay of six months. Otherwise 
no new agreements were permitted before January 1967 so that the 
policy was in effect a freeze from July to December 1966. The 
compulsory standstill was backed by Part IV of the Act. The 
Government was forced to activate statutory powers at the end of 
September by ASSET but only seven standstill orders were made up to 
January 1967 covering only 36,000 workers. The general council of 
the TUC reluctantly acquiesced in the policy and the annual Congress 
accepted the freeze by a majority of 4.9 to 3.8 million. The freeze did 
not reduce wage inflation to zero but it did produce a substantial 
slow-down.
Pay Policy after the 1966 Freeze
The six-month freeze was followed by a period of severe restraint 
for the following six months. This was enacted in Cmnd.3150 -'Prices 
and Incomes Standstill: Period of Severe Restraint'. The severe 
restraint applied to increases in pay and reductions in hours but not 
to other conditions of service except where these were likely to add 
significantly to labour costs. This period of severe restraint still 
had a zero norm but now increases deferred during the freeze could 
be implemented. Several substantial increases were made during 
this period notably to civil servants (backdated to July 1965), firemen 
and probation officers.
The role of the NBPI had now changed. The Government powers 
were now conditional on an adverse NBPI report although they were 
not obliged to act on it. However, not all proposed settlements
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were referred to the NBFI. In particular the Devlin agreement in 
1967 which allowed a modernisation payment of 5p an hour to dock 
workers was allowed through by the Government with no reference 
to the NBFI. After the London and Liverpool dock strike this 
payment was increased to lOp an hour. The NBPI could also only 
deal with about 30 references a year so that it was not possible 
for it to conduct a comprehensive review of wage settlements.
Under the phase of severe restraint between January and July 1967 
a zero norm was maintained but the original criteria under the 
pre-standstill policy were resumed. Controls were essentially 
voluntary and consisted of powers to delay settlements. There 
was a 30 day standstill whilst the Government examined claims.
They could then order a further delay of up to 3 months if the claim 
was referred to the NBPI. At the end of the 3 months the Government 
could impose a further delay of 3 months if suggested by the NBPI, 
giving a total potential delay of seven months. The policy stipulated 
a 12 month interval between settlements but it was intended to 
allow Part IV of the Prices and Incomes Act to lapse in August 1967.
The TUC resumed its vetting system in this phase of policy 
but it was hostile to the NBPI guidelines on productivity and recommended 
a 7 per cent wage norm for its own vetting purposes. The TUC was becoming more 
dissatisfied with policy however and the annual Congress passed a set 
of critical motions calling for repeal of the 1966 Prices and Incomes 
Act. In the following phase between July 1967 and March 1968 the 
zero norm was retained but the powers of delay were increased to a 
maximum of seven months. This was announced in a White Paper in March 
1967 (Cmnd 3235 'Prices and Incomes Policy after 30 June 1967') which 
argued that there was no justification for returning to a norm of
3-3$ per cent. The White Paper stated that
increases foregone under the standstill should not be made good 
although commitments deferred until July 1967 could be implemented. 
The controversial statutory powers of Part IV of the Prices and 
Incomes Act were allowed to lapse in August 1967 leaving the 
backing for the policy as largely voluntary as the remaining controls 
essentially those of delaying settlements. In this phase of policy 
an increasing number of settlements had a productivity clause as 
part of the claim.
The fourth phase of policy began in April 1968. A 3J per 
cent maximum increase had been announced in January and the White 
Paper published in April (Cmnd.3590 'Productivity,Prices and Incomes 
Policy in 1968 and 1969') announced an increase in potential delay 
to twelve months by giving the Government the power to delay 
settlements for a period of eight months after the NBPI had 
reported. Increases above the 3J per cent ceiling were to be 
justified in three exceptional circumstances: for major productivity 
agreements; major wage or salary restructuring or for low-paid 
workers as part of a settlement which, es a whole, was within 
the ceiling. The NBPI (Report 36) had set guidelines for 
productivity agreements. These were that:
(1) workers should make direct contributions to pay by 
accepting more exacting work or a major change in working 
practices.
(2) forecasts of increased productivity should be derived 
by the application of proper work-standards.
(3) costs per unit of output should be reduced.
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(4) there should be effective controls to ensure that 
productivity gains were achieved.
(5) there should be clear benefits to consumers via stable 
prices.
Through 1968 the Government was becoming less concerned 
about wage settlements and more concerned about legislation to 
moderate industrial action and allowed through a pay settlement 
of 8-9 per cent for railwaymen and averted a general engineering 
strike in October 1968 by allowing a three-stage settlement 
well above the ceiling without any reference to the NBPI. In its 
Fifth and Final General Report the NBPI (Report 170 p.l) stated 
that:
'by the beginning of 1969 ...... it had become apparent
that the Government was tending to accept wage increases 
of up to 3} per cent almost automatically. In many cases 
when wage increases were referred to the Board, the Govern­
ment had already agreed to an immediate increase of per 
cent and instructed the Board to examine the justification 
for a larger increase, for example for bus maintenance 
workers in September 1968, clearing bank employees in 
November 1968 and workers in the exhibition contracting 
industries in March 1969. In other words the 3$ per cent 
figure was thus rapidly becoming a floor rather than a 
ceiling.'
TUC reaction was gradually becoming more hostile. This 
was partly reflected by the behaviour of the TUC incomes policy 
vetting comnittee. Between November 1966 and November 1967 340 claims 
were notified to the TUC committee (covering 4 million workers) 
and approval was withheld in 40 per cent of the cases. * After May 
1967 the Comnittee met less frequently and of 461 claims considered 
up to January 1968 only 126 were passed but most unions ignored the 
TUC view. In the second half of 1968 however, the TUC found 309 
out of 327 claims unobjectionable and only sent 18 claims to its 
panel which usually passed them. It never really accepted the 
3} per cent ceiling and instead adopted its own criteria of 6 per
4.29
cent (Panitch, 197'6) . At the TUC Congress in September there was 
a vote of 7.7 million to 1 million in favour of repeal of the 
Prices and Incomes Act.
In April 1969 the Government announced that it would reactivate 
Part II of the Prices and Incomes Act, including the wage delaying 
powers and the statutory Prices and Incomes Board. As the work 
of the TUC vetting comnittee became more relaxed so the number of 
references to the NBPI declined. In the second half of 1969 
there were only six new references, of which four related to 
incomes,and only one reference was held back until the Board reported 
so that the powers of delay were used much less vigorously than 
in the early stages of the policy.
The emphasis towards industrial relations legislation and 
away from incomes policy matters was reflected in the White Paper 
of December 1969 (Cmnd.4237 'Productivity, Prices and Incomes Policy 
after 1969') which proposed a new ceiling of between 2i~4j per 
cent for 1970. Equal pay was now added as an exception. The 
White Paper was rejected by the TUC.
The election of the Conservative Government and a new approach
In February the TUC abandoned its incomes policy vetting 
comnittee. In June, the pay policy was effectively ended with the 
election of the Conservative government committed to a less 
interventionary role. In November the winding up of the NBPI was 
announced and 1970 as a whole saw a great burst in the number 
and size of wage settlements.
By the end of 1970 the faith in unemployment as the 
restraining mechanism on wage growth was being gradually eroded and 
the Government started to exert pressure on the public sector 
with its 'nrl' policy which was baaed on the principle that each
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successive public sector wage agreement should be 1 per cent less 
than the preceding one. The underlying rationale behind the policy 
appeared to be that the strong comparability element in wage 
determination could be broken in this way so that the size of 
private sector wage settlements might also be reduced eventually.
There was certainly little sign of a major deceleration in public 
sector settlements during the winter of 1970. The dustmen received 
14 per cent and the miners accepted 12 per cent and the electricity 
workers were awarded between 14 and 18 per cent after a work-to-rule. 
The one part of the public sector to be taken on were the Post Office 
workers who after a lengthy dispute only managed to increase their 
original 8 per cent offer by a further 1 per cent. To prop up this 
policy the Government managed to persuade the CBI to operate a period 
of price restraint from July 1971 and agreed in turn to hold back 
price increases by the nationalised industries. Problems with the 
pay policy continued however and in November the miners began an 
overtime ban and this became a full strike in January before the 
Wilberforce Inquiry in February granted them an increase of between 
17 and 20 per cent. This marked the effective end of the n-1 policy 
and this was officially recognised by the Government in March. Pay 
policy was then left somewhat in a limbo in succeeding months as the 
Government attempted to achieve an agreement on a voluntary pay policy 
with the CBI and the TUC. Anti-inflationary measures were not helped 
by the CBI's refusal to extend its support for price restraint in 
July 1922.
The 1972 Standstill.
In August the Government proposed a £2 p.w. pay limit but the 
tripartite talks broke down and in November statutory powers were 
taken (Counter-Inflation Act) to freeze pay and prices for 90 days
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(with a possible extension for a further 60 days). The White 
Paper accompanying the legislation (Cmnd.5125 'A Programme for 
Controlling Inflation: The First Stage') stated that promotions 
and increments were to be allowed and that where the operative date of 
a settlement was before November 6 1972 it could be implemented,
otherwise it would be deferred until the end of the standstill.
There was in fact a small flurry of settlements before the freeze 
and electricity supply manual workers, local authority manual 
workers and government industrial workers all had settlements 
operative in the first week of November.
Policy after the standstill
A White Paper published in January 1973 (Cmnd.520S ’The 
Programme for Controlling Inflation: The Second Stage') announced the 
procedure following the period of standstill. The original standstill was 
extended for another 60 days until the end of March 1973. Deferred 
settlements were to be allowed 90 days after their original operative 
date or on the 1st April as long as there was at least a 12 month 
interval between settlements. The basic norm for stage 2 of the 
policy to run from April 1973 to October 1973 was £1 p.w. + 4Z .
Increases agreed before the freeze were allowed and women's rates of 
pay could be increased so as to reduce the differential between male 
and female rates by one-third by the end of 1973. Legislation 
was also enacted (Cmnd.5206) to establish a new set of institutions, 
the Pay Board and the Price Commission. The TUC were not opposed 
to an agreement on pay in principle but they wanted higher increases 
than envisaged by the Government. They also wanted statutory control of 
prices whereas the price component of the policy merely 
ensured that increases in pay above the norm could not be passed 
through to prices. The TUC denounced pay restraint throughout
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the policy and refused to ait union representatives on 
the Pay Board and Price Commission.
Principles of the new pay policy and the work of the Pay Board.
Unlike the NBP1 who were obliged to only review settlements 
referred to them by the Government the Pay Board reviewed all 
pay settlements affecting 1000 or more employees before they could 
be implemented. They could reject settlements not conforming to the 
pay code but the Government had the power to over-rule the Pay Board.
Unlike pay policy in the 1960s it was now clearly stated that 
the aim of policy was to progressively reduce the rate of inflation 
rather than to attempt to achieve price stability. Pay was now monitored 
by the size of the pay bill rather than by individual earnings and this 
treatment has been referred to as 'kitty bargaining'. The average 
increase allowable under Stage II of the policy was 4% plus 
£1 p.w. and settlements were limited to a minimum of 12 months. The 
maximum individual increase allowed was £250 p.a. and changes in 
overtime were to count against the limit.
Exceptions to the limit were equal pay; hours of work (if they 
were over 40 hours per week); holidays; increments; and promotion.
Stage II of the policy lasted only from April to October 1973
and the proposals for Stagelll were announced in October 1973 (Cmnd.
5446 'The Counter Inflation Policy. Stage 3. A Statement by the Prime
Minister'). The new norm was to be 7Z or £2.25 p.w. whichever was to 
2be the greater . To this norm was added a flexibility margin
of 1Z (to cover improvements in efficiency which had to be observed by the
Pay Board before payment would be made) as well as the exceptions
such as improvements to holiday pay, the move to equal pay and
the reduction of hours of work. An allowance for the miners as
a special case was also implicitly written into the policy through
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a clause relating to unsocial hours (see Holmes, 1982).
A radical addition to the terms o£ a pay policy was the attempt 
to partially index-link pay by announcing a cost of living safeguard.
If the retail price index were to rise more that 7 per cent above 
its base level in October 1973 each additional 1 per cent would be 
compensated by an additional 40p. a week. In the final analysis 
this proposal was to prove devastating to attempts to reduce 
inflation since it coincided with the world-wide boom in commodity 
prices and the four-fold increase in OPEC oil prices so that the threshold 
was breached as early as April 1974 and triggered in all no less 
than eleven times before October 1974.
Confusion over the miners’ pay award led to an overtime ban 
in November and a strike in February which resulted in a 3-day 
working week for the majority of industry and commerce. This 
occurred despite the specific inclusion of a clause to treat the 
miners as a special case. In the end a general election was called 
in February and the Labour Government managed to form a government.
The new government immediately granted the miners a substantial rise 
and made no attempt to apply the Conservative government's policy 
other than to allow the threshold provisions to continue to operate.
They abolished the Pay Board in July.
The Social Contract
The TUC was prepared to operate a system of voluntary wage 
restraint with the new Labour government and published its guidelines 
for this so-called 'Social Contract'in December 1974. The basic 
principle for pay under the Social Contract was compensation for price 
increases but this was not specific as to whether past or anticipated 
price increases were the critical factor and indeed many claims seemed 
to include both! The going rate for wage settlements was 25-30 per
cent by the first quarter of 1975 and in July the Government 
announced a more specific (but still essentially voluntary) policy 
which had a £6 p.w. limit (with a cut-off point for pay increases 
set at £8,500) to run from August 1975 to July 1976. This policy 
had the overt support of the TUC, who indeed helped to plan it, 
and the pay policy was approved by the TUC Congress in September.
The £6 pay limit was to apply directly to the public sector with 
government influence used indirectly over the private sector through 
public sector purchases and there were powers held in reserve - 
notably legislation to make it illegal for the employer to exceed 
the pay limit (Cmnd.6151 'The Attack on Inflation'). The Price 
Code was maintained and the whole of any price increase could be 
disallowed for pay increases in breach of the policy.In the annual 
budget in 1976 the Chancellor of the Exchequer promised tax cuts 
conditional on an agreement being made with the TUC on a pay norm of 
around 3 per cent for the following phase of policy. In the end 
the TUC and Government agreed on a norm of between 4J and 6 per cent 
and in June the White Paper (Cmnd.6507 'The Attack on Inflation - The 
Second Year') announced a limit of £2.50 p.w. for those earning 
below £50 a week, 5Z for those earning between £50 and £80 p.w. and a 
maximum increase of £4 p.w. At the same time some easing was ann­
ounced in the Price Code provisions, estimated to add about 1 per cent 
to the retail price index. Phase 2 was formally endorsed by the TUC 
in July and was planned to run from August 1976 to July 1977.
In March of 1977 the Chancellor again announced tax cuts 
conditional on negotiations of a new pay policy. Some of these 
cuts were later rescinded in July as although the TUC continued to 
support the policy in general they were being more reluctant to 
agree to a specific limiting figure.
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Phase 3 of the Labour Government's pay policy began in 
August 1977 and ran to July 1978. It was formally announced in a 
White Paper (Cmnd.6882 'The Attack on Inflation after 31st July 
1977') and proposed a maximum increase of 10 per cent. In 
September the TUC voted in favour of unions' commitment not to 
re-open incomes policy settlements before they have run 12 months 
but were generally becoming less enchanted with the policy.
However, they still supported the Government officially with the 
General Council voting against supporting the firemen's strike 
at the end of the year. There were several other industrial 
disputes during the winter of 1977/8 although the pay policy continued 
to hold.
In July 1978 the Government announced the proposals for Phase 4 
(Cmnd.7253 'Winning the Battle against Inflation'). The new norm 
was to be drastically reduced from the 10 per cent of Phase 3 to 5 per 
cent. Productivity deals were to be self financing but there could 
be 'kitty bargaining' within 5 per cent to correct anomalies. Increases 
in low pay above 5 per cent were also allowed (with a maximum on 
earnings of £44-50 p.w.). Some allowance was also made for special 
cases.
The TUC was becoming more hostile towards the pay policy.
(Mayhew, 1981). In November the Government invoked a 'special case'
in order to allow a 22 per cent deal for firemen but then announced 
a decision to blacklist Ford for breaking the norm (with a 17 per cent 
deal). Soon after Vauxhall Motors also agreed a 17 per cent 
pay increase. In December the Government was forced by Parliament to 
reject discriminatory action against private companies which breached 
the pay guidelines. In January a series of crippling strikes in the 
public sector led the Government to relax policy considerably with 
acceptance of comparability studies. Union hostility was still growing
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however, and the GMWU started a co-ordinated campaign against 
Government pay policy. The policy finally ended in May with the 
general election and the return of the Conservative Party to power.
1979 and a new direction
The new Conservative Government saw no role at all for 
incomes policy and instead emphasised the role of market 
pressures. However, it did allow the Clegg Commission awards to 
be passed through. Control over public sector pay was through 
cash limits although no guidelines were set as to the mix of real 
expenditure and inflation.
4.4 Summary
Analysis of the economic history of the period from 1961 
reveals the constant search for new policy instruments in order 
to achieve the main goals of policy; low inflation, low unemployment 
and a reasonable rate of economic growth without incurring a 
balance of payments deficit. Thus incomes policy was continually 
used in an attempt to improve the inflation-unemployment trade-off. 
However, the support by the authorities for incomes policy has 
varied considerably with more than a little faith being placed at times 
on the underlying properties of the system to solve the problem (eg. 
the belief in the Phillips curve in 1970; the use of the real wage 
resistance model in early 1975). The range of form of incomes policy 
has also been considerable. Some governments have initially attempted to 
introduce a voluntary long-term policy (e.g. the Labour administration 
of 1964; the Conservative Government in 1971-2) only to have to 
resort to a short-term freeze. Whilst such snap measures avoided 
the bringing forwerd of settlements which might be induced by 
pre-announced measures they have inevitably led to problems in later 
periods as questions of 'fairness' and 'comparability' have risen.
4 .3 7
Whilst the degree of statutory backing has been very variable 
there appears to be no regular political pattern relating to 
the type and degree of incomes policy. Both types of administration 
have resorted to very similar policies even if their ideological 
backgrounds would lead one to assume a different attitude towards 
policy.
More detailed discussion of the precise formulation of incomes 
policy follows in Chapter 5.
The committee could take several possible courses of action.
It could make no observation. It could point out the criteria 
to the union concerned. It could make a specific comment on 
a claim and request the unions to reconsider or it could ask 
the union to meet the committee.
Absolute increases were written into Stages II and III in 
an attempt to help the lower paid and to appease the unions.
5.1
CHAPTER 5 MEASUREMENT OF POLICY
5.1 General considerations
The basic principles underlying the treatment of incomes 
policy were given in Chapter 3, The incomes policy measures depends 
on three main elements; real wage pressure, trade union response 
and the authorities' toughness. Real wage pressure is defined as the 
wage norm (appropriately adjusted for exceptions) less the rate of 
inflation in the previous period. Measurement of the wage norm is 
reasonably straightforward when magnitudes are clearly stated but 
there do exist several periods when no explicit norm is declared.^
These periods encompass periods of implicit norms such as the 'n-1' episode 
and the Social Contract and periods when policy was essentially "off"
(for example, the middle of 1970).
The real wage pressure term is defined as:
H-! - wn - pt.1
For most of the period it is possible to construct either an 
explicit or implicit wage norm and there are only a very few complete 
quarters where no such norm existed (in 1960 and early 1961 i  in mid- 
1970 and mid-1972). For these periods the wage norm is set by the rate 
of wage inflation in the previous quarter. This is obviously a very 
subjective rule but it does appear to correspond quite closely with 
actual bargaining practice where the"going"rate is often emphasised.
Given the relatively few number of observations affected in this way
2it does not seem to be a critical assumption.
The problem that some periods of policy with identical norms 
have very different institutional arrangements or were applied with 
different degrees of rigour is dealt with by the government and trade 
union pressure/reaction variables.
In some periods the stated norm is often a 'maximum' rather
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than an average or minimum (e.g. the 3} per cent value in 1968).
However as the experience of the NBPI and the Pay Board shows 
these maxima have in practice been indistinguishable from other forms 
of norm and all guidelines are applied in the same way. Stated 
exceptions to the central norm have been included in the wage norm 
when they are relatively precise. Thus, for example, the productivity 
provision in the 1968-70 era of policy does not count since it was a 
vague and open-ended exception,whereas the flexibility margin of the 
1973-4 policy had a definite upper limit and is incorporated. Other 
exceptions to the norm excluded because they are not quantifiable in 
ex-ante terms are the allowances for labour mobility and low pay in 
the period between 1965 and 1970. Although equal pay was covered 
between 1972 and 1974 when there was a clear statement of the allowable 
increase ho allowance is made in the policy measure as the actual take up 
was exceptionally low. Neither is equal pay included again in the period 
after 1975 when the provision was non-specific.
The general nature of incomes policies over the period and the 
various exceptions to the norm are shown in Table 5.1
The wage norm is always expressed as an annual rate since this is the form 
in which most wage norma have operated. Many of the incomes policies 
have not distinguished between actual earnings and wage settlements 
when setting the wage norm. In any case although some settlement data 
are available (see Appendix D) they exclusively refer to manual workers 
who represent only just over one-half of total UK employment during 
the period considered. Therefore the general model is expressed 
necessarily in terms of earnings although attempts are made to adjust 
for the settlements-earnings lag between very different periods of 
policy (a prime example is the allowance of previously agreed settlements 
to operate with a lag of six months after the 1972 standstill).
5.4
5.2 Derivation of the wage norm and exceptions
In this section we outline a description of how a wage norm 
is calculated for each quarter of the period under consideration.
More detailed descriptions of particular effects (such as the 
qualifications of the 1972-4 policy which involved a mixture of 
a percentage and flat-rate norm) are given in Appendix C .
An explicit norm for wage increases existed from the 
inception of the pay pause (July 1961) through to the election 
of the Conservative Government in mid-1970 and the subsequent 
abolition of the National Board for Prices and Incomes. A formal 
figure was also declared for the period from November 1972 (Stage 1 
of the Conservative government's policy) until the election of the Labour 
administration in February 1974 and then again from August 1975 until 
May 1979 in the various phases of the Labour Government's policy.
No explicit figure for wage increases was therefore declared in 
1960 and the first half of 1961, mid-1970 until end-1972, early 1974 
until the summer of 1975 and in the second half of 1979. The period 
between 1970 and 1972 was characterised by an informal policy for 
most of its duration ('n-1' policy) for which a wage norm can be 
inferred, and the same applies to the period of the 'social contract' 
between 1974 and 1975. Thus in very few instances are there genuine 
policy-off periods (see Table 5.2). These occur in 1970, 1972 and 
1979.
The'Pay Pause', 1961-62, and 'Guiding Light' 1962-64
The pay pause started in the third quarter of 1961 and continued 
until the first quarter of 1962. It was followed by the 'Guiding Light' 
policy which lasted until the election of the Labour Government in the 
last quarter of 1964. Under the pay pause there was a zero norm and 
no exceptions. The first stage of the Guiding Light policy set a norm
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of 2-2i per cent which was superseded by a new norm of 3-3J
per cent per annum for wage increases in the final quarter of 1963.
This second stage of policy continued until the last quarter of
196A. There were several exceptions to the central norm under 'Guiding
Light'. These were to reflect exceptional productivity increases; low pay;
labour shortage; and the restoration of differentials. However, none
of these exceptions were ever quantified ex-ante and are not therefore
included in the wage norm. The central norm is set at the upper end
of the range in both stages of the Guiding Light policy.
Early warning, 1964-66
The Guiding Light policy disappeared with the election of the 
Labour government in October 1964 but the new government quickly 
moved to try to establish a voluntary policy. In November they 
issued a draft statement of intent on prices and incomes policy 
with the TUC and in December a final statement was agreed. Although 
no norm was stated at this time the establishment of the NBFI in 
early 1965 with a wage norm of 3-3i per cent suggests that the 
guiding light norm was never really abandoned. Although the machinery 
of policy changed further between 1965 and the summer of 1966 
with the introduction of legislation enabling delay in November 1965 
the 'Early Warning System') the control norm remained the same 
throughout. The exceptions to the norm also remained as those of the 
pre-1964 machinery and yet again were not made in specific terms and so 
are once more excluded.
Statutory freeze and period of restraint. 1966-70
In July 1966 a six-month freeze on wages and prices was imposed, 
followed by various degrees of wage restraint. Under the period of 
standstill (July 1966 to January 1967) the central norm was zero
but increases in pay due to genuine promotion were allowed and 
existing comnitments were honoured but delayed by six months.
An estimate of the latter is included in the norm and is described 
in Appendix C . In the period of 'severe restraint* which 
followed the standstill and which lasted until June 1967 the zero 
norm was maintained but the exceptions allowed under the pre-freeze 
policy were again included although yet again no ex-ante estimate of the 
allowable increase due to these factors was given. Similar 
considerations apply to the succeeding phase of policy between 
July 1967 and March 1968.
From 1968 a maximum entitlement of 3} per cent per annum 
was announced with the same exceptions as previously and this 
was superseded by a new ceiling of 2$-4j per cent from the first 
quarter of 1970. The maximum entitlement is taken as the central norm 
throughout.
No intervention and the n-1 policy. 1970-72
The Conservative government elected in June 1970 adopted a 
'hands-off' policy towards wages initially before embarking on the 
policy of pressure on public sector wage settlements in November 1970 
('n-1' policy). Pure policy-off in the third quarter of 1970 is 
incorporated by setting the wage norm as the annual rate of wage 
inflation in the previous quarter whilst the value of the norm in 
the fourth quarter of 1970 is given by a weighting of the no-policy 
value of the norm (calculated in the same way as for the third quarter) 
and the implicit norm under n-1 policy. The implicit norm under n-1 
from the fourth quarter of 1970 until the first quarter of 1972 is 
calculated as follows.
5.8
Holmes (1982) in a study of the Conservative Government of 
1970—74 based on extensive interviews and analysis of speeches and 
statements claims the origins of the 'n-1' pay policy in Autumn 1970. 
It was nicknamed 'N minus 1' since the rough rule of thumb was 
that each pay settlement should be slightly less than the one 
before. He sets the beginning of N-1 as after the dustmen's strike 
in November 1970 and as ending after the miners' strike in February 
1972.
The settlement of the dustmen's strike in 1970 was some 
15 per cent. A literal translation of 'N-1' might then set the 
norm for pay in the public sector as 1 per cent lower for each 
successive settlement. However, this would imply a zero norm after 
a further period of 15 months and eventually a negative norm and this 
was clearly not the intention of the policy. Rather the intention 
was seen as a gradual reduction and a norm for the public sector over 
this period is formed by setting as initial norm of 14 per cent 
which then declines by 1 per cent in each quarter. Clearly this is 
rather an arbitary assumption but it seems to capture the spirit 
of 'n-1'.
The norm for public sector pay is then weighted with the 
'free-market norm' for the private sector (i.e. based on previous 
wage inflation) to give an overall figure for the whole economy.
Z p.a.
Public sector Private sector Whole economy
1970 4 14.0 (for one month) 15.2 15.1
1971 1 13.0 13.5 13.4
2 12.0 13.5 13.1
3 11.0 10.5 10.6
4 10.0 10.7 10.5
1972 1 9.0 10.5 10.1
weight .289 .711
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Following the collapse of n-1 the Conservative Government 
sought a voluntary pay policy but in effect a policy-off regime 
existed in the second quarter of 1972. The wage norm for this 
period is once again given by the previous quarter's rate of 
wage inflation. In August and September however, the Prime Minister, 
Mr. Heath, clearly announced an intention to operate a pay policy 
with a norm of £2 p.w. (representing some 6.9 per cent of average 
earnings). If this norm is applied to two months of the quarter 
with the no-policy norm used in the remaining month the result is 
a central norm of 8.6 per cent.
Freeze and further periods of policy
In November 1972 the attempt to persuade the TUC and CBI 
to agree to a voluntary policy failed and a 90 day standstill on 
wages and prices took effect. This gives an average norm for 
the fourth quarter of 1972 of 2.7 per cent. The standstill was 
extended by a further 60 days to end in March 1973, giving a zero 
central norm for the first quarter of 1973. In Stage 2 of the policy 
which started in April 1973 the central norm was set at £1 p.w. 
plus 4 per cent (equivalent to 6.9 per cent). Settlements due to 
be implemented during the period of standstill were allowed to 
operate and the policy allowed for an explicit exception to cover 
equal pay (with up to one-third of the male/female pay differential 
allowed to be removed). Other exceptions to the central norm were 
improvements in holidays; reductions in hours towards 40 hours a 
week and improvements in occupational pensions.
Stage 3 of the policy began after just a further six months in 
November 1973 with the central pay norm established as 7 per cent or 
£2.25 per week. As well as the exceptions included under Stage 2 there
was a 1 per cent 'flexibility' margin and a cost-of-living 
safeguard (threshold provision). The central norm was equivalent 
to 7.9 per cent (see Appendix C ).
In Appendix C the Pay Board's estimates of the effects 
of the exceptions to the Stage 2 and Stage 3 policy are given. The 
Pay Beard's ex-post estimate was that the provision for equal pay 
increased the norm by about 1/3 per cent per quarter; the settlement 
for anomalies by 0.4 per cent by the end of Stage 3; and the flexibility 
margin by just over j per cent.
No ex-ante provision was made for anomalies so these are not 
included in the wage norm. The rules for equal pay stated that up to 
one third of the differential existing in December 1972 could be 
eliminated. The National Institute Economic Review for May 1974 (p.18) 
suggested that equal pay may have contributed for some lj per cent 
of the increase in rates of pay between November 1972 and February 1974, 
very close to the Pay Board's ex-post estimate. However, both these 
figures are very different from the ex-ante entitlement. For example, 
in 1973 the entitlement for female workers would have been an increase 
of over 30 per cent on account of equal pay clause and close to 
10 per cent on overall earnings. The actual reduction in male/female 
differentials (see Mayhew, 1981) was in fact very slight in 1973 and 
1974 and most rapid progress was made in 1975 after the end of Stage 3. 
In addition the nature of the policy norm itself under Stage 2 and 
Stage 3 (with its flat-rate element) would have increased female pay 
by 2.1 and 2.9 per cent per annum more than male pay. An extra 
allowance due to the policy itself seems inappropriate.
The full flexibility margin of 1 per cent is allowed for in the 
exceptions to the norm although the ex-post effects suggest a figure
’ it -: t ' w~tt
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of one half this magnitude. Thresholds are added for the second 
quarter of 1974 (the first in which they were due) but not thereafter 
since the general provisions of Stage 3 were no longer being applied, 
although thresholds were still being paid.
The Social Contract 1974-75
Following the conflict with the miners in the winter of 
1973/74 a general election was held (February 1974), resulting in 
a defeat for the Conservative Government. The pay policy was 
not formally abandoned until later in the year however and was 
followed by a period of the Social Contract when pay increases 
were intended to do no more than match price increases. For the 
period of the Social Contract therefore the pay norm is set at 
equivalent to last period's rate of price inflation (which 
according to the real wage pressure variable produces zero real 
wage increases, as intended by the policy). Between the publication 
of the Social Contract guidelines in December 1974 and the ending of 
the pay policy in June 1974 there was a period when no formal or 
informal policy existed however. For this period the wage norm is 
given by the standard policy-off value (i.e. equal to last period's 
rate of wage inflation).
Voluntary Restraint 1975-79
In the summer of 1975 the Labour Government announced a 
£6 per week pay limit from August. This policy lasted until July 
1976 when it was superseded by Phase 2 which moved back to a percentage 
norm (5 per cent) but with upper and lower limits. After a further 
12 months Phase 3 set a norm of 10 per cent and this was followed by a 
further 5 per cent norm from August 1978. Flat rate elements of
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these policies are translated into a percentage norm using 
estimates of the distribution of earnings from the New Earnings 
Surveys. Details are given in Appendix C . . The values of the central
norm thus calculated are 13 - 18 per cent for Phase 1 of the policy;
5 6  per cent for Phase 2; 10 per cent for Phase 3 and 5 per cent 
for Phase 4. Equal pay was made an exception to the policy throughout 
but like the Conservative policy of 1972-4 no specific allowance 
is made, in the norm. The flat rate elements of the Phase 1 and 
Phase 2 policies are estimated to have increased female earnings by
6.6 and 1.4 per cent per annum respectively. The straight percentage 
norm of Phases 3 and 4 would have left no further sex differential 
drift from policy alone. Self-financing productivity was included 
as an exception under Phases 3 and 4 whilst some anomalies and low pay 
were exceptions from the central norm in Phase 4. None of these 
exceptions are included however as they were all non-specific in 
terms of allowable additions to the central norm.
1979,Clegg and a new approach
Following the election of the Conservative Government in 
May 1979 the formal incomes policy was abandoned in favour of a 
non-interventionist approach. However, the results of the Clegg 
Commission on Comparability, instituted under the previous 
administration were allowed to stand. The wage norm for the 
remainder of 1979 is calculated therefore by weighting together 
the various Clegg awards with the no-policy value of wages for the 
private sector.
Deferred settlements
The wage standstills of 1966 and 1972 allowed that settlements 
already made but not implemented could take place in the period
after the wage freeze. Thus it is appropriate to include this 
effect in the wage norm since it is quantifiable in ex-ante terms.
The commencement of both periods of standstill occurred part of the 
way through a quarterly period so that the wage norm for the first 
period of freeze is not zero (1.2 per cent for the 1966 freeze in 
1966 Q3 and 2.7 per cent for the 1972 freeze in 1972 Q4). The 
position of pre-standstill settlements is quite complicated since some 
settlements are staged. In a simple world where there existed no 
delay between wage settlements and their implementation and where 
wage settlements were made annually at a fixed time of year then the 
impact of pre-standstill agreements during incomes policy periods 
would be zero. If a lag between settlements and implementation is 
allowed then the effect of pre-standstill agreements would be a 
function of the rate of wage inflation in the pre-standstill period 
and the average delay between settlements and implementation.
e •
Thus w+ - w t-1 . (1-SL)
where w+ is the extra wage inflation due to pre-standstill settlements, and 
w fc_^ is the rate of wage inflation in the previous period.
In principle should refer to pay settlements rather than the
measured earnings increase. SL is the proportion of workers whose settlements
and implementation dates both occur within the previous period. Thus
(1-SL) is the proportion of the labour force receiving a settlement
in the previous period but whose implementation date lies in the
current period. With standard lengths of settlement but with
e
implementation lags spreading over more than one period then w+ 
becomes a more complex function of past rates of inflation, together 
with the distribution of the implementation lag over time.
The fact that contract length itself may vary, partly in 
response to incomes policies, further complicates the treatment
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of deferred settlements. In practice evidence from settlements 
of manual workers held on the Aberdeen database shows that the lag 
between settlement and implementation is very small except when 
incomes policies themselves lead to a deferment of the implementation 
date. Thus there is not a general problem involved in terms of 
wage settlements, although the actual increase in earnings paid 
in periods immediately prior and post changes in incomes policy 
rules will continue to reflect changes in the number of workers 
settling in each period as well as the average increases per 
settlement. This latter problem is one of specification of the 
wage relationship and need not detain us here.
Evidence from the Pay Board reports (see Appendix C) 
shows over 150 pre-standstill agreements between April and June 1973 
covering just over 1 million workers. The number of pre-standstill 
settlements then fall until the beginning of Stage 3 when a 
substantial number of staged settlements became due between December 
1973 and May 1974. Asstiming that these settlements would have been 
made at the pre-standstill rate of inflation then given the number 
of workers affected the additional effect of wage inflation would 
have been 0.2 per cent in 1973 (2), 0.1 per cent in 1973 (3) and 
1973 (4), 0.3 per cent in 1974 (1) and 0.1 per cent in 1974 (2).
Information on deferred settlements in 1966/67 is more 
difficult to come by. The National Institute (NIER August 1967) 
suggested that deferred settlements might increase wages by It per 
cent in the first quarter of 1967 and this estimate is consistent 
with the figure given in the White Paper relating to the freeze 
(Cmnd.3073 'Prices and Incomes Standstill') where six million workers 
were referred to as being affected by the allowance for deferred 
settlements. Thus 1{ per cent is the chosen allowance for deferred 
settlements in 1967 Ql.
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Table 5.3 Quantitative Indicators of Government and Trade
Union Pressure
Income 
references 
to the 
NBPIa
Number 
of claims 
submitted 
to TUC 
vetting 
committee^
Number of industrial stoppagesc 
(thousands)
Total Wage disputes
1965 2 2 n.a. 1961 2,686 1,306
3 - n.a. 1962 2,449 1,125
4 6 n.a. 1963 2,068 956
1966 1 2 n.a. 1964 2,524 1,208
2 - n.a. 1965 2,354 1,180
3 8 n.a. 1966 1,937 883
4 4 n.a. 1967 2,116 986
1967 1 4 - 1968 2,378 1,230
2 6 103 1969 3,116 1,783
3 2 166 1970 3,906 2,465
4 3 121 1971 2,228 1,155
1968 1 4 60 1972 2,497 1,477
2 8 85 1973 2,873 1,462
3 10 83 1974 2,922 1,922
4 8 95 1975 2,282 1,318
1969 1 3 45 1976 2,016 875
2 4 56 1977 2,703
3 3 52 1978 2,471
4 2 59 1979 2,080
1970 1 4 22
2 6
Source: Fels (1972) (b) Source: Blackwell (1977) (c) Source: D.E. Tear Books
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In some cases there may have been an incentive to advance 
settlements in order to avoid a more severe phase of policy (e.g. the 
£6 p.w. policy of 1975). These questions of timing as distinct from 
the rules of the policy itself are discussed in Chapter 6.
5.3 Government pressure and trade union response
Preceding chapters have made it clear that it is inappropriate 
to measure the strength of any given incomes policy purely by 
the pressure it exerts on real wages. It is also very relevant to 
consider the stringency with which any government attempts to apply 
a given policy and the response of the trade union movement as a 
whole. For example, a policy which has trade union co-operation 
through TUC vetting of wage claims has a much greater ex-ante chance 
of success than has the same policy within a hostile trade union 
atmosphere.
The intensity of policy is therefore given as a function of 
indices of government pressure - and trade union response shown in 
Table 5.4. These indices can only be measured subjectively although 
various quantitative pieces of information are used in their construction.
In forming the index of government pressure the following 
factors are relevant. First the sanctions behind the policy. Thus 
a purely voluntary policy would rank at the bottom of the range and a 
policy backed by a compulsory freeze at the top end of the range.
Whether a policy is voluntary or compulsory is just one part of 
the index of sanctions. The form of monitoring is also important 
so that policies which are based on a close monitoring of pay 
awards rank higher than a policy with no mechanism for monitoring.
Second the degree with which the Government attempts to enforce 
the policy. For example, the Government's attitude is given by 
its use of its powers such as the number of references to the NBPI.
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Indications of the trade union response are based on 
the motions and votes at the TUC Annual Congress and, during 
the 1967-70 period, the use of the TUC's own vetting committee.
Another quantitative indicator used to form a trade union response 
index is the number of industrial disputes. The paper by Davies (1979) 
concludes that the imposition of incomes policy has a significant 
impact in reducing strikes over pay issues with the ending of 
policy leading towards a sharp upsurge as workers attempt to make 
up for lost ground.
The two components of government pressure (sanctions and their 
use) are combined with equal weights as is the aggregate government 
variable with the TUC index to provide an overall index of incomes 
policy stringency. Treating both GPS and TPS as defined in 
Table 5.4 the overall index of policy (IPS) is given by 
IPS - 0.5 (GPS + TPS).
The following discussion describes how the indices for 
different policy periods have been derived.
5.3.1 The degree of formal controls
At the beginning of the period in question the existing 
institution was the Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes, a 
three-man body. This had been established in 1957 with a function 
to review changes in prices and incomes but it did not report 
on specific cases, had no real powers and was largely educational.
It therefore ranks quite low in order of degree of sanctions.
The Council issued its final report in July 1961 and the 'pay 
pause' began, but with no institutional backing. The policy was
i
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voluntary and the Government was only able to use its powers in 
the public sector and in a few wage council industries within the 
private sector. The policy therefore ranks more highly than its 
predecessor but is'still quite weak in terms of its sanction-power.
The pay pause was followed by the formation of the National 
Incomes Commission which like the Council in Prices, Productivity 
and Incomes had no substantive powers. Its terms of reference were 
to review pay where the cost was met from the Exchequer or to examine 
retrospectively any private or public settlement referred to it by 
the Government. In all it produced five reports on four references.
The era of the guiding light policy therefore ranks somewhere 
between the pre-pay pause policy and the pay pause itself.
After the election of the Labour Government in the autumn of 
1964 the National Incomes Commission remained until the formation 
of the National Board for Prices and Incomes in early 1965 but the nature 
of policy itself was increasingly volantary.
Mien the NBPI was first established its role, like the NIC 
was to review the cases referred to it by the Government and it had 
no independent role. Initially, powers of sanction were very limited 
but from September 1965 the Government was able to impose a delay 
until the Board had reported. From November 1965 the 'early warning' 
system was proposed whereby all important wage arid price increases 
were notified in advance. In July 1966 the Government announced 
a standstill on wages and prices with Part IV of the 1966 Prices 
and Incomes Act available to cover penalties for violation. The 
index for this six-month period is therefore set at its maximum 
value. In 1967 Part IV of the 1966 Act was allowed to lapse although 
the powers of delay were extended to a maximum of seven months. In 
1968 powers of delay were further extended to twelve months but then
reduced back to four months at the beginning of 1970. The 
index of sanctions reflects these changes in powers. In the 
middle of 1970 the NBPI was abolished along with powers of delay 
but the Government used its power in the public sector during the 
period of the n—1 policy.Puring 1972 it had no powers at all 
whilst it sought for a voluntary agreement.
In November 1972 the Conservative Government introduced 
a statutory freeze which was followed by two further stages of policy, 
both statutory, and both monitored by new institutions (the Pay 
Board and the Price Commission). Unlike the NBPI which could only 
examine cases referred to it, the Pay Board monitored all pay 
settlements and so the degree of control between 1973 and early 1974 was 
tighter than occurred after the freeze of 1966. With the change of 
government in 1974 and the abolition of the Pay Board, the degree 
of formal controls is ranked at its minimum value. The policy 
which succeeded the Social Contract in 1975 (the £6 p.w. 
policy) remained voluntary but the Government was able to use 
the Price Commission as a weapon to disallow price increases in 
excess of the norm so that the degree of controls increased. Further 
increases in powers were attempted in 1978 as the Government 
tried to discriminate against employers who broke the pay norm 
but this was subsequently defeated in Parliament. Finally, the 
election of the Conservative Government in May 1979 led to a 
complete abolition of all forms of pay control so that the index 
returns to zero again.
5.3.2 Government attitude
Chapter 4 outlines the development of policy over the 
period and the index of attitude shown in Table 5.4 is essentially 
based on that description.
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Until the pay pause of 1961 the prevailing approach 
was one of belief that inflation was a problem and that some 
restraint of wage increases would be beneficial but the Government 
was not prepared to intervene much. With the pay pause and the 
formation of the NIC this attitude changed a little but the Government 
did little to use the NIC as a major instrument of policy. With the 
replacement of the NIC by the NBPI in 1965 and the introduction of 
an early warning system for wages and attitudes hardened and a further 
increase in toughness occurTed in 1966 when the Government passed legislation 
enabling it to delay wage increase With the pay freeze of 1966 
and the policy of severe restraint in 1967 the Government was attempting 
to apply policy very rigorously but through 1968 and 1969 
the Government became more preoccupied with industrial relations 
legislation and by the beginning of 1970 the Government was 
by-passing the NBPI to a large extent and allowing through wage 
increases far in excess of the policy norm (NBPI Fifth General Report).
The number of references to the NBPI in the second half of 1969 and 
in 1970 is in fact misleading as none of these related to 
particular pay settlements. The new Conservative administration 
made no attempt initially to impose any controls but then adopted 
its 'n-1' policy which collapsed in early 1972. Thereafter it 
searched quite hard to achieve a voluntary policy but failure in 
this search led to the statutory freeze beginning in Noveinber 1972.
This freeze and its successive policy stages were firmly applied 
until the three-day week and general election of early 1974.
Yet again, the incoming Government (Labour) adopted a 
free-market approach to wages but by 1975 it had become determined 
to operate a formal policy rather than the 'understandings' of the 
Social Contract. Throughout 1976 to 1978 incomes policy was seen
as an important ingredient in economic policy but the new 
Conservative administration of 1979 again adopted a free-market 
approach.
5.3.3 Trade union response
The TUC having given evidence to the Council on Prices, 
Productivity and Incomes later refused to have anything to do 
with it. They remained opposed to the pay pause and subsequent 
formation of the NIC and refused to give any co-operation to this 
body, although Panitch (1976) notes that this did not turn into 
active hostility to the Conservative Government. In 1963 the 
TUC General Council Report stated the 'need for policies to 
ensure that money incomes, wages, salaries and profits as a whole 
rise substantially less rapidly than in the past' but they also 
declared 'complete opposition to any form of wages restraint'.
As the General Election approached in 1964 the TUC was in even less 
sympathetic mood towards any form of incomes policy under the 
existing government. However, two months before the election it 
gave overwhelming support to an incomes policy under a planned 
economy introduced by a Labour Government, although it explicitly 
opposed any policy which had wage restraint or limitations on 
collective bargaining as its aim (Panitch, 1976, p.61).
After the election of the Labour Government the TUC was involved 
in the drafting of the statement of intent which was the basis for the 
incomes policy which developed in 1965. The TUC was also involved 
in drafting the Prices and Incomes White Papers. The TUC endorsed 
the formation of the NBPI and agreed to the wage norm of 3-3J per cent. 
The mood of co-operation continued through 1965 and the General Council 
agreed (although reluctantly) to an early warning system and to powers 
to delay wage increases. Under the early warning system the TUC
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set up its own vetting committee which operated from October 1965 
to January 1970 with a break for the wage freeze of 1966. The 
vetting committee had several possible courses of action: it could 
make no observation on a claim; it could merely point out the 
Government's wage criteria; it could make specific comments on the 
claim and ask the union to reconsider; or it could ask the union 
concerned to meet with the committee. In fact, the TUC vetting 
committee operated far more as a monitoring agency as the NBPI 
only examined cases referred to it, and,in any case, could only deal 
with a limited number of references at any given period of time.
The TUC had indicated, however, that it would be flexible in its 
treatment of the norm in its vetting process. The powers of the 
incomes policy committee were largely those of moral sanctions as 
it had no direct means of guaranteeing union adherence.
The TUC General Council reluctantly gave support to the pay 
freeze of July 1966 and at the Annual Congress the freeze was 
accepted only by a majority of 4.9 to 3.8 million. Following the 
end of the freeze, the TUC incomes policy committee resumed its vetting 
but the TUC was becoming more critical of policy. In general it 
opposed the introduction of statutory powers and in particular it 
did not approve of the NBPI's guidelines for productivity agreements 
as an exception to the nil pay norm. The TUC also wanted to define 
the low-paid as those earning less than £15 for a standard working 
week but the Government insisted that this figure was far too high 
and refused to define the low-paid. The TUC also adopted its 
own norm for vetting purposes of 7 per cent and various critical 
motions were passed at its Annual Congress.
The Committee examined 340 claims notified to it during
1967 and withheld approval from 40 per cent of claims but this 
figure fell through 1968. In the period between May 1967 and 
January 1968 some 441 claims were examined and only 126 passed
but most unions ignored the TUC view and in the second half of 1968 the 
committee found 309 out of 327 claims as non-objectionable and only 
sent 18 claims to its panel which usually passed the claims. For
1968 the TUC had adopted its own norm of 6 per cent. The 1968 Annual 
Congress was very critical of government policy and a motion supporting 
the TUC voluntary policy was only passed by the meagre majority of 
34,000 votes. Industrial disputes (and particularly those which
were wage disputes) rose in 1968 and even more strongly during 1969. 
During 1969 the TUC became more and more opposed to the reactivation 
of Part II of the 1966 Act (which gave the Government powers of 
delay) and argued that the proposed White Paper of December was 
unacceptable.
In February 1970 the TUC finally abandoned its own vetting 
and the decade thus began with a trade union opposed to any form 
of incomes policy, whether voluntary or statutory. Although the 
Conservative Government of Mr. Heath in 1970 had no intention of 
operating price and incomes controls its attitude towards industrial 
relations legislation in particular and trade unions in general 
made the trade union movement very antagonistic towards it. By 1972, 
however, the TUC were looking to regain their influence with the 
Government and were prepared to negotiate over a genuinely voluntary 
policy (PanLtch, 1976, p.225). However, there was an air of 
suspicion present in the talks and they broke down over the size 
of the proposed norm and because the TUC wanted a voluntary pay 
policy but a statutory policy on prices. The TUC denounced the 
statutory policy which was finally introduced and refused to sit
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representatives on either the Pay Board or the Price Conmission. In 
addition a special Congress in March 1973 required the General 
Council to lead a one-day general strike against the policy. The 
TUC continued to talk to the Government over Stage III of its policy, 
but principally to make its views known. Finally Stage III came 
to an abrupt end with the Conservative Government's defeat at the 
general election of 1974 following the dispute with the miners. The 
new Labour Government had already been working on a 'Social Contract' 
with the trade unions whilst in opposition and now began to apply 
this understanding in practice. The TUC itself was responsible for 
vetting claims and was a more than willing partner to this 
voluntary policy. When, in 1975, this understanding was seen to 
be too vague and leading to an acceleration, rather than deceleration 
in the pace of wage settlements the TUC were instrumental in 
designing a more formal policy and they agreed to oppose any 
settlement in excess of this £6 p.w. pay norm. With the succeeding 
phase of policy in 1966 the TUC again supported the specific 
wage limit but with less enthusiasm than in 1975. By 1977 their 
support had diminished to one of a general nature and they no 
longer endorsed the specific limiting figure. In the following 
year the policy had no TUC backing at all.
As in 1970 the Conservative Government of 1979 was very 
unpopular with the TUC largely on account of its industrial 
relations attitudes and despite the fact that it eschewed any 
wage controls.
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5.4 Comparison of the actual outturn in wages with the policy norm
In this section we briefly examine the outcome for wages 
under different periods of policy and the relationship of the outcome 
with different policy norms. At this stage no attempt is made to 
reconcile discrepancies between the outcome and the policy norm 
in terms of the pressure of policy and/or the general failure of 
policy. This is dealt with by more formal analysis in Chapter 6.
The purpose of this section is merely to prepare the ground for the 
more formal analysis and to illustrate the dependence of statements 
regarding the actual outcome of wage inflation on the actual measure 
of wages chosen. Thus in Table 5.5 wage increases are shown for each 
policy episode for five alternative measures of wages (a description of 
these measures is given in Appendix D. The average wage and 
salary measure is the most comprehensive measure of earnings actually 
received as the average weekly earnings series has substantially less 
coverage. The index of basic weekly wage rates only refers to 
manual workers and is base weighted and whilst the CEPG and Aberdeen 
settlement indices are conceptually more appealing they also only 
cover manual workers.^
All the series are seasonally unadjusted and consequently 
very short-term movements may be due to seasonal factors which 
cannot be adequately dealt with in this informal analysis.
In Table 5.6 a more precise definition of the actual increase 
in earnings and wage rates is given by using monthly data. However, 
this more precise definition is only possible for two of the 
alternative measures of wages, namely the index of average weekly 
earnings and the index of basic weekly wage rates.
5.4 Comparison of the actual outturn in wages vith the policy norm
In this section we briefly examine the outcome for wages 
under different periods of policy and the relationship of the outcome 
with different policy norms. At this stage no attempt is made to 
reconcile discrepancies between the outcome and the policy norm 
in terms of the pressure of policy and/or the general failure of 
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coverage. The index of basic weekly wage rates only refers to 
manual workers and is base weighted and whilst the CEPG and Aberdeen 
settlement indices are conceptually more appealing they also only 
cover manual workers.^
All the series are seasonally unadjusted and consequently 
very short-term movements may be due to seasonal factors which 
cannot be adequately dealt with in this informal analysis.
In Table 5.6 a more precise definition of the actual increase 
in earnings and wage rates is given by using monthly data. However, 
this more precise definition is only possible for two of the 
alternative measures of wages, namely the index of average weekly 
earnings and the index of basic weekly wage rates.
Table 5.5 Wages and Earnings in Selected Policy Periods
X increase at annual rates
Basic
Policy Period ^ a g ^
rates
1961(3)-1962(1) Pay Pause 3.0 
1962(2)-1963(3) Guiding Light(1) 3.4 
1963(4)-1964(4) Guiding Light(2) 4.7 
1965(2)-1966(2) Early Warning 4.9 
1966(3)-1967(1) Standstill 2.0 
1967(1)-1967(3) Severe restraint 3.2 
1967(3)-1968(l) Restraint 9.0 
1968(2)-1969<4) Moderate restraint4.9 
1970(1)-1970(2) Little restraint 12.4 
1970(4)-1972(1) N-l Policy 12.8 
1972(4)-1973(1) Stage 1 10.4 
1973(2)-1973(4) Stage 2 13.1 
1973(4)-1974(1) Stage 3 19.3 
1974(1)-1975(3) Social Contract 30.8 
1975(3)-1976(3) Phase 1 18.2 
1976(3)-1977(3) Phase 2 5.0 
1977(3)-1978(3) Phase 3 16.2 
1978(3)-1979(2) Phase 4 13.1
, Average CEPG Aberdeen
ueltlv wage8 wage wage Wage . „  and settle-settle- normearnings salaries ments ments
n.a. 3.1 -3.2 7.4 -
n.a. 4.7 1.7 4.7 2.5
6.2 8.1 9.5 6.3 3.5
8.0 7.5 3.6 5.5 3.5
-2.5 5.8 9.2 4.7 0.6
6.7 5.7 4.2 5.2 0.6
7.9 7.0 2.2 6.3 -
7.4 8.3 3.7 7.1 3.5
12.5 14.2 24.6 11.4 4.5
10.4 8.5 9.7 11.1 11.5
12.3 11.2 10.0 11.1 1.3
12.9 14.3 10.3 10.2 7.0
16.3 14.4 12.8 15.6 8.8
28.3 29.9 35.2 15.0 16.3
13.5 12.4 13.4 n.a. 12.4
8.6 9.5 11.2 n.a. 6.3
16.1 14.8 11.9 n.a. 9.2
17.4 14.9 15.8 n.a. 6.2
Notes: The wage norm is described in section 5.2 and in Table 5.2
A description of the various wage and earnings series is 
given in Appendix D. They ere all unadjusted for seasonal 
variation.
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At the beginning of the decade whilst the Council on Prices, 
Productivity and Incomes was in operation the increase in wage 
rates was considerably lower than that of earnings or that 
indicated by both measures of wage settlements. During the pay 
pause the CEPG measure of wage settlements actually shows a 
fall in wages whilst the Aberdeen index shows a sharp increase.
Under the first part of the policy of the 'Guiding Light' both 
the CEPG measure of settlements and the index of wage rates show 
an increase in wages compatible with the norm whilst the average 
wage measure and the Aberdeen index show an excess of around 2 per 
cent per annum. The measures all consistently show an overshoot 
during the second half of the guiding light era, with the most modest 
increases being shown by the wage rate series. *
During the initial period of the Labour Government there is 
reasonably close agreement between the wage rates and settlement 
measures and the implicit wage norm of 34 per cent but not for 
the earnings series.
With the exception of the index of average weekly earnings 
all the measures show some increase over and above the wage norm 
during the pay standstill of 1966 and both the earnings series and 
the basic weekly wage rates series show a considerable rebound in 
wages during the period of severe restraint whilst this is not 
apparent from the wage settlement data. 5 The policy of little 
restraint appears to be just that with a major acceleration of 
wages under all definitions and with some easing when policy was 
finally removed in 1970. Given the implicit norm calculated for the 
'n-1' episode wage experience during this period appears to have 
been consistent with the demands of policy.
Stage 1 of the Conservative policy in 1972 seems, on the
5.29
Table 5.6 Earnings and Wages by More Detailed Policy Episodes
X p.a e
Average Basic
Weekly Weekly
Earnings Wage Rates
Pay Pause 1961 July - 1962 March n.a. 2.5
Guiding Light (1) 1962 April •- 1963 Sept. n.a. 2.9
Guiding Light (2) 1963 Oct. - 1964 Dec. 6.4 4.7
Early Warning 1965 April -- 1966 July 8.6 5.4
Standstill 1966 July - 1967 January -0.4 2.5
Severe Restraint 1967 Jan. - 1967 June 5.7 0.6
Res traint 1967 July - 1968 March 9.1 10.9
Moderate Restraint 1968 March -- 1969 Dec. 8.8 5.7
Little Restraint 1970 Jan. - 1970 June 14.4 10.9
N-l Policy 1970 Nov. - 1972 March 10.6 11.9
Stage 1 1972 Nov. - 1973 March 5.9 3.7
Stage 2 1973 April -- 1973 Nov. 17.6 17.7
Stage 3 1973 Nov. - 1974 Feb. 1 6.8
Social Contract 1974 Feb. - 1975 July 29.5 33.0
Phase 1 1975 Aug. - 1976 July 13.9 18.5
Phase 2 1976 Aug. - 1977 July 8.9 4.8
Phase 3 1977 Aug. - 1978 July 16.3 16.0
Phase 4 1978 Aug. - 1979 May 14.5 11.1
Mote: (1) affected by 3 day week.
Source: DE Gazettes; Historical Abstract.
face of it, to have been unsuccessful in terms of all the measures.
The discrepancy between all the measures and the wage norm is much 
less marked during Stage 2 of the policy but widens again during 
Stage 3. A major acceleration in earnings and wage rates then occurred 
for wages and earnings during the era of the Social Contract (with 
the exception of the Aberdeen settlement series which records no 
acceleration but which would do so if staged settlements 
were included) but during Phase 1 of the Labour Government’s policy 
of 1975 the wage increase was reasonably close to the wage norm with 
the greatest discrepancy being recorded for wage rates. In contrast 
the wage rates series records the greatest degree of 'success' for 
Phase 2 whilst there is a little more slippage in the other series. 
Slippage then appears to have increased throughout Phases 3 and 4 of the 
policy.
Comparison of the actual outturn of wages with the notional 
wage norm also depends on the method of differencing as well as 
on the actual measure of wages chosen. In the preceding discussion 
the implicit model has been one of quarterly differencing but with 
the measures expressed in terms of an annual rate. However, if 
the implicit model is one of annual changes then the interpretation 
of the outcome is somewhat different. ^ For example, if the 
wage norm of zero for 1966 (4) were related to the level of earnings 
one year earlier the implied rate of increase would be 1} per cent.
Table 5.7 shows the divergence of actual earnings from the 
implied wage norm under various assumptions. The first column of 
Table 5.7 relates the divergence between actual earnings and the 
predicted outcome for earnings if the wage norm were applied to 
actual earnings one year earlier. Under this interpretation of 
policy, events before the previous year are neglected but any 
'overshooting^ in the current year has to be remedied within the
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current quarter. This is quite a strict interpretation as the 
introduction of a zero norm, say, would require a fall in 
earnings in the current period for the requirement of policy to 
be met. The second column is more realistic and shows the 
implied level of earnings using the wage norm applied to 
the previous quarter’s level of actual earnings. The third 
column then shows the implied actual rate from column (2), using 
last year's earnings as base.
5.5 ’ Description of the incomes policy measures
The wage norm for the period as a whole was shown in 
Table 5.2 and the indices of Government pressure and TUC response 
in Table 5.4. The various incomes policy measures that are 
appropriate for use in aggregate wage equations are set out in 
Table 5.8. These are als6 shown graphically in Figure 5.1.
Several alternative measures are presented. The first (IP1)
shows the real wage pressure exerted at different periods of policy
by deducting the rate of price inflation in the preceding period from
the wage norm. A second measure (XP2) allows for the fact that real
wages are expected to grow over time and a moving average of real
wages is deducted from IP1.
. . ,
Thus IP2 * wn. - p - - 1 I (w - p),.
* C 1 n i- 1  C
The third measure, IP3, is derived from a product of the real wage 
pressure variable and the index of government pressure (GPS) whilst 
IP4 uses the product of IP1 and the overall index, IPS. The measure 
IP3 is less general than IP4 but the two measures
are quite similar. A weak intensity of policy (IPS) scales down the 
effect of the real wage pressure. Comparable measures to IP3 and IP4 
using real wage pressure as IP2 can also be derived but these are 
not shown in Table 5.8.
i
Figure 5.1 Income« Policy Measures
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The measures generally have a negative sign which implies a down­
ward pressure on wages but very weak periods of policy can have a positive 
influence suggesting a contributory influence to higher inflation.
At the beginning of the period under consideration 
policy is seen to be quite loose with a high implicit wage 
norm but the introduction of the pay pause leads to a considerable 
tightening during 1961. All of the measures shown in Table 5.8 
indicate a tightening of policy in late 1962 followed by some 
easing in late 1963/early 1964 as the wage norm was increased.
The slowdown in trend real wages through 1962 produces a 
more severe effect on policy using the IP2 measure than is the 
case from IP1. The easing of pressure continues until late 1964 
and the election of the Labour Government, following which the 
intensity of policy is increased but remains fairly steady throughout 
1965 and the first half of 1966. The increase in intensity stems 
from both an acceleration of prices relative to the wage norm 
(measure IP1) and the more sympathetic response of the TUC to 
Government policy.
The stance of policy then becomes more restrictive during 
the second half of 1966 and in early 1967 following the period 
of standstill and severe restraint where a low wage norm is 
accompanied by a high degree of formal control and by a reasonably 
sympathetic trade union movement. Policy then weakens in early 1968 
following the higher nominal wage norm but then tightens again 
throughout the remainder of 1968 and the beginning of 1969 as the 
price effects of the devaluation start to appear and increase real 
wage pressure for the unchanged wage norm. However, the gradual 
weakening of the intensity of policy coupled with an increase in the 
wage norm at the beginning of 1970 leads to an easing of incomes
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policy pressure. The end of the formal policy in 1970 and the 
election of a Conservative Government committed not to interfere 
with the normal processes of wage bargaining sees a considerable 
easing of policy in 1970, reduced a little during the period of 
'n-1'. The wage freeze of 1972 leads to quite a severe restrictive 
effect at the end of 1972/beginning of 1973 but this is then moderated 
considerably through 1973 as the wage norm is increased from the 
zero norm of the freeze. The pressure of policy then increases 
a little during early 1974 until the period of the Social Contract 
when by definition real wage pressure is zero.
Set against the very rapid rates of price inflation in 
1975 Che first phase of the Labour Government's policy in summer 1975 
is seen to be very restrictive in terms of real wage pressure, and is 
also accompanied by a high intensity of policy. When allowance 
is also made for the slowdown in the trend rate of growth in real 
wages the pressure of policy is seen to be even greater (IF2). The 
restrictive pressure of policy remains throughout 1976 and 1977 with 
a lowering of the wage norm in 1975. The increase in the norm 
in late 1977 together with some dissatisfaction by the TUC with policy 
leads to a reduction in pressure during 1978 with some tightening 
occurring during late 1978 and early 1979 with a lower wage norm.
5.6 Sumnary
An explicit wage norm can be observed for much of the period 
and implicit norms can be calculated for some of the remaining periods. 
Thus there are very few genuine policy "off" periods, mainly in 1960 
and mid 1970, early 1972 and in the second half of 1979. The chapter 
describes how the various pieces of information available can be 
pieced together to form measures of the stance of incomes policy 
with particular attention being paid to the role of deferred pay
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settlements under incomes policy. Some of the measures presented 
incorporate the intensity of policy and trade union response.
The resultant policy measures reveal considerable variation 
in policy pressure over the period and this casts doubts on methods 
which assume a relatively high degree of homogeneity between policy 
periods. The most intense and prolonged period of policy pressure 
implied by the measures of policy developed in this chapter were 
between 1975 and 1977 with weaker and short-lived periods of 
intensity in 1976-7 and in 1972-3. The least restrictive policy 
periods suggested are those in 1963 and in 1970-2. In relative 
terms policy in these periods may have contributed to higher and 
not lower wage inflation. Whilst the alternative measures of 
policy differ in absolute size they do indicate quite similar 
rankings of policy tightness over the period.
\
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Notes to Chapter 5
1. The recent study of Lawson (1982) which uses annual data 
mixes together slippage and the wage norm and does not 
allow for the overlapping of periods with different wage 
norms within the year.
2. Subsequent econometric analysis showed that the omission 
of these periods did not affect the coefficients of the 
estimated wage equation.
3. Whilst it might be tempting to interpret any discrepancy 
between the wage rates and earnings series as reflecting 
wage drift this inference cannot be made, see Appendix D .
4. The main difference between the basic weekly wage rates 
series and the Aberdeen series is that the former is base 
weighted whilst the latter is current weighted (see Elliott 
and Dean, 1978, for further discussion).
5. About 2 per cent of the increase in the Aberdeen settlement 
index can be attributed to staged settlements however 
(Elliott and Shelton, 1978).
6. An annual model pre-supposes a labour force settling at 
fixed yearly intervals.
6.1
CHAPTER 6 ESTIMATES OF INCOMES POLICY FROM A REAL WAGE MODEL
6.1 The appropriate measure of wages
A general formulation whereby a measure of incomes policy 
could be included in a real wage model was set out in Chapter 3. 
However, there remain two major issues to be resolved which have 
plagued previous work on the estimation of wage equations. The 
first of these concerns the appropriate measure of wages and the 
second concerns the appropriate form of differencing in the wage 
variable (i.e. whether AlogW^ is defined as log(Wt/Wt_^) or 
log(Wt/Wt_4). These issues are to some extent related.
The extent of the difference in the experience of wage growth 
under alternative measures of wages has already been discussed 
in Chapter 5. The main distinction lies between variables which 
purport to explain changes in the level of earnings per head 
and in the total wage bill, on the one hand, and those which 
attempt to measure the change in wage rates. Whilst some interest 
may be placed on the issue of whether incomes policy more successfully 
affects nationally negotiated wage rates rather than total 
earnings (which includes the effects of overtime and shift 
payments, local bargaining etc.) the existing data are not capable 
of resolving this issue. As Appendix D shows, earnings and 
rates data are not available on a comparable basis which covers 
the whole economy. Basic wage rate data typically relate only 
to manual workers who only cover just over one-half of those in 
employment (Whitley et al., 1980, p.123) and therefore the data are 
not capable of drawing any conclusions about the overall national 
effaces of any given policy. In addition, basic wage rates can, 
and are often, heavily influenced by the negotiations of major
sectors of the economy (such as engineering) where the settlement only 
defines a minimum level or floor to earnings and does not reflect 
any change in the pace of wage settlements. This objection is 
recognised by both Elliott and Shelton (1978) and by Coutts, Tarling 
and Wilkinson (1976) who construct wage rate indices which avoid 
some of these problems. However, such indices cannot incorporate 
the growing influence of local negotiations and they only measure, 
in any case, the manual sector of the economy. ^
Thus, whilst the various settlement indices are in some 
sense an improvement on the basic wage rates data and they 
may be able to answer useful questions about the influence of 
policy at the more microeconomic level they require some heroic 
assumptions in order to derive conclusions about policy at the 
aggregate level. Chapter 3 argues that, from a modelling point 
of view, the change in the overall pay bill is a more relevant 
measure of wages and for this reason changes in the average level 
of wages and salaries is the preferred measure. This is a
comprehensive measure which includes all employees and all 
sources of pay. From the point of view of macroeconomic policy 
it is the most relevant variable when considering the impact of 
incomes policy on inflation since it is total wage costs which 
help to determine the level of prices.
The average vage data combine two separate influences
as the absolute change in the wage bill can be defined as the change in
earnings per head and the change in the numbers receiving increases, 
m
Thus AWt Z
i-1
ei.t A WSi.t (6 . 1)
where AWS refers to the absolute increase in pay from those receiving 
a settlement within the period and 0
+ 9 C
reflects the numbers
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affected in each period. Absolute changes in the index can 
therefore be expressed as a weighted sum of solely those people 
settling within the particular period. But proportional changes in 
the wage level will depend not only on the number settling during the 
period but also the previous level of wages of all groups, including 
those who do not settle within the period.
If wage settlements were spread at uniform and constant periods throughout
the year an index based on (6.1) would provide a reasonably accurate
2
guide to movements in the average size of settlements.
However, the very presence of incomes policy and its rules on 
settlements ensure that this does not happen. This has led various 
authors (for example, Johnston and Timbrell, 1973 and Ashenfelter and 
Pencavel, 1975) to adjust the wage equation for variations in the 
number of workers settling in each period. Johnston and Timbrell 
add this variable to the basic equation whilst Ashenfelter and 
Pencavel use it to deflate the dependent variable.
Both Johnston and Timbrell and Ashenfelter and Pencavel 
use manual workers settling in each period. In order to measure 9 
as an index Ashenfelter and Pencavel deflate by the total number 
of employees (both manual and non-manual). This will clearly 
impart a falling trend to the resultant series ($) since the 
number of non-manual employees has grown far more rapidly than 
the number of manual employees since 1960 (Whitley at al. 1980 
. p.115).
The procedure adopted by Ashenfelter and Pencavel assumes
that contract length is fixed and evidence presented by Tarling
3
and Wilkinson (1977)'.suggests that this may not be valid.
' i ' -
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However, whilst contract lengths may not be completely rigid, 
there is a certain stickiness in wage bargaining so that changes
in 4 will still represent institutional factors such as the
4customary timing of settlements of different size groups.
Therefore, whilst one might expect $ not to be dominated
by purely economic factors (and this is the conclusion of Johnston
and Timbrell, 1973, amongst others) the very presence of incomes
policy will have an important influence. Evidence on contract
length from the Aberdeen database finds some support for the
idea that contract length is reduced in times of rapid inflation
but no conclusive evidence to draw inferences regarding the role
of incomes policy on contract duration. ^ For example, a wage
freeze might be expected to substantially reduce the level of wage
settlements. To deflate the wage variable by the proportion of
workers settling in a given period would clearly be an inappropriate
way to measure the influence of incomes policy since the main aim
of policy is to reduce the rate of growth of the wage bill regardless
of whether this comes from a reduction in the size of average
6settlement or the number of settlements. In Chapter S the
influence of policy rules on the timing of settlements was 
discussed and this influence would be increased by any 
anticipation or catch-up effects. In principle, incomes policies 
which involve a twelve-month rule for settlements should also 
affect the timing of settlements but if such a rule follows a 
period of freeze then the rule may not have such an effect since 
the freeze would have already extended the length of contract. 7 
Tarling and Wilkinson (1977) using data on national negotiations 
for manual workers show that 1970 represented a watershed in bargaining
■  I
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behaviour with a consistently higher proportion of bargaining
groups settling in each year and with a near 100 per cent
settlement rate since 1974. This might be explained by the
institutionalisation of the 12-month rule by the fact that price
and wage inflation was significantly higher after 1970 and under
these circumstances one might expect groups to settle more
8rapidly than otherwise.
The preferred approach to this question is to isolate 
the normal (if there are any) institutional patterns in wage 
settlements from the total as deferred settlements, anticipation 
and catch-up effects can be dealt with explicitly within the equation.
The issue regarding the differencing of the wage variable 
is also related to the timing of settlements. Rowley and Wilton 
(1973) set out a model where wages are set annually for all 
workers and then fixed until the next annual settlement and the 
relative change in the wage rate over its value four quarters 
earlier is given by a moving average of the importance of the 
groups settling within each quarterly period. On the assumption 
that these weights are equal the model then induces a fourth-order 
moving average serial correlation process which results in 
biased estimates of the standard errors.
Returning to (6.1) we have Alog Alog WSC
if Alog WSt - a+ 8Xt + et (6 . 2)
then Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1975) show that:
Alog - a$t B$tXt ♦ vfc (S3)
where v £ — q>cet. The disturbance term therefore depends systematically 
on $ *
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They go on to show that for:
logWt - log W t_4 - « ♦ 0 Z  *t-i V i
i-0
. X^ . + E 
i-0 t-i
(6.3)
and ♦ - i for all periods; i.e. workers settle evenly throughout
the year then:
3 3
log Wt - logWt_4 - a + 6 Z iXfc_i ♦ E . v ^  (6.4)
i-0 i-0
- « + i SEX . + Z
Ashenfelter and Pencavel then argue that there is no reason 
why (6.3) should not be fitted directly. However, the same 
objections as outlined earlier remain. The major question is whether 
the lags on the price and real wage variables should be 1 quarter 
or 4 quarters. If we were dealing with a group of workers settling 
at period t, having previously settled in t-4, then the four-quarter 
lag might seem the more appropriate. However, the logic of the real 
wage catch-up implies that it is the current size of the real wage 
gap that is relevant not the gap at the time of the last settlement. 
Therefore the real wage lagged one quarter is the correct variab le.
In terms of the real wage model there is no additional role for 
price inflation since this is already incorporated in the real wage 
catch up. Therefore its role must relate more to expected inflation.
In earlier versions of the model the specification used was 
largely that of equation (3. 12) ; i.e.
wt - bQ (1-k) + b 1 (1-k) u t + b2 (l-k)pt
♦ b3 (1-k) (r.w/p) t_ 1 ♦ b4 (l-k)T + kYIPt ♦ nt
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but including also the term wc_^> The rationale for this term was
that it reflected the influence of settlements made by other workers
in the previous period. A term in the proportion of workers
settling might be included on the right hand side of the equation.
However, when the settlements term is decomposed into non-seasonal
and seasonal elements (using seasonal dumnies to represent the
seasonal elements) it is the latter which provide all of the
9statistical explanation Therefore it is clear that the
proportion of settlements is not a useful addition to the equation, 
rather it is the seasonal factors reflecting regular changes in 
the proportion of workers settling in each period which helps to 
explain variations in the rate of wage inflation.
6.2 Anticipation and catch-up effects
Previous chapters have emphasised the importance of allowing 
as far as possible for timing effects relating to policy. In 
Chapter 5 specific allowance is made within the incomes policy 
variable for the effects of incomes policy rules in switching wage 
settlements. Here we deal with more general anticipation and 
catch-up effects.
Anticipation effects can be of two main types. First, the 
fact that incomes policies are sometimes announced in advance of 
their starting date may provide an incentive for workers to 
correspondingly advance their wage negotiations. Second, there may 
be no pre-announcement but expectations of changes in policy stance 
may be formed with a similar incentive to the first case.
If the period between announcement or expectation of a 
policy change and the actual occurrence of a policy change is brief 
then the scope for advancing wage negotiations will be limited
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especially if workers are constrained by a settlement interval 
which is not markedly flexible. 10 The incentive to advance 
negotiations will also depend on the actual (or expected) change 
in the pressure of policy. Similar arguments apply in reverse to 
the ending or relaxation of policy where an announcement or general 
expectation of easing of policy may encourage a postponement of wage 
settlements. Even if the period of prior knowledge or expectation 
is fairly short it is unlikely that speeding up or postponement of 
claims will extend over more than one quarter for the reasons 
outlined above. In the case of pre-announced changes in policy 
the effect of the change in the timing of settlements will therefore 
depend on the extent of the change in policy and the expected 
proportion of claims normally settled in the preceding period.
Thus the appropriate variable ,IPA, is given by:
IPAt - X * t  . (-AIP4t+1) C6.3)
where X *  is the expected proportion of settlements occuring in 
t
period t in absence of any policy change and AIP4^is the actual 
change in policy pressure in the following period.
Since this is purely a timing change we would expect the effect 
to be reversed in following periods so that:
n
I IPA - - IPA„ C$.4)
i-1 C 1 C
Complications arise when the lag between announcement and 
commencement is less than one quarter. The announcement 
effect can then be defined more generally as:
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IPA.t+L “ X U  Q t+i (-A IP4t+1) (6.5)
for t ■ 0 ,1
where Q reflects the proportion of the quarter during which 
announcement effects exist. Thus announcement effects can 
occur within the current quarter alongside the offsetting effects 
emerging from (6.4). The logic behind postponement of settlements 
due to announcement effects is exactly analogous to that 
described before.
The logic behind the allowance for expectations effects of 
incomes policy and general catch-up effects is somewhat different. 
Although the timing considerations outlined above still apply the 
model for expectational effects should be specified in terms of 
the expected rather than the actual change in policies. The 
determinants of this variable are therefore related to those 
underlying the authorities' decision to impose policy (see Chapters 
7 and 8) and are discussed more fully under the general heading 
of expectations in section 6.4. In terms of equation (6.5) the 
expectational effect of incomes policy now becomes
IPA7 X* (- a » 4 ; +1) (6. 6)
A* is the given institutional constant and £. IP4®+  ^is the expected 
change in policy pressure in the following period. Again, as the
issue is one of timing £ifA t+l -i p a!
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Table 6.1 Incomes Policy Announcements
Policy Quarters
affected
Increase or decrease 
in policy pressure
value of 
X*
value of
Q
Guiding Light 1962(1) increase 0.244 0.67
Guiding Light 1963(3) decrease 0.271 1.0
Standstill 1966(3) increase 0.224 0.33
Moderate restraint 1968(2) decrease 0.271 1.0
Freeze 1972(4) increase 0.260 0.33
Stage 3 1974(1) decrease 0.244 0.33
Phase 1 1975(3) increase 0.224 0.33
Phase 4 1979(2) decrease 0.271 0.67
Notes: * is the median value of the proportion of workers settling
in the appropriate quarter of each year; it is derived from 
the proportion of workers recorded as having made settlements 
in each period, excluding settlements relating to the 
engineering sector. The data only covers manual workers and 
is scaled so that on average the annual proportion settling 
is unity. Source: Department of Employment Gazette (various).
Q is the proportion of the month for which announcements were 
current.
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In earlier chapters it was argued that the real wage 
resistance formulation of the wage equation already allows 
for some automatic catch up resulting from any pressure on 
real wages. However, there may be some extra effects in which 
case the sign on the catch-up variable will be positive or 
alternatively incomes policy may actually defuse some of the 
desire to regain the previous trend in real wages so that it is 
conceivable that any catch-up variable has a negative coefficient. 
In either case the extent of potential catch-up would depend on 
the real wage effects of the policy so that a distribution of the 
lagged terms in the incomes policy variable itself would be 
appropriate. However, a less symaetric formulation would be more 
plausible as the probability of catch up will be higher, a priori, 
as policy pressure eases rather than when it tightens.
Thus we can also define policy catch—up as only occurring 
following an easing of policy (i.e. when AIP > 0) where IP is 
the measure of policy pressure. "^ le institutional considerations 
discussed earlier suggest that a significant easing of policy 
is unlikely to be followed by a major explosion of settlements 
but rather by a steady catch-up reflecting the normal distribution 
of wage settlements over time. Therefore catch-up is best measured 
as a set of lagged variables which incorporate X* defined thus:
CATCHt - AIP * >* ft 
*
CATCHt+1 - *IPt-l *  C l  *
c a t c hc+2 a *IPt-2 * Xf 2
CATCHt+3 - Alpt-3 * \ t+3
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where CATCH are the policy catch up effects and where AIPt is the 
change in the incomes policy variable, defined as AIP for AIP >0 
and AIP “ 0 otherwise.
A modification of this specific catch up approach would be
to measure AIP as the cumulative policy pressure over the last
n
two years (say) so that AIP is now defined as I IP . for AIP > 0
i-1 C
and AIPt » 0 otherwise.
The sign on the catch-up variable is not unambiguous.
Whilst it may be thought that the catch-up variable should be 
positively signed so that wages are higher after the ending of 
a severe phase of policy the real wage resistance formulation implies 
that any pressure on real wages is compensated automatically so 
that the catch-up variable measures a path of real wages after 
a restrictive policy phase which is different from pressure to regain the 
trend level of real wages. Thus if policy succeeds in reducing 
the trend rate of real wage growth or in reducing the pressure to 
regain real wages in any other way the sign of the catch-up 
variable may be negatively signed.
6.3 Estimation of the wage model
The form of the real wage equation incorporating incomes 
policy effects described in Chapter 3 was of the form:
AlogW - bQ (l-kt) + b 1 (l-kt)log Ut + b2 <l-kt)AlogPt
♦ b3 (l-kt) log(r.W/P) fc_1 ♦ b4 (l-kt)TIME ♦ kclog(l*IPlt/l00) (6,7>
where kfc - y IPSfc
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This model is teemed the restricted model of policy. First we 
consider the unrestricted form (6.8).
AlogW - b0 ' + bj-' logUfc + b 2' AlogP® + b 3' log(r.W/P) t _1
+ b 4* TIME + b5 ' IPt (6.8)
where IPt is the overall index of incomes policy. Here incomes
policy enters the wage model as an additional explanatory variable
instead of transforming the whole equation. This provides an
interim step between the traditional dummy variable approach
and the more comprehensive approach represented by equation 6.7.
A more general starting point for estimation of 6.8 is
one which allows for richer dynamic properties, following the
work of Hendry and Mizon (1978X might be of the form: 
m n
AlogW * an *■ Z  logU • ♦ E e.Alogr .
i-0 t_1 j-o J c J
P+ ^  6k AlogWt_k + 4^  log( W/P)t_x
+ ♦ j l o g P ^  + <»3AlogP* ♦ <).4TIME +*5 logIPt + (6.9)
Definitions of the data are given in Appendix B . All data are 
seasonally unadjusted so that the only prior smoothing that 
occurs is in the alternative version of the real wage gap variable 
(LPGAP).
Estimation is over the period 1963 4}2)quarterly through to 
1979(Q4).This allows for the construction of lagged variables and 
for extra-sample period teats of the forecasting ability of the 
equations.
6.14
The estimation methods used are ordinary least squares (OLS), 
generalised least squares (GLS), recursive least squares (RLS), 
instrumental variables (IV), and three-stage least squares (3SLS). 
The main statistical packages used are the TSP package (Time Series 
Processing), GIVB (Generalised Instrumental Variable Estimation) . 11
The first section of the chapter discusses the results from 
applying OLS and GLS to the unrestricted wage model. These methods 
assume that all the right hand side variables in the wage equation 
are exogenous. If in fact some of the right hand side variables in the 
wage equation are really endogenous (such as prices and the incomes 
policy variable) then the application of OLS will lead to biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates (Stewart and Wallis, 1981). However 
Maddala (1917,p.231) argues that the OLS method is more robust against 
specification errors than many of the simultaneous equation methods and 
that it is fruitful to report OLS estimates of the structural 
equations along with those from other methods which give consistent 
estimates. It is in this spirit that questions of stability and 
dynamic structures are considered as well as contrasting alternative 
measures of the pressure of demend for labour, the incomes policy 
variable and the real wage gap. The next section considers some 
of the biases arising from OLS estimation by re-estimating the 
unrestricted model by IV, treating both the price and incomes 
policy variables as endogenous.
Following this the restricted version of the model is 
estimeted by both OLS and IV and the results compared with those 
of the unrestricted form. Results ere elso presented for joint
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estimation of the wage equation and a price equation although 
full endogeneity with policy is treated in Chapter 9. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the role of expectations in the wage 
model but some of the empirical issues raised are deferred until 
Chapter 9.
6.3.1 The unrestricted model
Starting off with the more general dynamic formulation the 
estimation results show that (6.8) is a reasonable representation 
of the dynamic structure. The presence of the lagged real wage 
term does itself provide a form of error correction mechanism.
The equation results using OLS are shown in table 6.2. 
for comparative purposes the table shows the results of estimating 
the wage equation with a sat of zero:one policy dummies and also 
the results of estimating (6.8) with no policy variable at all.
At an early stage equations were estimated using
alternative measures for the pressure of demand and for the real
wage gap. In the first place the unemployment term was replaced
by the change in output (GDP) and the lagged level of output but
non-nested hypothesis tests such as the Cox-Pesaran-Deaton test,
the J test and the P test (see Davidson and Mackinnon, 1982) support
the version of the equation with a solitary lagged unemployment
variable. Other measures, such as vacancies or unemployment minus
vacancies also proved less satisfactory. Some authors
(e.g Minford, 1980)have argued that an important factor
in the labour supply decision is the wage replacement ratio
(measured as the ratio of unemployment benefit to the
average wage). Previous work by Whitley (1980) has
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found no role for such a variable and has argued that some of 
the significant results found in the literature arise from 
measuring the hypothetical entitlement of a selected so-called 
representative of the working population rather than the actual 
average ratio. The statistical representations of these series 
differs considerably with the actual average replacement ratio 
rising sharply in 1966 following the introduction of earnings- 
related supplement but then remaining steady and declining through 
the 1970s.
The alternative measure of the real wage gap variable 
was described in Chapter 3. It represents a variant of the 
real wage resistance hypothesis, replacing the exogenous time 
trend by a moving average of past real wages. However, the 
non-nested hypothesis tests described earlier found no support 
for this version of the hypothesis over the standard formulation. 
Another alternative version tried was the inclusion of a term 
in the change in the terms of trade to test the hypothesis that 
real wage resistance did not apply when the cause of a fall in 
real wages was external rather than internal. However, this 
variable always proved statistically insignificant at the 5 per 
cent level.
The policy variables were all'broadly significant 
whether the pure 'wage pressure' version was used (IP1) or the 
version using the degree of sanctions and trade union resistance 
(IP4). The estimated equation could not reject the hypothesis 
that the coefficients on IP1 and (IP4-IP1) were equal,: although 
£P4 was generally more statistically significant than IP1. This 
implies that both the real wage pressure and the goverment 
stringency and trade union response variables have an important
6.18
role to play.
Analysis of the correlation structure of the residuals
reveals an absence of fourth order serial correlation but
significant first order serial correlation. The unrestricted
form of the equation suggested the inclusion of an additional
lagged real wage variable and also the lagged dependent variable.
Equation (1) of Table 6.2. shows the wage equation with no
policy influences. All variables except for the constant term
and the price variable are significantly different from zero
and there is significant first order serial correlation of the
residuals. Inclusion of policy dunmies improves the overall
performance of the model and the unemployment term increases in
significance but there is no noticeable effect on the estimates
of the parameter values. This result is not surprising since
only one policy dummy is significant - that relating to the period
12
of policy for 1973-4 . Values of the policy dummies are given in Appendix E.
Including the most comprehensive incomes policy measure
(IP4) in equation (3) provides an equation which has a very
“ 2similar coefficient of determination (r  ) to the policy dummy
equation (2). All the variables have the expected signs. The
policy variable itself is significant whilst the coefficient on
the unemployment variable is only marginally so. The estimates
of the coefficients on unemployment and lagged real wages are now
considerably lower than for (2) but that on prices is higher (though still
not statistically significant). The absolute size of the two lagged real wage
coefficients i» almost identical and the null hypothesis that
they are equal cannot be rejected at the conventional level of
significance. If these coefficients are equal and the coefficient
on the price variable is zero then the equilibrium real wage
6.19
implied by the equation is indeterminate. The presence of the 
additional lagged term in real wage implies an oscillatory pattern 
for the lagged adjustment to desired real wages. Equation (4) 
re-estimates (3) by dropping the term in real wages lagged by 
two-quarters and instead incorporating a first order autocorrelation 
process. As (3) is a restricted autoregressive form and 
as the autoregressive parameter attached to (3) is insignificant we 
can reject (4) in favour of (3). The coefficient on the incomes policy 
measure is somewhat higher than in (8) whilst the coefficient on lagged 
real wages suggests a fairly rapid adjustment to desired real 
wages. The combination of the estimates b^ and b^ implies a-desired 
trend rate of growth of real wages of 2.5 per cent per annum.
Contrasts between the alternative measures of policy 
IP1, IP2, IP3, 1P4, and IP5 are given by equations (5),(6) ,(7) ,(3) 
and (8) respectively. The measure IPl is the pure real wage 
pressure variable; IP2 adjusts IPl for the trend rate of real 
wage growth; IP3 adjusts IPl for Government stringency and IP4 is 
equivalent to IP3 adjusted for trade union response. IP5 is a 
comparable measure to IP4 but using the quantitative index of 
strikes as a measure of trade union response instead of the 
subjective index TPS. Each policy measure is significant with 
equations containing the measures IP3 and IP4 providing the 
best overall statistical performance.
Since IP4t - (wnf - Pt_j>. XPSt or IP4t - IPlfc . IPSt 
and IPSt - 0.5 (GPSt ♦ TPSt)
where TPSfc is measured on a scale of increasing intensity then: 
IP4t - 0.5(wiit - ¿t_1),(CPSt + TPSt).
The results suggest that IPl and IPS
both contribute to the measurement of policy influence. Similarly 
we can further break down IPS into its two components; the
t >
government factor (GPS) and trade union response (TPS). Again
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that their coefficients
are equal although since the coefficient on TPS is in fact statistically
insignificant this is a weak result. A similar result holds when the strike
variable is used instead of TPS.
Equation (9) is a version of equation (4) with the 
introduction of the anticipation variable.
We cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on the variable 
in t-1 is equal to minus the coefficient in period t. Therefore the 
prior announcement effect is purely one of timing so that the effect 
on wage inflation in quarter t is exactly offset in period t+1. The 
coefficient b^ is positive but not quite significant. It is reduced 
when lagged wage inflation and the real wages lagged by two periods
are included as additional explanatory variables (10). First order
. . 13serial correlation then ceases to exist.
Equations (11) and (12) include a policy-catch up variable 
which relates potential policy catch up to occasions when 4 IP4 
is positive (see p.6.11). This variable is marginally significant 
in equation (11) and more so in equation (12). Additional lagged 
terms in the catch-up variable and the use of an AloPn polynominal 
distributed lag failed to find any further effect of catch up. The 
coefficients on the catch-up variable imply an additional positive 
effect on wage inflation. An alternative measure of catch up 
is merely the lagged value of the policy variable. This proves 
highly significant and has a negative sign implying that a previous 
tight policy will be reflected in higher wage inflation in the 
current quarter. However, since in equation (13) bj > b^ 
the persistence of incomes policy lowers wage 
inflation. Alternative specifications which included the
6.21
cumulative effect of past policy proved unsuccessful.
Tests of the forecasting ability of the equations over 
the four quarters following the end of the estimation period 
reveal reasonably good predictive performance.
Using a recursive estimation package ^  shows a basically 
stable structure for equation (11). This is achieved by computing 
the standard least squares parameter estimates recursively giving:
8t+l " 0t + 0t v t
where @c is the estimate based on the first t observations, 6£ is 
the gain and is the innovation or one step ahead forecast error. 
The t— test for zero innovation mean is equal to 0.5 well below 
the critical value and the Box-Pierce Portmanteau test statistic 
(to check on residual autocorrelation of the innovations)is 6.7 
(against a critical level of 21.0 ). Examination of the 
innovations reveal two main outliers, in 1973 Q2 and in 1975 Q2..
In Table 6.3 the results of using instrumental variables 
to estimate the wage equations are shown. Both price 
inflation and the incomes policy measure are taken to be endogenous 
and the instruments used are lagged values of the endogenous and 
exogenous variables together with current and lagged values of 
foreign prices. Estimation of the aquations by OLS which ignore 
simultaneous equation bias can result in biased and inconsistent 
parameter estimates since soma of the independent variables may 
be correlated with the error term. Use of lagged endogenous 
variables as instruments is only valid when there is no first-order 
serial correlation of the residuals since the instruments used are 
only valid if they themselves are independent of the error term.

6.23
Under IV Estimation the terms in real wages lagged by 
two periods and in lagged wage growth are now no longer 
significant. In contrast with equation (12) the price
coefficient now becomes significant and much larger in absolute 
value. The coefficient on the incomes policy variable also 
increases as does that on the announcement variable.
The latter and the catch-up variables are now statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent level.
Table 6.3 also reports the results of using an alternative 
measure of price expectations. Equation (16) uses the forecast 
growth in consumer prices as forecast in successive issues of the 
National Institute Economic Review. This is a genuine ex-ante 
measure of expectations but not necessarily a rational expectations 
measure. The measure of expected prices is taken to be endogenous 
in the same way as the standard measure of price inflation used.
Overall the equation performs better than the comparable
equation with actual inflation and the price expectations
coefficient is significant but much smaller in magnitude than the
estimates obtained from equations (14) and (15). The policy variable
remains significant but both lagged real wages and the time
trend become insignificant. The catch up variable is now significant and
much larger in magnitude.
Equation (15) restricts the price coefficient to unity, a 
restriction which is justified by the data (using standard 'F' 
tests). The coefficients on lagged real wages and the time trend 
imply a quarterly rate of adjustment of real wages to its desired 
value of 16 per cent per quarter and a long run growth of desired 
real wages of almost 2.4 per cent per annum (very close to the 
observed trend rate of growth over the period). The announcement 
variable is insignificant but that on the catch-up term is marginally
6.24
significant. In equations (14) to (16) both prices and the incomes 
policy term are treated as endogenous. The chi-squared test of 
the validity of the chosen instruments cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that they are independent of the error term. Tests of 
the forecasting ability of the model cannot reject the hypothesis 
of stability and there is no sign of serial correlation of the 
residuals judging from the Box-Pierce Portmanteau statistic of 
joint autocorrelation, although Stewart and Wallis (1981) argue that 
this is a weak test.
Equations (17) and (18) are estimated using the method of 
estimating seemingly unrelated regressions (Maddala, 1977, p.465) 
which allows for contemporaneous correlation between the residuals 
of different equations. Here the relevant wage equation is jointly 
estimated with a price equation of the cost mark-up variety ^  .
In this instance we allow for the possibility that the errors in 
the wage and price equations may be due to a common cause. The 
coefficients of equation (18) obtained are very similar to those of 
equation (15), the main difference being the lower point estimate of 
the coefficient on the policy variable.
The price equation itself is reasonably well supported by the 
data with all coefficients highly significant. The price equation 
contains a lagged dependent variable (to capture lags in price 
formation) and consequently the Durbin-Watson statistic is biased 
towards acceptance of the null hypothesis of zero first order 
serial correlation. An alternative test is the Durbin 'h' statistic 
and this confirms the lack of first-order serial correlation of
the residuals
6.25
6.3.2 The Restricted Model
Table 6.4 shows the results of estimating equations based 
on model 6.7. Because of the restrictions on the parameters the 
model was estimated using the non-linear least squares routine 
of TSP. In equation (19) the model is estimated on the assumption 
that all right hand side variables are predetermined whereas 
equation (20) treats the price and incomes policy variables as 
endogenous and uses instruments for these variables. The overall 
model does not perform quite as well statistically as the unrestricted 
model (e.g equation(ll)) but we now find that the additional lagged 
term in real wages needed for (11) is no longer required. The . -
coefficient on the policy variable is smaller in size than the 
estimate of the unrestricted model and is less significant. For 
equation (19) the term in lagged real wages and the time trend 
are no longer significant . whereas the coefficient on the unemploymnet 
variable is. In this equation neither the annowcement nor catch-up 
variable is significant. The Durbin-Watson test suggests little 
likelihood of first order serial correlation. However, the discussion 
in chapter 3 suggests a likelihood of heteroskedasticity.
One test for the presence of heteroskodasticity is the Glejser 
test (see Stewart and Wallis, 1981,p.250) 16. The test cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of the absence of heteroskedasticity although ,
one possible problem with the test is that the error in the second 
stage equation is likely to be heteroskedastic itself. 17
When the restricted equation is estimated by the method of 
instrumental variables, treating both prices and policy as
k* 5 5 rv •
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endogenous, the unemployment term becomes insignificant whilst 
the real wage and time trend terms increase in significance. The coeff­
icient on prices is now insignificantly different from unity. The 
coefficient on the policy variable is somewhat smaller than 
the comparable equation for the unrestricted model (18) but overall 
equation performance is very similar.
Equations(22) and (23) are estimated by treating the 
wage and price equations as a pair of seemingly unrelated 
regressions. The unemployment variable now becomes marginally 
significant and the real wage and time trend variables now 
increase in significance with an implied speeding up of the catch 
up of real wages to the desired real wage. The point estimate 
of the direct policy effect (y) is now almost identical to that 
on the policy coefficient in equations (17) and (18).
Finally the wage and price equations are estimated by the 
method of three-stage least squares (3SLS), which estimates the 
parameters of all the equations simultaneously using all the 
information in the model. The results of this estimation are 
shown in Table 6.4 for equation (24). The main biases emerging 
from comparison of the OLS results (19) is the increase in 
the coefficient on prices and its significance, the increased 
significance of the real wage term ,but no marked change in 
the magnitude of the policy coefficient (y). The catch-up coefficient 
is very sensitive to the choice of estimation method however. Comparing 
the restricted model (shown in Table 6.4) with the unrestricted 
model (Table 6.3) reveals little difference between overall performance, 
are unable to distinguish between the rival hypotheses: first that
policy operates linearly as a separate effect (the 'unrestricted'
model) and second that policy operates on all the variables in
18the model (the restricted model). Both models imply that 
incomes policy has had an effect on aggregate wage inflation 
but the estimates of y  imply that the average policy effect is fairly 
small. The final sections of this chapter discuss the properties 
of the unrestricted models, and the modelling of expectations.
The estimates of the contributions of policy to wage inflation 
over the period are discussed in Chapter 9.
6.4 Properties of the «age nodeIs
In this section the properties of the unrestricted and
restricted wage models are compared. First the models are
considered in isolation and then they are combined with the
properties of a simple price equation of the type shown in Tables 
196.3 and 6.4. • The results are derived by simulation analysis 
using equation (18) from Table 6.3 as an example of the unrestricted 
wage model and equation (23) from Table 6.4 as as example of the 
restricted wage model. The properties of the models are deduced by 
considering the effects of exogenous shocks compared with a base-run 
of the model.
Table 6.5 gives the effects on wages of shocks to some 
of the right-hand side variables assuming fixed prices.
First consider a permanent shock in the level of
20unemployment of 500,000 . Since only lagged unemployment
affects wages there is no impact in either model in the first 
period. The full effect builds up to a peak of 2.1 per cent 
and 2.7 per cent respectively in the unrestricted and restricted
6.29
Table 6.5 Single-Equation Properties
Effects of wages (Z) from continuous shock in quarter 1 of:
(a) 500,000 in unemployment
(b) 10Z in prices
(c) 0.2 on the index of stringency policy (IPS)
(d) 3 percentage points on the wage norm (IPQ) >.
(e) 10Z increase in the average retention ratio
(f) assumes a constant pressure of policy under (b)
Unrestricted equation (18)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Quarter 1 - 10.0 -0.1 0.4 - 10.0
4 -1.8 4.2 -0.2 1.4 -4.8 10.0
10 -2.1 8.0 -1.8 2.5 -7.7 10.0
20 -1.4 9.6 -1.0 2.1 
Restricted equation
-8.8
(23)
10.0
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Quarter 1 - 8.8 0.1 0.4 - 8.8
4 -2.4 3.8 -0.8 1.4 -5.2 9.5
10 -2.7 8.1 -2.6 2.4 -8.0 9.9
20 -2.6 9.7 -1.6 1.5 -9.0 10.0
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models by the tenth period. In the unrestricted model the 
effect dies away a little thereafter. This reflects the 
operation of the real wage resistance effect in the model 
since with fixed prices an increase in unemployment reduces 
real wages initially. Nevertheless the rate of catch up is slow.
The effects of a change in price inflation depend on
the interpretation of the policy variable in the models. If
policy is implicitly assumed to tighten following an increase
in prices (since real wage pressure is defined as the wage norm
less previous price inflation) then there is an automatic policy
response as in simulation (b). However, if the overall stance
of policy remains fixed the results are given by simulation (f).
Thus for (b) it can be seen that the impact of an increase in
prices fades as the automatic policy effect operates but the
real wage effect then starts to increase wages. Under (f) there
is no such cycle in the effects of a shock to prices. For both
simulations (b) and (f) the effects from the restricted model are
less than for the unrestricted model where the unit coefficient on
prices ensures a complete pass-through of the price effect. In
the restrictive equation the price coefficient also equals unity
but here the effects depend on the weighting effect from the
stringency of policy (IPS). When IPS is zero the full
29pass-through of prices does take place.
Simulations (c) and (d) examine the policy effects. In 
simulation (c) the stringency of policy is increased. This reduces 
wages, as expected, with the effects greater in the restricted model 
than in the unrestricted model (since IPS also influences the 
contributions of the other variables in the wage equation).An 
increase in the wage norm by 3 per cent per annum increases wages
Thebut not by the full extent of the change in the wage norm, 
results shown under the policy simulations omit the policy catch-up 
effects. The effect on wages of a change in policy then depend on 
the direction of change. If for example the overall pressure of 
policy (IF4) is increased, the catch-up effect built into the base run does 
not occur and wages are lower by about 0.3 per cent. If however 
policy pressure is eased then a substantial policy catch-up effect 
occurs (but only in the current quarter). This adds nearly 1 .8 'per cent 
to wages. Thus if simulation (d) were re-designed to incorporate catch-up 
the increase in wages would be greater throughout but would be particularly 
increased in the current quarter.
Finally Table 6.5 shows the effect of increasing the average retention 
ratio (and thus increasing real disposable wages). Since the real wage 
catch up operates with a lag there is no effect in the current period but 
after 2£ years wages are 8 per cent lower in both models.
Table 6.6 shows the effects of changing some of the exogenous 
variables assuming that prices are flexible. The results given are for 
equation (18).
The effects of changing unemployment are much greater than when 
prices are fixed but with a much smaller decline in real wages. Similar 
considerations apply to an increase in the stringency of policy and in 
an increase in the wage norm. An increase in the retention ratio now leads 
to a wage effect twice that when prices were fixed but the real wage 
implications are much the same. Simulation (e) shows the impact of a 
10 per cent increase in foreign prices. Less than one half of this 
increase is reflected in domestic prices although the slow rats of 
real wage catch-up means that there is a small decline in real wages 
over a considerable period. Finally simulations (f) to (i) show the 
effects of temporary shocks. With the exception of a temporary increase 
in the stringency of policy there are negligible long-term effects.
Next the assumption that the exchange rate is flexible is 
added to the model. In the results of the simulations where
22
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Table 6.6 Simulation Effects Assuming Endogenous Wages
and Prices
Equation (18) - Effects on wages and prices of given shocks.
(a) shock of 500,000 to the level of unemployment
(b) 0.2 on the index of stringency (IPS)
(c) 3 percentage points on the wage norm (IPQ)
(d) 10 per cent increase in the average retention ratio
(e) 10 per cent increase in foreign prices
(f) once-for-all shock of 0.2 on IPS
(g) once-for-all shock of 3 percentage points on IPQ
(h) once-for-all shock of 10 per cent to retention ratio
(i) once-for-all shock of 10 per cent to foreign prices
Wages (Z)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
t- 0 - -0.4 0.2 -0.3
t- 1 -0.9 -0 .1 0.8 -2.0
4 -2.8 -0 .1 1.9 -7.0
10 -3.6 -2.2 3.3 -12.2
20 -3.9 -1.8 4.5 -16.4
Prices (X)
t- 0 - - 0.1 -
1 -0.1 - 0.3 -0.4
4 -1.1 - 0.8 -2.7
10 -2.3 -1.5 1.6 -6.8
20 -3.3 -1.3 2.7 -9.4
e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
1.7 -0.4 0.2 -0.3 1.7
2.9 -0 .1 0.4 -2.0 1.2
2.0 -0.3 0 .1 -1.6 -0.4
3.2 -0.4 -0.2 -1.1 0.2
3.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.7 -
1.8 - 0 .1 - 1.8
3.1 - 0.2 -0.4 1.3
3.9 -0 .1 0.1 -0.9 -
4.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.9 0.2
4.0 -0.2 -0 .1 -0.2 0.1
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only wages and prices were flexible less than one-half of the
effects of a change in foreign prices feeds through to domestic
costs and prices reflecting the relative weights of wage costs,
taxes and import costs in the price equation. Empirical experience
of estimating exchange rate equations has not been successful
(viz. the collection of papers in Eltis and Sinclair, eds. , ¡.981). The
equation used here is based on data from 1972 (when the exchange
rate was floated) through to 1979 (Q4) and attempts to model the
dollar exchange rate. The equation explains the exchange rate by
its past value, the state of the current account and changes
in past price competitiveness. Although not empirically a great
success this equation does introduce some sensitivity of the exchange
rate into the model without imposing a theoretical view of exchange
rate behaviour such as purchasing power parity which has been used
23in illustrative models such as that by Artis and Miller (1979).
Table 6.7 reports simulations using wage equation (18) comparable 
to those of table 6.6 where the exchange rate was fixed 
whilst Table 6.8 reports similar simulations using wage model (23). 
Compare first the unemployment simulation using (18). The 
reduction in wage costs now improves competitiveness and thus raises 
the level of the exchange rate with a further second round effect on 
wages and prices so that the longer-run effects on wage-inflation are 
greater when the exchange rate is flexible. Similar considerations 
apply to the operation of incomes policy through a tightening of the 
index of severity of policy (IPS). Both these simulations reduce 
the level of real wages after five years»more than countering the 
automatic real wage resistance properties of the equation.
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Table 6.7 Simulation Effect«: Wages, Prices and the Exchange 
Rate Flexible : Unrestricted Model
Unrestricted model (18)
(a) shock of 500,000 to level of unemployment
(b) increase of 0.2 in index of stringency
(c) increase of 3 percentage points in wage norm
(d) 10 per cent increase in retention ratio
(e) 10 per cent increase in foreign prices
(f) once-for-all 10 per cent increase in retention ratio
(g) once-for-all 10 per cent increase in foreign prices
Wages (Z)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (8)
Quarter 1 - -0 .1 0.4 - 2.0 - 2.0
4 -2.8 -0.5 2.1 -7.9 4.9 -2.2 0.5
10 -4.8 -3.6 3.7 -15.8 6.5 -1.4 0.7
20 -4.9 -2.6 4.0 -19.2 6.6 -0.4 0 .1
Real
disposable -2.1 -0.8 1.3 -0.3 - - -
(Quarter 20)
(Z)
Prices (Z)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (8)
Quarter 1 - - 0 .1 - 1.8 - 1.8
4 -1 .1 -0 .1 0.8 -3.0 4.9 -1.2 0.4
10 -2.7 -1.7 2.0 -8.2 6.4 -1.0 0.6
20 -2.9 -1.9 2.6 -11.4 6.6 -0.3 0 .1
Competitiveness (Z)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (8)
Quarter 1 -0 .1 - 0 .1 - -7.3 - -7.3
4 -1.0 -0 .1 0.8 -2.8 -1.7 -1.0 1.6
10 -1.8 -1.3 1.4 -6.3 -3.1 -0.7 0.6
20 -2.3 -1.3 1.9 -8.7 -2.8 -0.3 0.2
Note: An increase in the competitiveness measure implies 
a worsening.
6.35
The impact on wages of a reduction in direct taxation 
(increase in the retention ratio) has an effect which is magnified 
under flexible exchange rates with a 10 per cent increase leading 
to a 19 per cent fall in wages and 11 per cent fall in prices 
(simulation (d)) whilst a once-and-for-all shock in the retention 
ratio results in very little long-run response.
Finally, a permanent 10 per cent increase in foreign prices 
has a larger effect on both wages and prices than under fixed 
exchange rates and there is now no medium-term or long-run real 
wage effect in contrast to the fall in real wages under fixed exchange 
rates. A once-for-all shock(simulation (g)) is quite quickly passed 
through the system however without any marked effect on wage and 
price levels in the long-run.
The wage impacts under the restricted model (Table 6.8) 
are in general smaller than those from the unrestricted model 
(Table 6.7). This reflects the assumption of a non-zero value for the
index of the stringency of policy for the simulations (the higher
. 24the value of IPS the lower the estimated wage effects).
The real wage implications of the simulations are very similar 
between models (18) and (23) however.
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Table 6.8 Simulation Effects; Wage», Prices and the 
Exchange Rate Flexible: Restricted Model
Restricted model (23)(IPS - 0.2)For details of the simulations see Table 6.7
WageS'(Z)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (*) (f) (8)
Quarter 1 - 0.3 0.3 - 1.6 - 1.6
4 -3.1 0.4 1.2 -6.5 5.1 -1.4 0.3
10 -4.3 -2.4 2.5 -11.0 5.8 -0.6 0 .1
20 -3.5 -2.2 2.0 -11.8 6.2 - -
real
disposable
wage
(Quarter 20XZ)
-2.5 -1.4 1.2 0.3 - - -
Prices (Z)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (f) (8)
Quarter 1 - - 0.1 - 1.8 - 1.8
4 -0.8 0 .2 0.5 -1.5 5.0 -0.5 0 .1
10 -1.4 -0.5 0.8 -3.3 6.3 -0.6 0.3
20 -1.0 -0.7 0.7 -3.2 6.3 - -
Competitiveness (Z)
(a) (b) (O (d) (a) (f) (8)
Quartar 1 - - - - -7.4 - -7.4
4 -0.7 0 .1 0.4 -1.1 -1.7 -0.4 1.3
10 -0.9 -0.3 0.5 -2.2 -3.1 -0.2 0.4
20 -0.8 -0.5 0.5 -2.5 -3.0 -0 .1 0 .1
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6.5 Expectations and endogeneity
In section 6.1 it was argued that the main role for the 
price inflation term in the real wage resistance equation was 
in terms of expected price inflation. The empirical results 
so far have used current price inflation as a proxy measure.
UnderOIS estimation this variable has an insignificant coefficient 
but IV estimation finds a much more significant effect.
A look at more sophisticated ways of including price expectations 
is therefore appropriate.
Expectations also arise through the general anticipation 
effects of incomes policies. Specific allowance for pre-announced 
policies is described in the previous section but no attempt was 
made to incorporate more general expectation effects. There are 
various ways of incorporating expectations in empirical work.
One is to use direct survey estimates of expectations. A second
(25)is to deduce estimates of expectations from other variables .
Third, one can attempt to model the formation of expectations.
As soon as this third route is chosen decisions about the precise 
way in which expectations are formed hare to be taken. As Stewart 
and Wallis (1981) show there is a fundamental difference between 
approaches which model unobservable expectations variables on the 
assumption that expectations are extrapolated in some fashion from 
past experience and are thus exogenous to the system, and approaches 
which describe the formation of expectations as dependant on 
currant and/or future variables and are consequently 
endogenous. An example of the former type of expectations is 
that of adaptive expectations (Cagan, 1958< and Nerlove, 1972) and
rational expectations (Muth, 1961) is an example of the 
latter. Under rational expectations expectations are essentially 
the same as the predictions of the relevant structural model. In 
order to apply rational expectations in its true sense it is 
important to specify the structural model. Ormerod (1982) 
attempts to apply a rational expectations framework incorporating 
a real wage resistance model using the reduced form of predictions 
of the NIESR model to generate a series for the rational expectations 
on prices. Ormerod concludes that, although the rational 
expectations formulation explains wage inflation to a greater power 
than do alternative methods of generating price expectations (i.e 
autoregressive schemes and substituting actual price inflation for 
expected inflation)the extra explanatory power does not appear to be 
significant. Furthermore, he finds it difficult to rationalise the 
size of the coefficient on price expectations in terms of 
institutional behaviour. The approach adopted here assumes that 
the organisation of the labour market is not one where 
rational expectations are relevant. Most micro studies of wage 
inflation (e.g. Brown, 1976, Jackson et.al. 1971) stress factors 
such as comparability , aspirations and past experience rather than 
expectations. Further evidence against the rational expectations 
approach to the determination of wage inflation is 
provided by Pesaran (1982) who uses data from the CBI 
Industrial Trends survey to reject the hypothesis that inflation 
expectations are formed rationally.
The rejection of the rational expectations approach does 
not necessarily imply a return to exogenous expectations variables 
however. It is still possible to specify alternative expectations 
mechanisms which may be more ad hoc and less related to the true
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structural model. For example, expectations of a change in the 
stance of incomes policy may be related to a rule-of-thumb 
calculation where the relevant variables might be the recent 
presence (or absence) of a tight policy, the political complexions 
of the government and current wage inflation. As with all variants 
of modelling expectations however it is difficult to test the 
expectations formation process independently of the model in which 
it is embedded.
The earlier section of the chapter has discussed alternative measures 
of price expectations. In forming expectations of the incomes policy measure 
political factors appear to be important. It has been fairly 
common (see Chapter 4) for UK governments to eschew tight incomes 
policy in the early part of its period of power. Thus the 
length of time since the political party came into power would 
seem to be important. There does not appear to be any clear-cut 
rule that Conservative administrations are more likely to impose 
than Labour administrations but this may be a factor in determining 
expectations. It is difficult to pursue the matter of 
policy expectations however until the issues concerning the actual 
formation have been discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.
6.6 s»"»"«ry and conclusions
Estimates of two different forms of the wage equation are 
presented in this chapter. In the first (the unrestricted model) 
incomes policy enters only as a separate quantity variable whereas 
in the second (the restricted model) the intensity of policy also 
affects the coefficients on the other variables in the model. Both 
models incorporate an announcemant/anticipation and catch-up effect 
of policy. The latter is distinct from the normal real wage catch-up
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In both models the overall equation performance is 
reasonably satisfactory with the policy variables emerging 
as statistically significant. There is little to choose between 
the two wage models however. The size of the policy coefficients 
is between 0.2 and 0.3 and implies a considerable average leakage 
between the ex-ante and ex-post effects of policy. The best 
equation performance comes from using the most comprehensive measure 
of policy, IP4, revealing that the application of policy by government 
and the degree of resistance by trade unions are important aspects of 
the influence of incomes policy upon wage inflation. The anticipations 
variable is not usually statistically significant whereas the policy 
catch-up variable is. OLS estimation results in a low and insignificant 
coefficient on price inflation but this coefficient becomes 
insignificantly different from unity when IV estimation is used. 
Allowing for endogeneity of policy by adopting instruments does not 
lead to any major change in either the significance or value of 
the policy coefficient however.
Some of the properties of the wage models are given by looking 
at simulations which allow some of the exogenous variables to change. 
Asymmetry of the policy catch-up effect makes the policy effects on 
wage inflation depend on the direction of change of policy. The effects 
on wages of exogenous shocks depend on whether only wages are flexible, 
wages and prices, or wages, prices and the exchange rate. The main 
difference between the simulation results using the restricted and 
unrestricted models depends on the value of IPS, the intensity of 
policy. For low values of IPS the results are very similar but 
for higher values of IPS the effect of exogenous shocks is often
moderated
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When wages only are flexible an Increase in prices 
is fully translated into higher wage inflation. This is guaranteed 
by the unit coefficient on prices. Real wage catch-up is also 
guaranteed in principle by the form of the equation but the adjustment 
rate is quite slow. A permanent increase in unemployment 
can lead to a permanent reduction in real wages for a
considerable period (as in the theoretical model of Artis and Miller, 1979).
Under flexible prices, a permanent increase in unemployment can still
lead to a permanent reduction in real wages and, although a shock to
foreign prices ultimately leads to no fall in real wages, the slow
rate of real wage adjustment results in a reduction of real wages
for a considerable period. When the exchange rate is also made
flexible a permanent increase in unemployment or a permanent increase
in policy pressure can still result in permanently lower real wages
but a permanent rise in foreign prices does not and now leads to
considerably higher inflation.
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Notes to Chapter 6
1. Brown (1981) reports that single-employment bargaining has 
become the most important means of pay determination for 
two-thirds of manual workers. Among non-manual workers 
the proportion is three-quarters of employees.
2. But proportional changes would depend on the previous 
level of wages of all groups.
3. Evidence from the Aberdeen database reveals a median
contract length of 51.4 weeks, a mean of 51.7 weeks and 
a standard deviation of 10.6 weeks. I am indebted to 
R. Elliott of Aberdeen University for access to this data.
4. A  major limitation of the usefulness of $ is that it refers 
only to industry-wide settlements and does not capture any 
of the growing influences due to local bargaining.
5. The regression estimated by OLS over the period 1961-75 is:
DUR - 47.806 ♦ 0.558 IP4 - 433.63AlogP + 0.1048TIME 
(6.3) (0.8) (-3.8) (1.0)
+ seasonal dunonies
Figures in brackets represent t - ratios
R 2 - 0.332 D.W - 1.18 S.E. - 9.14 weeks
DUR is the average length of manual wage settlements, 
IP4 the measure of incomes policy and P the price level.
6. In its limit a wage freeze would reduce the number of 
settlements to zero and lead to an infinite increase in 
the dependent variable.
7. If the average length of contract were already greater than 
12 months the introduction of such a rule might even shorten 
the average contract length.
8. Some support for this interpretation is given by the 
regression on contract length described in footnote 5.
9. This result holds whether the settlement proportion is used 
as an additional variable on the right hand side of the 
equation or used to deflate the dependent variable as in the 
work of Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1975).
This may be a consequence of a formal 12-month rule laid 
down by policy or by informal bargaining arrangements 
which also place constraints on the variation in the 
settlement interval.
Developed by D.F. Hendry and F. Srba of L.S.E., and part 
of the AUT0RE6 library.
When the tens in real wages lagged by two periods was 
omitted, policy dummies for the periods 1969 (suprisingly), 
1975-6, 1976-7, and 1977-8 were all significantly different 
from zero. The definitions of the dummy variables are 
given in Appendix B. In general they are defined as equal 
to unity in periods of policy "on" and zero in policy "off".
Tests of higher order serial correlation processes are 
consistently rejected.
'PSTAB', kindly provided by M. Salmon of the University of 
Warwick.
This is a reasonably standard form in the macroeconomic 
modelling literature, see Ormerod, 1979.
The test consists of using the (US residuals (e^) to run 
a second regression
An alternative test, the Breusch-Pagan test, requires all 
the explanatory variables, together with k, to be exogenous 
and so is not appropriate here.
Comparing the estimation of the restricted model without 
imposing the common policy effect on all the variables 
rejects the common policy affect but leads to implausible 
implied values for y on some of the variables.
The actual price equation used is:
P - -1.7520** + 35.74^*WC + 43.84^*TAX + 0.1238Pif* 
(-5.6) (7.7) (4.2) (4.4)
+ 0.6557**Pt_,
(15.3)
RSS - 43.7 S*E - 1.1% Durbin 'h' - 0.63
where P refer* Co retail price*, HC to unit wage costs,
TAX to unit taxes and PM to import prices. Figures in 
brackets are t-ratios and ** denotes statistically significant 
at 9SZ.
This represents a considerable shock in the first period.
The results shown use a value of 0.2 for IPS.
The similarities described here assume no endogenous policy 
catch-up effect. If the policy catch up is allowed to 
operate the wage response to an increase in the wage norm 
would be greater throughout with the catch-up effect 
operating in the first period.
The estimated exchange rate equation is:-
log(EXCH) - 0.3925** + 0.000014 BAL + 0.90697**log(EXCH)
(2 . 2) (0 . 6 ) (22 . 2)
-0.2201AC0MP , - 0.2340AC0MP , - 0.2203AC0MP .
(-1.0) (-1.6) C“* (-1.4) C 3
-0.1762ACOMP
( - 1 . 2) t—6
0.1028AC0MP _
(-l.o)
Estimation by Almon least squares
R2 - 0.951 RSS - .0295 Durbin 'h' - 0.49
Although with a zero value for IPS the properties of 
the two models are very similar.
For example, by deducing price expectations from movements 
in nominal interest rates, e.g. Fame (1975).
CHAPTER 7 ENDOGENEITY OF POLICY - SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
7.1 Introduction
The concept of a policy reaction function has been applied 
to the UK by Fisher (1970) and Pissarides (1972) using the form 
of quadratic optimisation developed by Theil (1964). These models 
have been extended by Jenson (1974) who applies his analysis to 
the Australian economy. Criticisms of the Theil approach have led 
others (e.g. Mosley, 1976) to adopt an alternative approach to 
policy (the 'satisficing' approach). The relevance of policy 
reaction functions is stressed by Goldfield and Blinder (1972) 
who argue that the classical bias in the structural parameters 
of a model resulting from treating policy variables as exogenous 
when they are really endogenous is not usually severe. However, 
the policy results derived from the reduced form of the whole 
model stay be quite misleading. The importance of incorporating 
policy reaction has been given an extra impetus with the paper by 
Lucas (1976). Lucas argues that econometric model predictions 
will be affected by private agents' perception of policy and that 
their adjustment to changes in policy will vary with alternative 
policies. Consequently the so-called structural parameters are not 
constant. The Lucas argument can be incorporated into existing models 
by incorporating explicit policy reaction functions of the authorities 
and relating the behaviour of private agents to resultant policy 
variables.
A large part of the empirical research involving explicit policy 
reaction functions has concentrated on monetary variables although 
some authors (e.g. Pissarides, 1972) have considered a more comprehensive 
set of policy variables. However, to date policy reaction functions 
have not been applied to incomes policy. The main purpose of this
chapter is to evaluate the alternative approaches to policy reaction 
functions and to develop ways of applying policy reaction functions to 
incomes policy in the UK over the period 1961-1979.
In this chapter we consider the structure and final form 
of alternative approaches to the policy reaction problem. In 
Chapter 8 the results of applying versions of the Theil approach 
to incomes policy variables are discussed, both in a 
form where policy instruments are independent of each other and 
in a simultaneous setting.
7.2 The Theil approach and its limitations
7.2.1 General considerations
The basic framework used here initially starts from the quadratic 
objective function of Theil (1964). This has been the most 
common approach in empirical work and has been applied to the UK 
by Fisher (1970) and Pissarides (1972) among others.
The general form of estimating equation has been:
Xt ■ Qj X* + Q2 Xt-1 + Q3 (Yt - Y*)
where X is the policy instrument Y is the target or goal variable 
and X* and Y* are the desired levels of X and Y respectively. One 
of the common criticisms of the approach is that the desired values 
of the targets and instruments have been taken to be either constant 
or zero whereas it would seem that the authorities may well have 
used an adaptive approach (see Was«, 1978).
A second criticism has been made by Nobay (1974). Here it 
is argued that policy is set simultaneously so that it is invalid to 
treat each decision about a policy variable as independent. To 
fully accommodate this criticism requires either a full simultaneous 
model of policy determination or allowance made for simulCatleity 
in a single equation approach.
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Makin (1976) had shown that the published work on reaction 
functions cannot be used to derive implications about the 
preference trade-offs between various objectives by the authorities 
except under restrictive assumptions about the authorities’ view 
of the relationship between the instruments of policy and policy 
targets. In the past few years the Treasury has been obliged to 
publish the details of its economic model and it might be argued 
thatthis provides an ideal measure of the authorities' view of the 
actual trade-offs in the economy. However, it has recently been 
made clear that the Treasury model does not always coincide with the 
policy-makers' views. In addition, the versions of the published 
model have differed considerably in the three or more years that they 
have been generally available. Compare, for example, the results 
described by Laury, Lewis and Ormerod (1978) and those published 
in Ormerod (ed.,1979) . It is therefore clear that there is no one 
'model' that can be used to interpret policy actions of the past.
A reaction function model therefore needs to be able to cope with both 
the changing preferences of policy makers and the changing 
perceptions of their view of the economy.
Perhaps an even more damning criticism of the standard 
reaction function model is that the authorities are assumed to 
react to current or past values of the target variables. In practice 
the authorities typically have information on expected economic 
developments and it may be more plausible that they will react to 
forecast developments rather than to current or past events especially 
when changes in instruments are likely to have a lagged effect on 
policy goals. Empirical relationships between policy instruments and 
targets which reveal a zero correlation may not necessarily imply that 
the authorities are insensitive to economic developments but rather 
that they have correctly foreseen these events and already reacted
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accordingly. Using forward or expected measures of the policy 
targets in any case avoids the possible simultaneity problem 
whereby current period values of the instruments have some impact 
on the target as well as the line of causation implied by the 
reaction function approach. However, the description of policy 
in Chapter 4 suggests that the authorities may have reacted to 
past events rather than anticipated future outcomes.
The Theil or quadratic utility function approach also 
implies a degree of flexibility of policy instruments which is 
either not available in practice or only available at considerable 
cost• This would seem to apply particularly to the treatment of 
incomes policy where the operation of the policy has often involved 
the preparation of statutory or enabling legislation, or of the 
publications of necessary rules and institutions. Thus in practice 
policy tends to have a degree of inertia inconsistent with the 
quadratic utility function approach. Policy inertia can also be 
explained,not by the cost of changing policy, but because of the 
uncertainty" of economic developments or even uncertainty about 
the effect of the policy instruments on the goals of policy.
Blackaby (ed., 1978) argues that changes in objectives have in 
the past been related to changes in the authorities' belief that 
they could achieve these objectives so that changing structure and 
changing objectives have been related. He also criticises approaches 
which assume a simultaneous setting of policy objective and instruments 
by arguing that over the period 1960-74 policy had followed the 
pattern of one thing at a time and one idea at a time rather than 
the careful balancing of ultimate objectives.
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7.2.2 Comparison of the Theil approach with other methods
The standard derivation of reaction functions using a 
quadratic utility function following Theil (1964) is as follows: 1 
The basic methodology is to maximise u ■ U (y,x) (7.1)
subject to the constraint y * Rx S (7.2)
where y, x and s are all vectors and refer to target variables, 
instruments and the set of exogenous influences respectively.
The first equation represents the utility of objective function of 
the authorities' and the second equation is the reduced form of the 
authorities' view of the economic structure, x and y are more 
appropriately defined as the deviations of the instruments and 
targets from their desired levels. Assuming that the nature of 
the utility function is quadratic gives:
u - a'x + b'y ♦ J (x'Vx + y'Wy + x'Cy + y ’Cx) (7.3)
where V is the matrix of weights attached to deviations of policy 
instruments from their desired values and W is the corresponding 
matrix for policy targets. C is the matrix of cross-product weights 
between policy targets and insruments.
Maximising (7.3) subject to the constraint (7.2) gives the 
following first order conditions :
"v C R* ' X r-a
C ’ W  -I y m -b0H1 -8
m m • **
Second order conditions require the weights w^ and v^ to be positive. 
Substitution for X gives the following expression in
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x - - K
where K
v-1 R-1b - K-1V-1:
r -1 . 2li + V R' C'l
L Ìw
Cy - K V 1-
where scarred variables indicate desired or target values
and an estimating equation:
X - X ao + ai  Or - T ) (7.6)
and at - -K-1 V-1 (R'b + a)
and a. -K-1 V-1 (R'W + C)
Regressing deviations of instrument variables on deviations 
of target variables gives a set of coefficients which are an 
amalgam of W, R, V and C so that the true set of preference weights 
cannot be determined except by knowledge of R. If C is a null 
matrix, which is a plausible proposition, then (7.4) becomes:
-v_1R'h - v-1*'“-- ”-1-x - V b V R Wy - V a 
and the estimating form is now: 
X - X* - b ♦ b, (Y - Y*)O I
where b„ - -V-1 (R'b + a) o
and bx - -V-1R'W
(7.7)
(7.8)
(7.8) is identical to (7.6) so that it is not possible to 
determine empirically whether it is appropriate to include C or 
not. It is still impossible to determine U without knowledge 
of R.
If we further simplify the model to exclude the constant
terms a and b then we obtain
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X  -  - V _ 1R 1W y (7.9)
which is estimated as
X - X* - cx (Y-Y*) (7.10)
with c^ given by -V ^R'W'
The model remains unidentified. This type of model was estimated 
by Pissarides (1972).
Jonson (1974) sets out an alternative formulation which 
allows for the costs of changing policy to be entered into the 
utility/loss function and extends the analysis to two periods. 
This cost function is:
and K is the cost function relating to the change in policy 
instruments.
The constraint is now:
t+1 Vt+1 xt+l
(7.11)
where Y Y* and Yt+1 Y*t
(7.12)
Maximising (7.11) subject to (7.12) gives:
A-1 R* W t <Yt - Y*t)
(7.13)
^ - -
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where A - Vt ♦ *t ♦ *t+1 d  - (Vt+1 ♦ *t+1)'1 K ^ )
Che estimating equation is:
Xt “ X* " do Xt-1 + dl (Yt - * % >  + d2 « f l  - Y*> C7.14)
This differs from (7.10) in the inclusion of lagged instrument 
yalues and the inclusion of Che future deviation of the policy targets.
Jonson shows that in the single-period case: 
i.e. where Vfc+l - - * t+1 - 0
then (7.13) reduces to
xt - CVt ♦ K,.)“1 Vt X* + (Vfc ♦ K t)”1K tXt_1 - CVt + Kt)"1 R't^O^ - Y*) (7.15)
which gives an estimating form:
Xt “ eoX* + el Xt-1 + «2 * Y*>
It still remains the case that we cannot identify W without 
information on R.
Let us return to model (7.9). Makin (1976) shows that for the 
simple case m ■ n *■ 2, we can write:
(7.16)
X1 " -rllWll + r21 w21* yl ~ rll W12 * r21 W22 * y2
X2 " -r!2Wll + r22 W21 ‘ yl • rl2 W12 + r22 w22 * y2
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dividing Che coefficients of and Y^ for equation by each 
other gives:
rllW ll + r21W21 
rllW 12 + r21W22
if cross product terns in w are zero, i.e. the disutility from 
inflation is independent of disutility from unemployment then 
this reduces to:
rllW ll
r21W21
if we know the values of the reduced form coefficients, r .j, then 
it may be plausible to obtain estimates of the w^j. Makin shows 
that if m  - n ■ 2 there are four equations and five unknowns so 
that here we can only obtain relative preferences.
Makin generalises the results to the multiple target - multiple 
instrument case where W  is symmetric. A solution is possible when 
n,the number of goal variables: n ■ m + (m-2). On these grounds
the model of Fissarides (1972) is not unique whereas that of 
Friedlander (1973) is. Makin also shows that the addition of lags 
either between instruments and targets or vice versa can ease the 
problems of underdeterminacy. Papers by Waud (1976) and 
Brainard (1967) deal specifically with the issues of uncertainty 
and asymmetry in the utility function - common criticisms of the 
Theil approach.
Brainard shows that uncertainty about the effect of the 
exogenous variables (the vector s) does not affect the choice 
of policy as the policymaker merely substitutes the expected 
value of s for s. However, if the uncertainty concerns the
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impact of the instruments on the policy targets, i.e. if R is 
uncertain, then optimal policy will need to incorporate the variance 
in R. Implied optimal policy will not in consequence be such as 
to attempt to reach Y* (the desired policy goal) but may be such 
as to undershoot or overshoot depending on the nature of the gap 
between Y and Y* and on the nature of the correlation between 
uncertainty about the matrix of reduced form-coefficients and 
the vector of exogenous effects. Waud deals with the problem 
of asymmetry whereby policy makers may be more concerned with 
deviations of Y below Y* than above it and shows that even when there 
is no uncertainty this implies that the authorities will not aim 
for Y*. This approach is related to the piecewise quadratic approach 
which was developed by Friedman (1975) and to some extent has 
similarities to the satisficing approach of Mosley (1976). However, 
first we consider the relationship of the Theil approach to methods 
of stabilisation policy which are not based on the assumption of 
optimising a quadratic utility function.
Phillips (1957) has developed several alternative stabilisation 
policy models. The first of these is proportional policy where 
the desired level of policy instrument
X ^  y(Y-Y*)
(X*) is set by the gap between the outturn and the desired level of 
the policy variable. He later refined this so that X* was 
defined not as the level of X but the deviation of X from its steady 
state levelO^.This rule is identical to the Theil formulation if X*, 
the long run desired level of x, is zero. The second formulation 
can be called integral policy correction where 
¿ t '  T Ctt  -  * * )
I
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This ia identical to the Theil approach of equation (7.10) where 
X*t is approximated by its lagged value Xt_^.
The third formulation is derivative policy where 
x - - Y(It - Yt_1)
This is equivalent of the standard Theil result with X* equal to 
zero and Y* given b y  its lagged value Y t_^.
Theil optimisation can be seen as a set' of optimal decision 
rules showing how the set of instruments, x, is varied in response 
to initial conditions (Y-Y*) and the influence of non-policy 
exogenous variables (s). As 8 enters the solution in a linear 
fashion the Theil approach of quadratic optimisation subject to 
linear equality constraints gives decision rules which are themselves 
linear. The set of decision rules formulated by Phillips are thus 
seen to be similar in concept but differ in that they do not follow 
from explicit analytical optimisation. In particular, the Phillips 
rules express the values of instrument variables as functions of 
observed differences between previously observed actual and desired 
target values whereas the Theil rule determines the difference 
as functions of the vector of exogenous influences, s.
We have already referred to the costs of adjustment of x and 
this was introduced in a very specific form by Jonson (1974).
Turnovsfcy (1977) has shown that, for the one instrument - one target 
case, the policy instrument will be adjusted to close some proportion 
of the gap when costs of adjustment exist so that x - \ (x-x*) where 
x is the optimal value of x and \  the rate of adjustment. For multiple 
instruments and targets the change in each policy instrument is 
determined not only by its own deviation from the optimal level but 
by the deviation of other variables from their optimal level.
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It is important to remember that in this analysis we are 
concerned with the description of actual policy and not with 
how policy might have been more successfully applied. This 
means that some of the more complex studies of optimal control 
are not applicable for the present analysis. Theil has extended 
his model to a multi-period time horizon. Under certainty the 
first period decision can be obtained by replacing the additive 
disturbances in the constraint by their expected values and 
optimising the multi -period objective function with respect to the 
decision variable for all periods and then solving for the first 
period subvector. Decisions for subsequent periods are later 
modified as more information becomes available.
Turnovsky considers the multiperiod problem in terms of 
control theory using the dynamic system:
Yt - AV i  + BXt
with long run solution Y* - AY* + BX*. The quadratic cost function 
of being away from equilibrium is given by :
T  T
C - z (Y. - Y*) ' M(Y - Y*) + I (X - X*) 'N(X - X*) where M  is the cost 
t-1 t C t-1 C
matrix. This leads to a linear feedback control law
X. “  R *Y , t t t-1
where R fc -  - [n  + B ' S tB]_ 1 [B' SfcA^and is given by
M + R^ NRt + (A + BRt) ' S ^ A  + BRfc)
This is a generalised form of the Phillips' rule using proportional 
adjustment policy although the constant of proportionality is a function 
of time. Turnovsky also considers stochastic systems using the model 
minimising the expected value of E(y^Myfc + x ^Nxt> subject to
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y fc - (A + V t)Yt_ x + (B + W fc)Xt + ufc
where and wt denote the random components of the coefficients. Given 
certain restrictions this implies a feedback rule
X t  "  R Y t - l
where R . -|Vl + B'SB + E(W'SW)J _1Jb 'SA + E(WSV)J
and S - M  + R ' N R  + (A + BR) 'S (A + BR) + e [(V + WR> ’S(V + WR)J
rfae only difference from the deterministic case is that the 
optimal stabilisation policy depends on the stochastic disturbances 
in parameters. If these are zero the solution is the .same as in 
the deterministic case.
Friedman (1975) shows that dynamic programming techniques allow 
for more generality in the admissible functional forms than does the 
more restricted quadratic optimisation approach. The dynamic 
programming approach decomposes the larger multi-stage problem 
into a sequence of smaller single-stage problems whereas the 
quadratic optimisation approach has a direct analytical solution from 
a single set of simultaneous equations. The dynamic programming 
approach essentially decomposes the initial T-period optimisation into 
T one-period optimisation problems with the (T-l) solution, for example, 
embedded in the solution for period T. The solution to the one 
period optimisation problem is parallel to the Theil solution method. 
Friedman (1975) shows that the Theil quadratic optimisation 
methodology and the Bellman (1957) dynamic programming methodology 
are parallel ways of solving equivalent problems for deterministic 
systems.
Friedman (1975) formally deals with the symmetry problems 
connected with the Theil approach by specifying a piecewise 
quadratic function. Here for each target and instrument variable 
two fixed values separate the whole range of*possible values into
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three disjoint convex sets. The middle range is a closed, 
bounded set of values with a zero preference loss and the two 
extreme ranges contain values with non-zero preference losses.
Two distinct quadratic functions, one defined for either extreme 
range, determine these losses constructed so that the two functions 
approach limiting values of zero as the argument variable approaches 
either boundary of its middle range; the two quadratic functions 
are not defined for the boundary points themselves.
For the standard quadratic function with the form:
W(x,y) - a'X + b'y + *j(x'Ax + y ’By + x'Cy + y'C'x) 
with a, b null vectors and c a null matrix for simplicity
W ( x , y )  -  *j (x* A x  +  y ' B y )
where the constant criterion coefficient b is replaced by:
- 0 If y L  eMiy^ - { y j y j  < y± *yi }
-  i f  y t e U y ^  « { y j y j ^  < y £ }
where b u  - coefficient applied to values of y. i n  U(y.) ,  the upper extreme 
i i  set
bL - coefficient applied to values of y. in My.), t*le lower extreme 
i i  * 1 set
u is the upper boundary point of M(y^) ,  the middle set for y^
if y ± e&ty^
yL by yt • y± -  y£ i f  Yt euty^
■ yi " yi or yi ■ yilf yi6*4*7^  
m y\ -  yt> i f  y1cMyi )
symmetry is given byb“A - b^± and strict convexity by yj^  - y^
Using this approach the Theil model can incorporate inequality 
constraints whilst still staying in the same basic framework.
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Mosley (1976) adopts a slightly different modification to the 
basic Theil approach. He, too, finds the symmetry assumption to 
be unreasonable but in addition he argues that desired values of 
targets are seldom formulated in explicit quantitative terms. He 
believes that the authorities have adopted an ex post response to 
crises resulting from the unacceptable levels of targets rather 
than an ex ante approach which optimises a function of those 
targets. Mosley terms his approach one of 'satisficing' rather 
than 'optimising' and applies it to the British economy over the 
period 1946 to 1971. The satisficing approach has four basic 
principles. The first is that targets are framed in acceptable 
levels rather than optimum levels. As long as this acceptable level 
can be quantified it can easily replace the optimal level Y* in the 
Theil framework however. The only difficulty arises if this 
acceptable level is itself related to the actual performance of the 
economy (Y). In this instance Y* can be expressed as a function of 
the vector Y. The implications of this change, however, suggest 
some sort of adaptive or moving average approach to the treatment 
of policy targets.
The second principle is that of sequential consideration of 
alternatives i.e. concentration normally on one target at a 
time rather than on the simultaneous achievement of multiple 
goals. This point is also made by Blackaby (ed., 1978). One could 
argue against this point that it does not necessarily invalidate 
the general approach of Theil specifically as modified by Friedman 
as this also implies that attention will be concentrated on target 
variables that stray some way from their desired value. What 
would be inconsistent with the Theil model would be frequent 
temporary abandonment of particular policy objectives when one or 
more policy objectives were equally at variance with their desired
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values. It may be argued that this has happened under the 
Conservative Government which came into power in 1979, where 
full employment objective as been shelved in favour of the 
inflation target. If this were generally true then the underlying 
preference function must be considered to be unstable and policy 
reaction functions could only be estimated by taking account of case 
by case instances of the implied preference function. The approach 
could still be a useful mechanism for appraising past policy 
formation but would lose a considerable degree of generality and could 
not be very usefully applied to future economic situations unless 
one could explain these frequent preference adjustments by some 
other variables which in turn were amenable to predictions.
The third principle of satisficing theory is that satisfactory 
levels of targets are reached by resolution, usually through 
compromise, of a conflict between various groups in the policy 
making circle. This would not matter for the Theil approach if the 
groups all had identical preference functions but to the extent 
that these differ and that various groups will dominate in the 
policy-making process at different times then again (for example, 
Keegan and Pennant-Rea, 1979) preference functions will be subject 
to frequent (and not easily explained) shifts. The fourth 
principle relates to flexible targets. This is very similar to 
the first principle and can be treated in the same manner.
The basic implication that satisficing theory has for the 
optimising approsch is that the preference function may be inherently 
unstable. The solution without the optimising approach to this 
problem is to adopt a subjective interpretation of the preference 
function at various points in time.
Moslty in his approach attsmpts to avoid this problem by 
looking first at instrument changes and identifying periods in
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which these changes were particularly sharp. He then looks for the 
"crisis" variable which provoked this response. Mosley argues 
that "crisis" periods of reflationary instrumental change appear to 
be most closely related to peaks in unemployment and that "crisis" 
periods of deflationary instrumental change appear to be most closely 
related to troughs in the balance of payments but that there was no 
consistent pattern of response to movements in the retail price 
index or the growth rate of GDP.
This may merely reflect the absence of any major inflationary 
crisis in the period of analysis, however, especially as he 
ignores the imposition of incomes policy as an instrument. If 
incomes policy were assigned to deal with inflationary pressures, 
then one might not have expected to find any relation between 
inflation and other policy instruments.
The formal approach adopted by Mosley is a kinked reaction 
function of the form
Axi(t) " “ + e(yi - t-k when yi < V  
dxi « 0 when > y*
This can be seen as a special case of the Friedman piecewise quadratic 
function.
Mosley obtains the value of y* for unemployment by using 
a trend line through the actual observations of unemployment; for 
the balance of payments y* - 0. Mosley's model was obtained on 
data for the UK economy for 1946-71 using budget changes in taxes 
and changes in public investment as the dependent variables. He 
doe* find different coefficients on the crisis and non-crisis 
periods but only the equations for budget tax changes are satisfactory.
Mosley adopts a single target-instrument equation system 
whereby budget tax changes, for example, are explained by either
7.18
unemployment or the balance of payments but not both simultaneously. 
He does not attempt to compare the influence of these alternative 
targets indirectly either. Given that public expenditure changes 
are not explained at all well by the current balance whereas there 
is a significant relationship between the former and unemployment 
the inference must be that tax changes were used to regulate the 
balance of payments. Mosley's choice of public investment as an 
instrument is a little surprising since the work of Price (1978) 
suggests that public investment has not been used as a counter­
cyclical device.
7.3 A synthesis of Theil and other approaches applied to the u k
In the previous section we have outlined the Theil 
approach and shown its basic similarity to other methods of policy 
analysis. He have also discussed the limitations or criticisms of 
the standard Theil methodology and shown how Friedman (1975) and 
Mosley (1976) have attempted to circumvent them.
The main criticisms can be classified as follows:
(i) the appropriate formulation of the target levels of these
instruments and targets (X* and Y*).
(a) are these constant or adaptive? If they are adaptive, 
what adaptive rule is appropriate, or are X* and Y* 
derived from a preference function which is inherently 
unstable
(b) are reactions to Y-Y* asymmetric?
(c) have some variables alternated between instrument and 
target variables, e.g. interest rates; or have some 
variables (for example, the PSBR) been used as indicators 
of the effects of policy?
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(d) is the appropriate formulation of Y in past terms or 
in expected values? i.e. do the authorities react to 
past changes or to expected future changes in the 
target variables?
(ii) What is the basic nature of policy setting?
(a) is it simultaneous or independent? If it is simultaneous, 
then it is appropriate to use single-equation techniques 
to derive policy reaction functions. If it is sequential 
as argued by Blaclcaby (ed., 1978), then single-equation 
techniques are valid.
(b) how can we capture changing the authorities' changing 
views of the economy?
(c) how is uncertainty about the authorities' view of the 
economy incorporated and, in particular, how do we 
allow for changing degrees of uncertainty?
(d) what is the role of political factors?
(iii) How do we allow for a lack of flexibility in the setting of
instruments?
(a) are there constitutional or technical constraints to 
the flexibility of some policy instruments?
(b) how are institutional changes incorporated into the 
framework? For example, is the change to floating 
exchange rates in 1972-3 a policy instrument or not?
What about the introduction of competition and Credit 
Control in 1971?
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7.4. Appropriate formulation Of X* and Y*
The preference function
It would seem clear from a description of economic policy 
between 1960 and 1979 that it is implausible to expect that some 
target values have remained constant. In particular there is some 
a priori evidence that both higher levels of unemployment and 
inflation are now more acceptable than they were in I960, say.
This may reflect a shift in the underlying preference function 
or a change in view by the authorities regarding their ability 
to achieve the targets. By allowing for this shift we are then 
also incorporating some of the factors in (ii) (b). In other 
words we would adopt the assumption that changing preference 
patterns are not independent of changing views of the underlying 
economic structure.
Adaptive procedures such as a distributed lag on past values 
of the target variable or a deviation from moving average is one 
of the ways of allowing for such systematic shifts. Thus the 
underlying nature of the utility function is regarded as constant.
An alternative approach would be to use varying parameter methods 
(e.g. Cooley and Prescott, 1972).
If, however, the preference function is such that the relative 
preference weights are variable and non-systematic, then it is 
probably fair to say that no reaction function which is built upon 
a standard modelling framework will prove acceptable. Mosley's 
approach falls by the wayside along with the Theil approach in this 
respect. As long as the changing preference Weights are systematic 
then it is possible to represent the derived values of Y* and X* in 
soma tractable form. The first impression gained from the accounts 
of Blackaby (ed. ,1978) and Keegan and Pennant-Rea (1979) suggests 
that changes in preferences were subject to diverse influences and
subsequently the outcome of these varying influences was not a 
systematic set of preferences. However, an alternative interpretation 
of recent economic history is that preferences have not been variable 
but that policy actions have been determined by the degree of 
success in achieving certain targets. For example, the switch in 
policy objective from anti— inflation policy to anti-unemployment 
policy might be explained by the more critical position of 
unemployment and is therefore not inconsistent with the reaction 
function approach. Only if periods of identical inflation and 
unenployment pressure saw different policy responses would the 
reaction function approach be less valid. Even in these cases the 
approach can be salvaged if the change in priorities can be explained 
systematically. For example, we might want to allow that different 
political complexions of government might have different policy 
preferences or that the relative policy preferences were dependent 
on the distance from the next election. Interpretation of recent 
economic history does lead to the conclusion however, that the 
symmetric approach to policy formation may not be entirely plausible and 
that the "crisis" approach is more appropriate. Thus the quadratic 
piece-wise approach of Friedman (1975) or the approach of Mosley 
are appropriate with the Friedman approach being the more general 
of the two.
Choice of X»
Generally, desired values of X*, the instrument vector, 
have been set to zero or equated with the lagged value of the 
instrument. Clearly a zero value is appropriate when this is the 
median policy value of the variable. In other cases, however, it 
is store appropriate to use the lagged value of X. Note that in
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formulations of the reaction function which explicitly include 
costs of adjustment the variable Xt_^ is correctly included so that 
it is not then reasonable to interpret the lagged values of X 
when proxying X* as a measure of policy inertia.
Intermediate targets
The use of intermediate targets such as the 
FSBR is one way of incorporating changing views held by the 
authorities about the nature of the economic system. Changing 
emphasis on these variables can therefore provide some information 
about views on the structure of the economy. In the same way 
that the piece-wise approach can incorporate different degrees of 
sensitivity to changes in the target variables so allowance for 
alternative targets and for different sensitivity to them can 
generalise the model.
Past or future Y
The issue of whether the appropriate formulation of the 
target variables in the reaction function should be past values 
of the target or expected future variables is ultimately an 
empirical issue since the arguments run both ways. On the one hand 
a more consistent approach by the authorities would relate changes 
in policy instruments to changes in the expected economic environment 
since policy would affect the targets with a lag. On the other 
hand the view that the authorities were essentially myopic and 
only reacted once events were upon them would favour the use of 
past values of Y. Use of current values of Y would imply an 
assumption regarding the information and reaction lag of policy
which may not be credible in a quarterly setting. In addition 
this might pose simultaneity problems between the targets and the 
instruments.
Simultaneous policy Setting
Nobay (1974) has criticised some formulations of the 
reaction function approach for their implicit assumption that 
policy instruments are independently set since he argues that in 
practice the structure of policy-making is "hierarchical with a 
parallel structure controlling the links within the process of 
economic policy". Inter-relationships between instrument changes 
may also arise as a consequence of the lack of flexibility of 
some instruments. That criticism can easily be taken into account 
by including appropriate instrument sets in the equation and 
estimating by an appropriate econometric technique.
Changing views of the economy
As we have shown earlier the reaction function approach 
incorporates both the utility function of the authorities and their 
view of the economy. The best way to treat these problems appears 
to be to assume that the underlying decision process is constant 
so that the authorities react in a constant manner to certain 
stimuli. What might than change is the measurement of these 
stimuli. Thus in the case of changes in the utility function we 
have already agreed that these can be accommodated by using appropriate 
definitions of the target variables Y*. To some extent this can also 
apply to changing views of the structure in that authorities may 
respond to different values of the instruments or target variables. 
Systematic changes of this sort can be captured by adaptive regression 
techniques as we argued earlier for changes in the utility function
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weights.
Nobay (1974) suggests that some general indicator of 
policy might be used to capture the various aspects of fiscal 
policy, thus avoiding specifying individual fiscal instruments.
He uses the first-round effects on GDP of tax changes. This measure 
is only partial, however, and the probability of finding a suitable 
indicator of monetary policy is low (see Chapter 4).
Uncertainty
As we note earlier the work of Brainard (1967) distinguishes 
between uncertainty about the vector of exogenous influences and 
uncertainty about the set of reduced-form parameters. If the latter 
is the source of uncertainty and this is a plausible representation 
of policy formation, then we need to know the variance of the 
reduced form parameters. Clearly, this is an impossible task. If 
the degree of uncertainty is constant, then the omission of this 
variance will not be too important. If, however, as implied by 
Wass (1978), uncertainty has increased then some allowance will 
need to be made for this and adaptive regression techniques may give 
some guidance to the impact.
Role of political factors
One suggested reason for possible instability of reaction 
functions in the UK has been political influences mainly because 
it may be felt that different political parties may have different 
basic motives. Salmon and Wallis (1980) argue, however, that even 
then one may preserve the case for a constant structure by relating 
the role and motives of government to a uniform structure. This may, 
as these authors acknowledge, be harder to do in practice than in 
principle. Many attempts at estimating politico-economic reaction
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functions (e.g. McCrae, 1977, Alt, 1979) assume ithatreach 
different government has its own weighting of the importance 
of the targets and constraints of economic policy. On the other 
hand, Frey and Schneider (1978) assume that the ideological 
differences do not affect relative weights although they have 
been criticised by Chrystal and Alt(1981) for this very fact. However, 
even though there exists some dispute about whether ideological 
differences affect the relationship between instruments and targets 
directly, there appears to be some consensus that political behaviour 
is not completely random but that it is systematically related to 
economic factors.
Flexibility in the setting of instruments
Some economic policy instruments are more flexible than 
others. For example, direct tax rates can in principle be changed 
whenever the Chancellor wishes but in practice any change requires 
substantial preparation by the Inland Revenue and this means 
that the principal time for taxation changes occurs in the annual 
Budget with changes at other times being exceptional. Direct tax 
changes, once announced, are therefore not easily reversed within 
a short period of time.
Changes in public expenditure are again possible at any 
time in principle, but in practice, require not pnly considerable 
preparation but also have proved very difficult to implement 
(see Blackaby, ed. 1978). Other potential instruments such as interest 
rates are much more flexible.
At first, though, incomes policy appears to come at the 
'non-flexible'range of instruments, as in some cases it has required 
the formation of a special body and in this instance falls into the category 
of institutional change. However, these institutions can be abolished
and then fairly promptly set up again (for example, the abolition 
of the NBPI in the early days of the Heath administration followed 
by the establishment of the pay board some 2-3 years later).
The broad definition of incomes policy includes all forms of explicit 
and implicit policy pressure which makes it a more flexible policy 
instrument than first thought.
Lack of flexibility can occur for legal or constitutional 
reasons (.such as the necessary approval of parliament or some 
enabling legislation or for cost reasons). To some extent cost 
factors can be included in the reaction function so that lack of 
flexibility of policy instruments on this account presents no 
inherent problem. If the problem is severe enough, then the cost 
of implementing the change in the instrument is justified.
Lack of flexibility can in principle be incorporated by introducing 
lags of various lengths on the appropriate policy instruments.
7.5 Conclusions
This chapter has set out some of the problems involved in 
using policy reation functions. We have shown the similarities 
and differences between different approaches, using the Theil 
optimising framework as a base . We have also shown that most of 
the criticisms can be met by modification to this basic framework 
and that problems which are not soluble in these terms are probably 
not soluble for any class of policy reaction function since they 
imply that the underlying structure is unstable.
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Notes to Chapter 7
1. It differs from the Tinbergen (1952) approach where the 
solution required an equal number of instruments and 
targets. The Theil approach does not require this 
assumption.
CHAPTER 8 EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF INCOMES POLICY REACTION FUNCTIONS
8.1 General background
In the previous chapter it was concluded that policy reaction 
could be endogenised in principle by extending and adapting the 
original Theil optimising framework. In general the approach is 
to maintain a consistent framework for policy whilst allowing 
for flexibility in the definition of the target variables and in the 
nature of the response of policy to changes in variables away from the 
desired outcome (e.g. a possible asymmetric response).
In estimation of the wage equation seasonally unadjusted 
data was used in order to avoid prior smoothing of the data. However 
when we consider policy formation it is apparent from the various 
descriptions of the last twenty years (e.g. Keegan and Pennant-Rea, 
1979 and Blackaby, (ed.) 1978) that policy makers have based 
decisions upon seasonally adjusted data.1 Consequently, the 
analysis of incomes policy in this chapter uses adjusted data.
The discussion of the results begins with a description of the 
policy setting model assuming the independence of the setting of 
policy from the position of other policy instruments.
Earlier chapters have argued that use of on/off dummy variables 
to measure the pressure of incomes policy is inappropriate. Not 
only is the presence of policy pervasive over the period but 
simple on/off variables cannot hope to capture the variations in 
policy. One approach which has been used in the literature is that 
of Cragg (1971). This approach would lead to estimation of 
two separate equations. The first would determine the decision 
as to whether to impose policy and the second the extent of 
policy pressure. The first equation would then be similar to a
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'tobit' model and the second would be an ordinary regression 
equation. An alternative to the two stage procedure is 
described by Maddala (1977). It is clear from the description 
of policy in Chapters 4 and 5 however that a superior 
approach can be used by quantifying policy in terms of 
real wage pressure and by assuming that policy is 'permanent' but 
merely applied to different extents. Thus policy is not only 'on' 
when it is formally announced but also can be applied implicitly.
The description of the policy measure in Chapter 5 reveals that 'pure' 
policy off periods are then minimal and can be handled conveniently 
within the general framework.
In terms of the measures of policy developed in Chapter 5. 
the appropriate measure is IP3 which incorporates both the real 
wage pressure of policy (IP1) and government stringency(GPS).
These were both seen in Chapter 6 to contribute significantly to 
the overall influence of policy or wage inflation. The overall 
influence of policy also included an effect from trade union 
response (TPS) and empirical estimates for the overall policy 
measure (IP4) are also presented.
Separate relationships for the stringency of policy (GPS)
2or for trade union response (TPS) were not estimated. However, 
estimates are presented for three of the policy measures, IP1, IP3 
and IP4. Given that IP3 is a less general version of IP4, 
it is possible to make inferences about the nature of the policy
model
In Chapter 7 it was argued that adaptive procedures 
could be used to allow for shifts in the underlying preference 
function or for changes in the authorities' view regarding the 
policy trade-offs. Alternatively such procedures could deal with 
growing uncertainty regarding the policy trade-offs.
Other issues raised in Chapter 7 concern the choice of the desired 
value of the policy instrument (X* in the notation of Chapter 7); 
whether the target variables relate to past observed data or to expected 
future outcomes; the role of political factors; and flexibility in the 
setting of instruments. The first of these issues can be connected to 
the last since including the lagged value of X* to measure the 
desired value of the instrument can be interpreted along the lines 
of policy inertia.3
The issue of flexibility of incomes policy as an instrument 
can perhaps be over-stated. Although the imposition of 
a formal policy backed by legislative sanctions and supported by 
some form of review body would inevitably imply some
'stability' in arrangements for policy and considerable costs in short­
term changes in the stance of policy, this argument does not apply 
with equal force to incomes policy as broadly defined. In many 
ways incomes policy can be seen then as no less flexible than other 
policy instruments such as direct and indirect taxation and changes 
in public expenditure.
The issue of whether the appropriate formulation of the target 
variables should be in pastor future expected outcomes 
fa essentially an empirical issue. Most of the analysis concentrates 
on past values of the target variables but results are presented
using genuine ex-ante forecasts of the target variables.
A general expression of macroeconomic policy aims would
probably include inflation, the level of unemployment and the
rate of growth of output as the primary elements in the authorities'
preference function. However, the last of these variables was
consistently insignificant in the analysis and so is excluded
from the results presented here. This is perhaps not surprising
given the close relationship between cyclical changes in the rate
of growth of output and the level of unemployment. Although
the state of the balance of payments cannot perhaps be viewed
as an ultimate target of policy it has clearly played a very significant
role in the determination of policy over the period (see Chapter 4) .
Consequently it is included as one of the target variables either in
the form of the current balance or in the wider concept of the change
in reserves.
The relevance of political factors is in whether they 
exert an independent influence on policy. If political behaviour 
is systematically related to economic factors then it is not 
appropriate to regard these factors as independent exogenous factors.4 
Independent political factors which may, a priori, be relevant are 
the length of time that the political party has been in 
power and its ideological background. The reasons for the presence 
of the former measure is connected with the cycle of influence 
description of policy elaborated by Keegan and Pennant—Rea (1979) 
whereby the propensity to Impose a tighter policy varies with the length 
of time in power. There may also be an argument that certain types 
of Government may be more likely to use incomes policy measures,
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ceteris paribus .although this description is not clear from the 
discussion of the development of policy in Chapter 4. Further, 
distinguishing between Labour and Conservative administrations by 
means of a dummy variable did not support the hypothesis that there is 
an effective ideological difference between the two parties.
Neither did the length of period in power prove to be a significant 
influence.
8.2 Empirical estimates
Some empirical results from the policy equations are 
presented in Table 8.1. These estimates mainly refer to 
estimation by ordinary least squares for the period 1963(2) to 1979(2). 
However, there may be simultaneous bias present due to the 
possibility that some of the right-hand side variables (notably 
that relating to the inflation rate) are influenced in turn by 
policy stance. Estimates allowing for such influences are shown 
also and joint estimates of the wage, price and policy equations are 
given in Chapter 9, Table 9.1.
Several alternative measures of the unemployment level and 
the inflation rate are shown in Table 8.1 and many others were 
tested. The unemployment term is represented either by its lagged 
level, its deviation from a six-quarter moving average, and by its 
positive deviation from the moving average (both also lagged 
by one quarter). The unemployment level always proved superior to its 
rate of change whether in combination with the rate of change or as 
an alternative. The decision to use a moving average was made in 
order to incorporate the possible presence of moving targets or of 
changing uncertainty. Initially a longer moving average was chosen
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(12 quarters) to reflect the average length of the economic 
cycle but the results indicated a superior performance from the 
equation using the shorter reference period. Application of 
the piecewise approach is given by defining the unemployment 
deviation term to operate only when it is positive so that the
authorities react asymmetrically to increases and declines in the
5level of unemployment. Among alternatives tested but rejected 
was the cumulative deviation of unemployment from its moving 
average level. This tests whether the persistence of a gap 
between a target variable and its desired level is necessary 
before any change in policy pressure occurs. However,this variable 
always proved insignificant.
The inflation variable is defined in a similar way to that for 
unemployment except that it was found that it was the change in 
the inflation rate or the change in its deviation from its 
moving average that was relevant. Other alternatives tested were 
identical to those for unemployment.
The change in foreign reserves (deflated to constant price 
terms) was used to reflect the balance of payments constraint.
From the description of economic policy in Chapter 4 it appears 
that this is the appropriate variable rather than alternatives such as 
the current balance of payments.
As mentioned earlier one of the economic goals omitted from 
the incomes policy equation is the rate of growth of GDP. The 
general insignificance of such a variable may be related to the fact 
that although the authorities have often justified a tightening 
of incomes policy pressure by the desire to increase the 
rate of economic growth the target rate of growth has often been 
vague and ill-defined. An alternative interpretation of this result 
is that the primary influences on incomes policy have been the
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inflation-unemployment trade-off and that it is through changes 
in this trade-off that higher economic growth was to ensue.
The equations described in Table 8.1 all assume the 
independence of the setting of the incomes policy instrument 
from other economic policy instruments. However, on several 
occasions policy instruments have been used either as substitutes 
for one another or complements.6 Issues regarding the joint 
setting of policy instruments are discussed later in this 
Chapter but in order to use a proxy for the general fiscal stance 
of policy the actual financial deficit and the weighted full- 
employment budget deficit were used following the example of 
Nobay (1974).7 However, neither proved statistically significant 
and we cannot reject the hypothesis that changes in incomes policy 
are unrelated to the overall fiscal stance. A priori, 
the sign on the change in reserves is expected to be positive 
whereas one would expect a worsening of inflation or unemployment 
to be associated with an increase in policy pressure and therefore a 
negative coefficient on these variables. The results in Table 8.1 
indicate a uniformity with these expectations.
Consider first the results relating to the incomes policy 
measure, IF1 (equations(5) to (8)). The unemployment variable is 
always statistically significant but is least significant when in 
straight level form. The inflation term is always highly significant 
but there is little to choose between its measurement as tha change in the 
actual inflation rata or in the change in the deviation of the 
inflation rate from its moving average. The change in foreign 
reserves variable is correctly signed but never statistically 
significant. The sise of the coefficient on the lagged dependent
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variable is quite high and implies considerable policy inertia.
First order serial correlation coefficent of the residuals exists and the
serial correlation is of the order of 0.2 to 0.3. Overall
the equation fits the data tolerably well and there is little
to choose between any of the particular specifications, except that the
version (equation (8)) which measures the unemployment as its
positive deviation from the moving average, and the inflation
variable as the change in the deviation from the moving
average, peforms slightly better. Here possible
specification errors (as indicated by the presence of first-order
serial correlation) are less apparent than for the other versions 
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of this equation. The size of the coefficients in the inflation 
term indicate almost a 1:1 short-run relationship between changes in the 
inflation rate, or in its deviations from the moving average, and 
the incomes policy measure with a considerably larger effect in the 
longer run.
The results relating to incomes policy measure IP2L seem 
to indicate a weaker overall performance as measured by K2 , 
but there is less evidence of specification errors due to the 
presence of serial correlation as this is conclusively rejected 
by the joint-test of serial correlation up to the eighth order.
The change in reserves is now more significant and the unemployment and 
inflation coefficients are lower. However, the variation in IF3 
is considerably less than that of IF1 so that this does not imply a 
lower policy effect. The lagged dependent variable continues to be large 
in magnitude and highly significant as the 5 per cent level. As with 
the equations based on IF1 there appears to be a case for preferring 
versions where the unemployment variable is measured in deviation 
form although the same cannot be said about the inflation measure.
Equations based on the more comprehensive measure of
policy (IP4) provide a higher degree of fit than those for
9IP1 and IP3. The presence of specification errors as indicated 
by serial correlation of the residuals is less obvious when the 
dependent variable is IP4, unless the unemployment variable is 
measured in non-deviation form. Both the unemployment and 
inflation variables are significant but the reserves variable 
is not.
A slight improvement in performance occurs when only 
the positive deviation of unemployment from its moving average 
is used signifying that the authorities react asymmetrically to
changes in unemployment and that only increases in unemployment about its 
target are relevant to policy decisions. When the unemployment term 
is decomposed into positive and negative deviations only the 
positive term was statistically significant but the hypothesis 
that the coefficients on positive and negative components were equal
. 10could not be rejected.
Versions of equation (.2) and (3) were also estimated 
recursively in order to assess the validity of the moving average 
procedure and more generally to test the constancy of the 
parameter values. Recursive estimation of equation (2) gave 
a mean value for the innovations of 0.027 with a t-value of 0.18 
and a modified Portmanteau statistic of 13.7 (for 13 degrees of 
freedom}.^ Estimation of equation (3) where both variables are 
expressed in deviation form gave a mean innovation value of -0.22
with a t-value of 1.11 and a modified Portmanteau statistic of
129.3. Thus the equations adopted appear to be a reasonable
approximation to the data over the sample period although
ex-post sample stability is marginal given the values of the
y ?,. statistics reported in Table 8.1.(4)
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Table 8.2 Influences of Unemployment and Inflation on Incomes Policy
Beta coefficients8
Unemployment Inflation Reserves
Equation Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run
(2) -0.165 -0.721 -0.291 -1.270 0.147 0.643
(3) -0.317 -1.428 -0.463 -2.082 0.147 0.643
(4) -0.307 -1.259 -0.343 -1.409 0.107 0.440
(5) -0.193 -0.625 -0.337 -1.089 0.086 0.278
(6) -0.293 -1.150 -0.456 -1.791 0.086 0.348
(7) -0.285 -1.099 -0.371 -1.430 0.072 0.280
(8) -0.342 -1.284 -0.480 -1.805 0.147 0.323
(9) -0.153 -0.684 -0.342 -1.526 0.107 0.476
C I O ) -0.339 -1.455 -0.478 -2.049 0.103 0.460
(11) -0.323 -1.540 -0.392 -1.869 0.082 0.431
(12) -0.391 -1.862 -0.502 -2.388 0.095 0.365
Note:
(a) Beta coefficients are the estimated slope parameters adjusted by the 
ratio of the standard deviation of the independent variable to the 
standard deviation of the dependent variable. See Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1976, p.71.
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Table 8.2 shows the contributions of unemployment, inflation 
and the change in reserves to incomes policy using the regression 
estimates from Table 8.1. Since both dependent and independent 
variables differ in order-of magnitude the regression coefficients 
are normalised by their respective standard deviations. The 
coefficients in the table are then to be interpreted as showing the 
effect of a one standard deviation change in one of the independent 
variables in terms of a standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
Thus taking equation (2) a 1 standard deviation change in the level 
of unemployment will lead to a -0.165 standard deviation change in 
IP3 in the short-run and -0.721 in the long-run. One can now compare 
effects across equations and it is apparent that the inflation 
effects are uniformly greater than those of unemployment. The 
unemployment effects themselves increase in magnitude when expressed 
in deviation form and increase even more when only the positive 
deviation is considered (e.g. compare equation (8) with (6)). On the 
other hand the inflation effects decrease when the deviation measure 
is used. Moving from equations using IF1 to IP3 to IF4 reveals 
a greater proportionate effect for both inflation and unemployment 
but not for the change in reserves.
The lag structure of the equation typically implies that 
one-quarter of the total adjustment occurs in the current period, 
nearly two-thirds within one year and just under 90 per cant within 
two years. The range of the mean lag varies between 2 and 4 quarters.
8.3 Expectations
The estimates of the policy reaction functions described 
thus far use observed current or pest values of the policy
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target variables as determinants of the income policy decision.
Whilst past information about the economic system may not be 
optimal in terms of policy decisions it is possible that the 
authorities attach a greater certainty value to past or 
current data than to conditional forecasts. Indeed many of the 
accounts of economic policy formation over the period (e.g. Blackaby 
(ed.), 1978) emphasise the reaction of the authorities to events 
rather than their anticipation of future problems.
In order to test the backward versus forward looking approaches
it is necessary to have information either about the authorities' decision
process or on expected values of the target variables themselves.
Many alternatives offer themselves under the former option,
ranging from time series projections to use of the authorities'
own model of the economy.13 The overall policy model cannot be
tested Independently of the expectation generating process and
so the second method is used here. Only very recently have the
authorities produced conditional forecasts of the economy but the
National Institute of Economic and Social Research have done so
regularly since 1961. For a long time the National Institute was
regarded as a "Treasury in exile" and its projections have
often been taken as a guide to the official view of the economy.
By taking the successive forecasts of the current balance of payments,
14the inflation rate and the growth of output a set of genuine 
ex-ante variables can be formed.
However the results are disappointing(see Table 8.3) 
with the expected sign on the forecast balance of payments but 
statistically insignificant although the coefficient on 
expected inflation is of the expected sign and statistically 
significant. The coefficient on the forecast growth rate is positive
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and insignificant and the overall performance of the equation 
is substantially inferior to the formulation using past or 
current values of the policy targets.
8.4 Simultaneity of policy setting and comparison with other instruments
The estimates of the policy reaction functions in Table 8.1 all 
assume that the independent variables are exogenous to the policy decision 
and that the choice of incomes policy stance is independent of the 
setting of other instruments. In Table 8.3 equation (11) is re-estimated 
by using instruments for the change in the inflation rate since any 
significant policy effect through wages is likely to influence this 
variable. The instruments chosen are lagged values of endogenous 
and exogenous variables, foreign prices and output growth. The 
results are shown in equation (14) in Table 8.3. The reserves 
variable now becomes marginally significant whilst the coefficients 
on the unemployment and inflation variables decline a little. The 
value of the Durbin 'h' statistics suggests some first order serial 
correlation of the residuals in which case the use of the lagged 
endogenous variables as instruments would be invalid. Further 
allowance for price simultaneity is made in Chapter 9 where the 
wage and policy equations are jointly estimated with a price 
equation.
Estimates for other policy instruments are given in Table 8.4 
The other policy instrumentschosen for comparison are hire purchase 
controls; the standard rate of tax; personal tax allowance; 
the short term interest rate; public expenditure and the indirect 
tax rate. Both the direct and indirect tax rate have been changed
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very Irregularly over the period and the continuous model applied 
to these instruments does not therefore yield particularly 
convincing estimates. The equation for the other instruments 
were more satisfactory. For hire-purchase controls the change in 
reserves is marginally significant and implies that an increase in 
reserves lowers the degree of controls and Increases in unemployment 
and output growth would also lower the extent of controls. These 
variables are statistically significant as is the inflation variable. 
The lagged value of hire purchase controls has a negative coefficient 
reflecting the temporary nature of controls. None of the other 
policy instruments has a significant effect on the setting of 
hire-purchase controls.
The interest rate equation has a significant reserve term 
but Insignificant inflation and unemployment effects whilst 
public expenditure growth is only significantly related to its 
past value.
The incomes policy equation is also shown in the tible and 
has considerably higher explanatory power than the equations for the 
other policy instruments. Incomes policy is significantly related 
to some of the other policy instruments with higher interest rates 
associated with greater policy pressure and higher tax allowances 
associated with lower pressure. Finally, the incomes policy, h.p. 
and interest rate equations are estimated simultaneously using 3SLS.
The results, shown in Table 8.4 are very close to the OLS estimates 
and suggest that case for arguing that policy instruments are set 
together rather than one at a time is weak. H.P. controls appear 
to be a substitute for incomes policy however, although the 
presence of other policy variables in the incomes policy equation 
qualifies this result. In addition, it should be recognised that some 
of the equations explaining changes in the other policy instruments are
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quite weak.
8.5 Summary and conclusions
The empirical estimates of this section show that the stance 
of incomes policy is sensitive to changes in unemployment and 
inflation although there is a considerable degree of inertia in 
policy. The evidence suggests that the authorities have adopted, 
for whatever reasons, an implicit moving target for unemployment 
and that they may have responded asynmetrically to changes in 
unemployment about this moving target level with a greater response 
to increases in unemployment than to decreases. The results 
also show that it is the change in the inflation rate that is 
relevant for incomes policy rather than the inflation rate itself.
The results also suggest that there is not a great deal of 
simultaneity between policy instruments although incomes policy 
stance does appear to be negatively related to interest rates and positively 
to tax allowances suggesting some weak complementarity of policy.
The estimated incomes policy equation performs better than 
many of the comparable equations for the other main policy instruments 
although this finding needs to be qualified by the fact that all the 
equations were estimated using an identical specification.
In the following chapter where the complete model is 
estimated comparable equations are based on seasonally 
unadjusted data.
Some work attempting to explain TPS found some-sensitivity 
to real wages but the results were in general inconclusive.
Although the cost of adjustment formulation would also 
suggest the inclusion of the lagged value of the 
policy instrument.
The debate over political factors is summarised briefly 
in Chapter 7. This debate appears, as yet, to be unresolved.
In this case it is implied that there is no reaction at all 
to an easing of unemployment below its moving average level.
For example, the tightening of incomes policy in late 1966 
was complemented by restrictive fiscal measures whereas 
that of 1975 was presented as an alternative to more 
vigorous fiscal and monetary measures.
See Chapter 4 for a discussion of these fiscal measures.
Inclusion of additional lagged values of the unemployment 
and inflation terms did not remove the serial correlation.
But since the dependent variables differ and thus 
also the original sum of squares this statistic 
cannot be used to determine both the choice of 
specification and the choice of dependent variable.
The F ratio is 0.71 against a critical value of 4.0.
The main outliers were observed for 1966Q3, 1975Q1,
1968Q1, 1970Q3, and 1972Q4.
Here the main outliers were for 1967Q1, 1974Q3 and 1975Q3.
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13. However, on several occasions the authorities have taken 
actions clearly inconsistent with the predictions of 
their own model, e.g. the Conservative Government of 
1979-80.
14. Continuous forecasts of unemployment are not available.
4. ■ * * * * . *
9.1
CHAPTER 9 THE COMPLETE MODEL
9.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 described the measurement of the quantitative 
incomes policy variable whilst Chapter 6 used the resultant 
policy variables as part of an estimated real wage resistance 
equation and Chapter 8 attempted to explain the variations 
in incomes policy pressure by movements in the main targets 
of economic policy. In the first section of this chapter, 
estimates of the joint model of wages and policy are presented, 
together with the linking price relationship. The wage equation 
already contains estimates of pre-announced policy effects and 
in Section 9.1 further discussion of more general anticipation 
effects is given.
The chapter examines the difference between the results 
given here and those given by the empirical literature. The role of 
simultaneity bias is also examined as is the nature of the form of 
policy within the wage equation and the chapter presents an account 
of the contribution of incomes policy to wage inflation over the 
period.^ The final section of the chapter examines the implications 
of the estimated model by analysing its simulation properties.
The wage equation is given by either (9.1) or (9.2):
AlogW ■ bQ + b^logUt_^ ♦ b3 log (rW/jj + b^AlogP
+ b4 TIME bjlog (!♦ I P V l W  + b6 108 <1+DLPA/100)
+ b7 log(l + CATCH/10q ) + seasonal dusmies (9.1)
Alog.W- e0 (l-YlPSt) + ex (l-YlPSt)logUt + e2 (l-YlPS^logi^W/P)^
+ e3(l-YlPSt)log APt + (l~YlPSt)TIME
+YIPS (l+IPl/l00) + e5 log (1+DLPA/100) + efi log(l+ CATCH/1(X))
+ seasonal dummies (9.2)
where U refers to unemployment; Wto wages; P to prices, r to the 
retention ratio; IP4 to the overall measure of incomes policy;
DLPAto anticipaiion/announcement effects; CATCH to the catch-up 
effects from policy; IP1 to the real wage pressure of policy; and
IPS to the intensity of policy.^ Chapter 6 refers to (9.1) as 
the unrestricted model where the incomes policy variable enters as
separate variable and (9.2) as the restricted model when the policy 
effects enter both separately, and jointly with the other variables, 
through the intensity of policy.
The price equation is given by (9.3)
p . c0 + ci HC + c2 TAX + c 3PM + c4 Pt_x + seasonal dummies (9.3)
where WC refers to unit wage costs (WC - W,E/0) ; TAX to unit 
indirect taxes and PM to the price of imports.
The policy equation is given by (9.4):
IP4 ■ rQ ♦ rj DRSVS ♦ r2P* + r3U*t-l * r4 IP*t-l ♦ seasonal dummies 
where DESVS is the price deflated change in foreign reserves; and 
P* and U* are appropriate measures of inflation and unemployment 
(see Chapter 8).
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9.2 Empirical estimates
In Table 9.1 joint estimates of the wage, price and policy 
equation are given. In equation (1) the restricted wage model is 
estimated along with the price equation (described in Chapter 6) 
and a policy equation by assuming that they are a set of seemingly un- 
related regressions. Equation (2) re-estimates the same set of 
equations by three-stage least squares (3SLS) and equation (3) 
also estimates the system by 3SLS but using the unrestricted wage 
model of Chapter 6.^ In the restricted model incomes policy enters 
the equation in two ways, by modifying the coefficients by the stance 
of policy (IPS) and by entering as a separate variable (IP1) whilst 
in the unrestricted model policy merely enters as an additional variable. 
When the two models were compared in Chapter 6 there was little to 
choose in explanatory power between them. In Chapter 6 it was 
concluded that, for the unrestricted model, as one moved from OLS 
estimation to IV estimation the inflation coefficient increased 
in size and became insignificantly different from unity whilst the 
policy coefficient decreased only a little in size and also became 
less statistically significant. Treating the wage and price 
equations as a set of unseemingly related regressions further reduced 
the size of the policy coefficient but not its significance.
Although the same conclusion can be made regarding the restricted 
model and the inflation variable, there is no downward revision 
to the direct policy coefficient as either simultaneity or 
contemporaneous cross-equation error correlation is allowed for.
However the lagged real wage variable does increase in size and 
significance.
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Comparing the equations in Table 6.4 with (1) and (2) 
in Table 9.1 shows the impact of including an equation for 
policy formation. Equation (1) in Table 9.1 is directly 
comparable with equation (23) in Table 6.4^. Most of the changes 
in the estimated coeficiente are small but of note are the slower 
rate of adjustment in the real wage gap and a slightly smaller direct 
policy coefficient. The policy catch-up term now becomes statistically 
significant. When simultaneity and error correlation are combined 
(3SLS) the policy coefficient is reduced and is now comparable in 
size to that estimated by IV in Table 6.4 (equation (21)).
As was the case when comparisons were made on the basis 
of OLS and IV estimation is Chapter 6 there is little to choose 
between the restricted and unrestricted wage models, with the 
unrestricted model explaining wage inflation at least as well 
as the more complex restricted model? Allowing for simultaneity 
leads to an inflation coefficient in the unrestricted model which is 
not statistically different from unity. The policy coefficient is 
of the order of 0.25 implying a substantial leakage on average 
from incomes policy. The unemployment variable in equation (3) 
is of the expected sign but is insignificant. The standard real wage 
catch-up mechanism implies that just over 15 per cent of any 
discrepancy between real wages and its trend is made up within the 
quarter with an annual growth rate of 2{ per cent in the desired 
value of real post-tax wages.^ The prior announcement variable 
has the expected sign but is not statistically significant. The 
policy catch-up effect is positive and significant implying that for 
each 1 per cent easing of policy pressure nominal wages grow by 2 
per cent. The policy equation corresponding to equation (3) explains 
policy by the change in the inflation rate and the deviation of
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unemployment from its moving average. The equation implies a strong 
degree of inertia with a value for the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable of 0.88. Both inflation and unemployment are 
significant and of the expected sign. A 1 per cent change in the 
rate of price inflation produces a J per cent increase in policy 
pressure (i.e. a lower value for IP4).
In order to properly assess the relative contributions 
of the variables beta coefficients are presented for the 
impact effects of variables in the wage and policy equations in 
Table 9.2. Thus it can be seen that, for the wage equation, 
inflation and real wages have by far the greatest ing>act (each 
1 standard deviation in prices leads to a change of 0.77 standard 
deviations in wages) with the policy effect the next most 
important variable. Incomes policy catch-up effects are comparable 
in effect to unemployment though with a different direction of 
effect. For the policy equation inflation and unemployment are 
equally important with each 1 standard deviation change in either 
U* or P* leading to just over { standard deviation change in 
the policy variable.
Although these estimates are calculated allowing for 
simultaneity between wages and policy the full flavour of changes 
in variables when the effects are allowed to work through the sub-system 
are given by the simulation analysis of section 9.3.
Expectation effects
The role of price expectations and pre-announced policy changes 
were incorporated into the wage model in Chapter 6 where there was 
some discussion regarding the more general expectational elements of 
policy. There it was stressed that it is not possible to test
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Table 9.2 Beta Coefficient» for the Complete Model
Impact coefficient» for model (3)
Wage equation
Unemployment Inflation Lagged real 
wages
Policy Announcement
-0.19 0.77 -0.73 0.28 0.10
Policy equation
Change in reserves 
0.08
Inflation Unemployment
-0.27 -0.29
See Table 8.3 for details of the construction of the beta coeffient
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expectation-generating mechanisms directly. It was also argued 
that a non-rational expectations mechanism was more plausible.
Several alternative expectations generating mechanisms were 
experimented with to derive a role for expected policy changes.
Underlying them all was the assumption that expectations of policy 
changes would only lead to timing changes. In Chapter 6 the 
empirical estimates of pre-announced policy changes supported the 
hypothesis that the timing effect was only spread over two quarters 
with equal and opposite signs in each period. This restriction was 
also placed on some of the expectations generating mechanisms.
None of the expectations systems proved a useful adjunct to 
the main wage model and only one is described here. In this 
version policy expectations are determined by the stance of policy in the 
previous period, the change in the pace of price inflation and the length 
of time since the last general election. This expectations 
formation thus incorporates both political elements (since policy 
pressure might be expected to ease close to an election .) and 
elements of the estimated actual policy reaction function which 
includes the inflation term and lagged policy effects.
Thus if IP* - “oIPt-l + alNQEL “ °2APt
(so that the nearer an election (the higher NQEL) the less 
restrictive expected policy,and the greater the change in pace of 
price inflation the more restrictive expected policy) 
the restriction that IP*+  ^ - IP* produces the expectations
variable:
9.9
DIP' - -«0(IPt_x ♦ IPt_2>
-Oj (NQEL +'NQELt_1)
+a2(APt  + APt - 1 )
Although the variables have the expected sign, none is statistically 
significant. The negative results of this exercise are not 
conclusive however and merely illustrate the difficulty of 
modelling expectation effects in economics.
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Figure 9.1 Variables in the Wage Equation
(i) Unemployment lagged (ii) Price inflation
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Figure 9.1 
(v) Announcement (vi) Catch-up
Variables in the Wage Equation (cont'd.)
(vii) Wage inflation (dependent variable-) (viii) Equation residual (3)
Note: For definition of variables see Appendix B. All variables are
represented on a log scale; the residual (viii) is only calculated 
from 1963 (Q2) onwards.
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Figure 9.2 Variables in the Policy Equation
(ii) Unemployment deviation
(iii) Change in foreign reserves
Note: See Appendix B for definition of variables.
The equation residual (iv) is only shown from 1963 (Q2) onwards
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The contribution of policy
In Table 9.3 the final direct contribution* of changes in 
policy stance to wage inflation over the period are detailed.
These effects are derived from the wage equation (3) of Table 9.1. 
and do not incorporate any further feedbacks from wages to 
prices etc.
The results can be sumnarised by the statement that the 
major policy effects occurred for the two periods of freeze in 
1966 and late 1972; and Phases 1 and 2 of the Labour Government's 
policy between 1975 and 1977. Thus previous analyses of policy (see 
Chapter 2) may have been correct in picking out the freeze periods 
as the most relevant periods but the results shown in Table 9.3 
show that the policy effects in other periods are generally non-zero 
and furthermore are far from uniform. In some cases either policy 
itself or policy catch-up effects have contributed to higher wage 
inflation (for example Stage 2 of the Conservative policy in 1973). 
Policy catch-up effects are particularly important in this period 
as they are in 1967 and 1977. Although announcement effects appear 
to be relatively unimportant this disguises the fact that most 
of the announcement effects have been reversed within the policy 
period, leaving little overall effect. Within particular policy 
episodes there were significant timing effects in 1966, 1968,
1972(3), 1975 and 1979. The announcement/anticipation effects of 1968 
and 1979 will have acted to delay pay settlements whilst those 
in other periods contribute towards an advancement of settlements.
A more detailed examination of the policy effects shown in 
Table 9.3 implies that a tightening of policy pressure in 1965 
and early 1966 helped to slow wag* inflation. Some of the influence
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Table 9.3 Contribution of Incomes Policy to Wage Inflation 1963-79
Estimates based on equation(3). Table 9.1
per cent per quarter
Policy period _ ,. Announcement Policy effect effecC Catch-up Total effect effect Actual wage inflation
Guiding Light (2) 
1963(4)-1964(4) 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.19 1.9
Early Warning 
1965(1)-1966(2) -0 .2 2 - 0.06 -0.16 1.5
Scanditili 1966 (3)-1966(4) -0 .6 8 - - -0 .6 8 1.4
Severe restraine 
1967(1)-1967(2) -0.65 - 0.24 -0.39 1.4
Restraint 
1967(3)-1968(1) -0.39 - 0.46 -0.07 1.7
Moderata restraint1968(2)-1969(4) -0 . 2 1 - 0 . 2 1 - 2 .0
Little restraint1970(1)—1970(2) -0.05 - 0.16 0 . 1 1 3.3
No policy 1970(3)-1970(4) 0.13 - 0.31 0.44 3.0
N-l policy 1971(1)-1972(1) 0 . 1 2 - 0 .02 0.14 2 .0
Search for voluntary policy 
1972(2)-1972(3) 0.18 - 0 . 1 2 0.30 3.3
Stage 1
1972(4)-1973(1) -0.87 - - -0.87 2.6
Stage 2
1973(2)-1973(3) -0.025 - 1.16 0.91 3.7
Stage 31973(4)-1974(1) -0.13 0 .0 1 0.26 0.14 2 .6
Social Contract 
1974(2)-1975(2) -0 . 1 1 -0 . 0 1 0.13 0 . 0 1 6.7
Phase 11975(3)-1976(2) -2.08 - 0.42 -1 .6 6 3.5
Phase 21976(3)-1977(2) -1.74 - 0.14 -1.60 2.4
Phase 31977(3)-1978(2) -0.79 - 1.09 0.30 3.3
Phase 41978(3)-1979(1) -0.34 - 0 .0 1 -0.33 3.0
Clegg1979(2)-1979(4) 0 .0 2 - 0.37 0.39 4.9
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can be attributed to the TUC's reaction to the new Labour Government 
as well as the increasing formalisation of policy by the 
authorities. Although policy in the standstill was significantly 
restrictive actual wage inflation did not slow much but nor did 
it pick up again in the following six months as the overall policy 
influence eased. The less restrictive overall policy influence 
of early 1967 was due however to policy catch-up effects as the 
overall stance of policy remained. muqh the same as during the standstill.
During the remainder of 1967 as the stance of policy weakens 
and as further policy catch-up appears, the overall influence of 
policy is negligible, allowing wage inflation to pick up again. In 
1968 and 1969 the real wage pressure of policy intensifies as the 
effects of the 1967 devaluation feed through to prices with the 
unchanged wage norm but at the same time there is an easing in 
both the degree of formal controls and the Government's attempts to 
use them, and a distinct erosion of trade union support, so that the 
overall policy effect weakens. As in late 1967 the effect of policy 
catch-up offsets the direct effect of policy and wage inflation continues 
to accelerate. By early 1970 both the informal and formal aspects of policy 
have led to a considerable weakening of policy pressure and with 
further policy catch-up effects, the overall impact of policy is a small 
contribution to the rather abrupt acceleration in wage inflation.
It has become a common claim that the acceleration of wage 
inflation in 1969 and 1970 was a consequence of
a breakdown of the incomes policy. The results shown in Table 9.3 
imply that policy was at best accommodating and at worst slightly 
expansionary over this policy but cannot be blamed for the 
rapid acceleration of early 1970. By then most of the policy 
catch-up effects have already occurred. Nor can this acceleration 
be explained by 'normal' real wage catch-up since by the end of
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1968 real wages were already in line with the implied growth 
of desired real wages (approximately 2 { X  p.a.) so that some other 
explanation is necessary for this acceleration. The most plausible 
must lie in other factors since the equation shows a 
particularly significant positive residual in 1970(2). Despite 
the further removal of policy pressure in the second half of 
1970 and further policy catch-up effects, wage inflation eased.
Policy pressure then remains weak and slightly expansionary until 
late 1972 and cannot be used to explain the slowdown of wage 
inflation in 1971 and the subsequent expansion in early to mid-1972.
Although the freeze of late 1972 had a zero norm it started 
almost half way through the last quarter of 1972 and although a 
significant increase in policy pressure occurs,this and the luke-warm 
reaction of the TUC mean that it is only sufficient to reduce 
wage inflation by less than 1 per cent per quarter against a 
prevailing rate of over 3 per cent.
The increase in the wage norm through 1973 together 
with a high degree of policy catch-up imply that the overall 
policy influence in 1973 was to increase wage inflation.9 During 
1974 and the Social Contracts policy pressure remains weak and 
the contribution of policy explains little of the very rapid 
acceleration of wage inflation during this period. Some policy catch-up 
is estimated to have occurred during 1975r76 and moderates the 
quite large policy influence during this period. Overall policy 
influence remains the same during 1976-77 as although the direct 
effect of policy pressure weakens' there was less policy catch-up. During 
this period policy influence more than accounts for the slow-down in 
wage inflation. The following phase of policy between 1977 and 
1978 is characterised by a marked weakening of overall policy 
pressure and consequent acceleration in inflation. The
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further weakening of the direct policy effect as trade union 
co-operation diminishes is coincidental with a strong policy 
catch-up. There is also a strong element of overall real wage 
catch-up during this period. In mid-1973 real wages were very 
close to their trend level but by the end of 1977 had fallen 
nearly 9 per cent below trend. By the end of 1978 however the 
gap was less than 3 per cent. The effectiveness of policy further 
weakens in 1978-9 as government controls became subject to 
challenge and as trade union support ebbs away further. The 
absence of policy catch-up however means that there i.s a small 
restraining effect from policy.
Finally, the election of the Conservative Government in 
May 1979 results in a neutral policy stance and with the presence 
of some policy catch-up overall policy influence helps to explain 
some of the acceleration in wage inflation during this period.
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9.3 Simulation properties
Tables 6.5 - 6.7 of Chapter 6 simulated the properties 
of the restricted and unrestricted wage synthesis together with 
various forms of flexible price and exchange rate mechanisms but 
with an exogenous policy assumption. In this section policy is 
also assumed to be flexible so that one can examine the properties 
of the wage-price-policy-exchange rate sub-system. Output is still 
taken to be exogenous so that demand feedbacks are ignored but 
the sub-system selected is the one where the greatest degree of 
simultaneous feedback is present, both theoretically and empirically. ^  
Similarly the effects of a changing exchange rate on the change in 
foreign reserves is also ignored.
Table 9.A gives the results of changing some of the exogenous 
variables in the s y s t e m . I n  the first simulation unemployment is 
increased permanently by 100,000. There is no effect on wages in 
the current quarter as the unemployment variable only enters both 
wage and policy operations with a one-quarter lag. The effect 
builds up slowly to reduce wages by 1{ per cent after one year, just 
over 3 per cent after 10 quarters and 3} per cent after 5 years. 
Thereafter there is a slight waning of the effect. Real wages are 
reduced by nearly one per cent after a year, with a peak effect of 
1{ per cent after 10 quarters. Some of the reduction in wages comes 
about as a result of the tightening of policy. This increases by 
nearly 1 percentage point after one year but then eases to $ percentage 
point and gradually declines as lower price inflation starts to 
counteract the impact of higher unemployment. Given the coefficient 
on the policy variable in the wage equation the maximum impact is to 
reduce wage inflation by 0.2 per cent. As policy pressure eases so 
the policy catch-up mechanism comes into operation after nearly two
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Table 9.A Simulations with the Complete Model
Effect on wages (Z)a 
Using (3) from Table 9.1
Simulation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Period 1 _ m _ 1 . 1 -0 . 2 _ 1 . 1 -0 .2 0.34 -1.3 -1 . 2 -1.4 2.3 -0 . 6 -0.4 0 . 1 -0 . 1 0.9
10 -3.1 -8.3 -3.5 4.2 -1.3 -0.4 0.3 -0 . 2 2 .2
20 -3.5 -21.9 -5.9 6.3 -1.9 -0 .2 0 . 1 -0 . 1 1.3
Simulation: 1 2
Effect
3
on real 
4
wages (Z)
5 6 7 8 9
Period 1 _ _ -0 . 2 * -0 .2 . -0 . 14 -0 . 8 -0 . 8 1 . 6 -1.0 0 . 2 -0 .2 -0 . 2 0.1 -0.3
10 -1.3 -4.4 0 .8 -0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0 .2
20 -1 . 1 -8.7 0 . 2 - - - - - -0 .2
Simulation 1 2
Effect on 
3 4 5
1 (Z points)
6 7 8 9
Period 1 _ _ -0.7 0.1 -0.7 0 . 1 -0 .24 -0.9 -1 . 1 0 . 2 -1.4 0.3 0 . 1 - - -0.5
10 ■ 4 .5 -3.2 0 .2 -0 . 1 - -0 . 2 - -0 . 1
20 -0.3 -5.4 - - - - - 0.2
Effect of change of policy pressure on wages (Z)
Simulation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Period 1 -0 . 2 _ -0 . 2 -0 . 14 -0 . 2 -0.3 0 . 1 -0.4 0 . 1 - - - -0 . 1
10 -0 . 1 -0 .8 0 . 1 - - - - - -
20 -0 . 1 -1.4 - - - - - -
Notes:
(a) Oiffarances from basa simulation.
1. Permanent 100,000 shock in level of unemployment 6.2. Increase in unemployment, growing by 50,000 per quarter
3. Permanent increase of 2} par cent in the retention ratio 7. 
6. Permanent increase of 10 per cane in world prices
5. Permanent 1 per cent increase in output
9.
Temporary increase of 2) per 
cant in the retention ratio Temporary increase of 10 par 
cant in world prices Temporary increase of 1 per cant in level of output 
Permanent increase of 10 per cant in indirect cax rate
years and increases wage inflation by almost J per cent per 
quarter for the next 3-4 quarters. The reduction in both nominal 
and real wages is greater than when policy influences are ignored.
The catch-up effects are not sufficient to outweigh the direct 
effects of policy and it should be noted that although there is an 
automatic catch for real wages under the real wage resistance model 
the slow adjustment lag means that real wages can be depressed for 
a considerable period.
The second simulation examines the effect of a gradual increase 
of unemployment of 50,000 per quarter. After five years this has 
built up to a total increase of 1 million, quite drastic, but in fact 
unemployment rose by this amount in just one year between 1981 and 
1982. As might be expected the result is to reduce both nominal 
and real wages by an increasing amount. The effect on policy pressure 
does not augment in the same way however as the reduction in price 
inflation gradually stabilises the influence of higher unemployment 
on policy pressure so that after 5 years the increase in policy 
pressure is only reducing wages by under lj per cent. Because, 
however, policy pressure is decreasing less rapidly in the base 
simulation the catch-up effects are smaller than in the base simulation 
and act to decrease wages compared with the base.
The third simulation increases the average retention ratio 
by 2} per cent. As with unemployment the retention ratio only 
enters the wage equation with a lag. Although money wages fall, real 
after tax incomes rise,at least in the short-to-medium term.However 
inflation leads to a slight easing of policy pressure which has a 
minor expansionary influence on wages.
Next, consider a permanent increase of 10 per cent in foreign 
prices. Money wages rise steadily but not by the full amount of the
increase in foreign prices but this reflects the outcome for 
domestic prices since real wages only fall temporarily. This 
follows as a result of the higher exchange rate on inflation 
as competitiveness improves. Policy effects are initially 
restrictive but then become minimal as the critical variable 
for policy, the rate of change of price inflation, reverts to its 
base simulation profile. The results of this simulation are 
therefore very close to the results presented in Chapter 6, Table 6.8.
Simulation 5 looks at the impact of a persistent 1 per cent 
increase in output (assuming no corresponding reduction in unemployment). 
The purpose of this simulation is to illustrate the effects on wages 
and policy of an increase in productivity growth. Thus the initial 
effect is on wage costs and prices. Prices and money wages do fall 
more or less in parallel although there is a small temporary 
improvement in real wages. After 5 years both prices and wages are 
nearly 2 per cent lower than in the base simulation. The change in 
the inflation rate is insufficient to produce more than a minor effect 
on policy pressure however. The next three simulations describe 
the outcome of temporary shocks to the exogenous variables. First 
the retention ratio is increased, then world prices, and finally 
the level of output. In all three simulations the shocks pass through 
the system eventually with the retention ratio change persisting 
the longest. The effects on policy pressure are trivial with the 
exception of the initial effect of the shock of foreign prices to 
inflation and hence policy.
Finally the indirect tax rate is increased by 10 per cent.
Money wages increase with the effect building up for three years and 
then easing off. There is a small permanent reduction in real wages 
and the higher inflation induces a small policy response. Between 
periods 10 and 20 however, policy pressure eases compared with the
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Table 9.5 Teat» for Synmetry
Calculations using model (3) from Table 9.1*
Change in unemployment
Wages(Z) Real wages (Z) Policy
period 1 increase - - -
decrease - - -
4 increase -1.3 -0.8 -0.9
decrease 1.6 1.0 0.9
10 increase -3.1 -1.3 -0.5
decrease 3.6 1.6 0.5
20 increase -3.5 -1.1 -0.3
decrease 4.0 1.3 0.4
Change in foreign prices
Wages(Z) Real wages(Z) Policy
period 1 increase 1.1 -0.2 -0.7
decrease -0.9 0.3 0.6
4 increase 2.3 -1.0 -1.4
decrease -2.2 1.1 1.3
10 increase 4.2 -0.4 -0.1
decrease -4.2 0.2 0.3
20 increase 6.3 - -
decrease -6.3 - -
Note:
(a) Differences from base simulation
Simulations correspond to 1 and 4 from Table 9.5
base simulation and this leads to a policy catch-up effect which 
delays the easing of the wage increase.
The properties of the model are reasonably linear and
symmetrical (see Table 9.5). The main element of asymmetry comes
from the operation of the catch-up variable, but this has a minor
effect . ^  The properties of the model are such that changes in
real wages can persist over reasonably long periods of time,
despite the adoption of a real wage resistance model. This reflects
in part the slow rate of real wage catch-up. The role of the policy
equation differs between the source of the exogenous shock. In
some cases, for example, the unemployment simulation, it reinforces
the initial reduction in money and real wages whilst in others, such
as the simulation of higher world prices,it moderates the increases
in wages. The estimated coefficients on policy in the wage equation
and on inflation in the policy equation imply only a small response
of wages to a change in the inflatioif\ o  that whilst the properties
of the equation sometimes increase the stability of the wage-price
system they are not radical enough to guarantee stability. Indeed
it would be odd to argue from historical experience that the wage-
price nexus delivers a stable solution to exogenous shocks.
Whilst the presence of the policy catch-up variable inevitably
erodes some of the impact of policy on wages, it again is not
sufficient to offset the effects of policy. The real wage catch-up
mechanism implies of course that any reduction in real wages due
to policy will eventually be compensated but the lags may be substantial
14and this compensation depends on a policy effect on real wages.
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9.4 Summary and conclusions
This chapter examines the complete model of wages and 
policy. Joint estimation of the wages and policy operations, 
together with a price equation results in a lower policy coefficient 
in the wages equation than obtained by non-simultaneous methods 
of estimation. Significant policy and policy catch-up effects 
are found but there is little to choose between wage models which 
merely incorporate the policy variable as an additional additive 
factor and those which use the stance of policy to influence the 
contribution of the other independent variables. Thus it does 
appear legitimate to use the simpler method of incorporating policy 
pressure. Although incomes policy is seen to be an important 
determinant of wage inflation the size of its coefficient suggests 
a considerable slippage between ex-ante and ex-post pressure.
Analysis of the contributions of policy over the period reveals a 
considerable variation in effect with particularly important 
contributions towards lowering wage inflation between 1975 and 1977.
In some instances however either policy itself or policy catch-up 
effects have contributed to higher wage inflation with policy catch-up 
effects being quite important in 1967 and 1977. Although announcement 
effects appear to be relatively unimportant this disguises the fact 
that most of the announcement effects have been reversed within quite 
short time periods. The policy equations show that changes in the 
inflation rate and in deviations of unemployment from its moving 
average are about equally important in policy determination. There 
appears to be considerable inertia in policy setting however. There 
is some evidence that the authorities have reacted asymmetrically to 
changes in unemployment.
The simulation properties of the model confirm the analysis 
of those shown in Table 6 where persistent divergencies between
real wages and their trend level could occur despite the adoption 
o£ a real wage resistance model. The role of policy varies with 
the source of exogenous shock, in some cases it augments the 
initial shock to wages whilst in others it moderates the shock.
The nature of the sub-system is not enough to guarantee stability 
of the wage price spiral however. Indeed in the light of historical 
experience it would be implausible if it did.
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Notes to Chapter 9
1. The type of analysis was also given in Chapter 6 but 
referred to the single-equation estimates.
2. Note that IP4 - IP1*IPS
3. The policy equations in this chapter are estimated using 
seasonally unadjusted data.
4. Equations(1) and (2) explain the policy measure IP4 by 
means of lagged inflation and the lagged level of unemployment 
whilst equation (3) uses the change in inflation rate and the 
lagged deviation of unemployment from a 6-quarter moving 
average as independent variables.
5. The restriction of the coefficient on the inflation variable 
to unity continues to be justified empirically.
6. The equations are not directly comparable in Table 9.1 since 
the specification of the policy equation differs.
7. One-half of the adjustment is completed within one year 
and three-quarters within 2 years.
8. Although some easing in the degree of formal controls and 
the inclusion of deferred settlements in the wage norm 
might lead one to expect a sustained easing of policy, 
the real wage pressure of policy is greater as price 
inflation did not slow as rapidly as wage inflation.
9. Both as a result of the 'basic' norm and the allowance 
for exceptions to it (see Table 5.2).
10. The demand effects would come about primarily as a result 
of the foreign trade implications of any change in price 
competitiveness and from the link between wages and prices 
and real incomes.
11. In addition to introducing a flexible policy response the 
results quoted here differ from those given in Chapter 6 
as different wsge and price equations are used.
If the policy equation incorporated the asymmetrical 
effect of unemployment, e.g. equation (4) in Table 9.1 
the unemployment simulations would lead to different 
results depending on the direction of change of the 
unemployment shock.
A 1 per cent change in the inflation rate will have an 
impact effect on policy of -0.4 percentage points and 
an effect of less than 0.1 per cent on wages.
The simulations shown in Chapter 6 show that a permanent 
change in policy pressure can lead to a reduction in 
real wages over a considerable length of time.
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CHAPTER 10. FINAL CONCLUSIONS
The first chapter of the thesis identified three main areas 
of weakness emerging from previous empirical literature on incomes 
policy. The first was the lack of a continuous quantitative measure 
of policy. Both the lack of a measure of quantity and the 
discontinuous nature of measures used have led to conflicting 
and confusing analyses of policy. By using the various pieces 
of information available regarding policy it has proved possible 
to construct a quantity measure which reflects the real wage pressure 
of policy. By further adjusting this measure to take account 
of the intensity with which government has pursued incomes policy 
and the nature of the response of the trade union movement an overall 
measure of ex-ante policy pressure can be constructed on a continuous 
basis and this is shown in index form in Table 10.1. Although the 
index shows that the strength of policy was relatively great during the 
pay freezes of 1966 and 1972 and so provides some justification for 
the comnon selection of this period in previous empirical literature, 
it can also be seen that policy was very severe between 1975 and 1977, 
and that policy pressure was far from neutral and generally quite 
variable through the remaining parts of the period under consideration. 
It is therefore inappropriate to select two or three periods as 
those where incomes policy 'operated'' and ignore the remainder of 
the period.
Having measured policy the second aim is to examine its 
influence on wage inflation. In Chapter 3 two alternative models 
of wage inflation are considered. In one the intensity of policy 
(i.e. Government and trade union components) are allowed to influence 
the contributions of other variables in the wage equation with the 
real wage pressure of policy entering the equation independently.
In the second the overall policy variable merely enters as an
Table 10.1 Index of Policy Pressure
1970(3) - 100
1961 1 100.8 1971 1 100.8
2 101.1 2 100.9
3 98.8 3 100.2
4 98.1 4 100.1
1962 1 98.4 1972 1 100.2
2 99.2 2 100.7
3 98.9 3 100.7
4 99.6 4 98.0
1963 1 100.0 1973 1 95.4
2 99.8 2 99.5
3 100.3 3 98.6
4 100.7 4 99.5
1964 1 100.5 1974 1 99.4
2 100.6 2 98.7
3 100.6 3 99.2
4 99.4 4 100.0
1965 1 99.3 1975 1 100.0
2 99.3 2 100.0
3 98.6 3 94.5
4 99.0 4 90.1
1966 1 99.2 1976 1 91.1
2 99.3 2 93.2
3 97.9 3 94.5
4 96.9 4 94.1
1967 1 97.9 1977 1 93.2
2 97.1 2 92.1
3 98.1 3 94.0
4 98.9 4 95.6
1968 1 98.6 1978 1 98.1
2 100.5 2 100.3
3 99.4 3 99.4
4 98.7 4 98.3
1969 1 98.9 1979 1 98.4
2 98.4 2 99.7
3 99.1 3 100.4
4 99.2 4 100.2
1970 1 99.8
2 99.9
3 100.0
4 101.0
Note Derived from policy measure IP4. A lower value of the index 
indicates a higher policy pressure.
additional explanatory variable. These models are applied using 
the real wage resistance model and particular attention is paid to 
the role of announcement and policy catch-up effects. The 
results indicate that there is little to choose between the more 
complicated incorporation of policy and the simple method and this 
provides some justification for the usual approach adopted of 
merely adding an incomes policy variable to the equation.
The policy effects emerging from the estimated equations 
are statistically significant but their magnitude indicates a 
considerable slippage between ex-ante and ex-post policy effects 
with an average of 1 per cent increase in policy pressure leading 
to only one quarter of a per cent reduction in wage inflation.
The results confirm that announcement effects are usually only those 
of timing and that they are not, in general, statistically significant. 
Specific policy catch-up effects are marginally significant however 
and imply that there is an increase in wages as policy pressure 
eases independent of any real wage catch-up embodied in the real 
wage resistance model. A 1 percentage point reduction in policy 
pressure can lead to one-half a per cent increase in wage inflation 
due to the policy catch-up effect, although this only applies for 
the period of reduction. The size of the catch-up effect is 
independent of the length of period of policy pressure which precedes 
its easing and so the conclusion is that gains from policy are greater 
the longer the period of 'tight* policy. Short-lived periods of 
relatively severe policy are likely to be eroded by the policy 
catch-up (see Table 10.2). The nature of the policy catch-up makes 
the wage model asymmetrical in its response to policy. Whilst a 
sustained 3 percentage point increase in policy pressure will reduce 
money wages by U  per cent in the first period and 13 per cent after 
5 years ( | per cent and 4| per cent for real wages) an equivalent
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Table 10.2
Quarter 1 
4 
10 
20
Impact on Wage Inflation from Policy
Z difference from base simulation
Policy pressure
Sustained
increase of 
3 per cent 
points
Money Real
-1.2 —0.8
-4.3 -2.5
-9.8 -4.6
•13.1 -4.8
Sustained
decrease of
3 per cent 
points
Money Real
3.0 2.0
6.3 3.4
12.3 4.8
17.1 5.2
Temporary 
reduction of
3 per cent 
points
Money Real
-1.2 —0.8
0.6 0.4
0.5 0.1
0.2 —
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easing of policy results in 3 per cent higher money wages in the first 
quarter and 17 per cent after 5 years (2 and 5 per cent respectively 
for real wages).
Analysis of the contribution of policy over the period finds 
the main policy influences occurring during the freeze of 1966 and 
the following period of severe restraint, the standstill of late 
1972/early 1973, and phases 1-3 of the Labour government's policy 
of 1975-1978. However during the period of severe restraint in 1967 
and Phase 3 of policy in 1977-78 policy catch-up effects were sufficient 
to offset the direct impact of policy. Catch-up effects were also 
important during Stage 2 of Conservative policy in 1973. The 
policy effects (allowing for catch-up) over the period suggest an 
overall reduction in wages of 12 per cent over 16 years or just over 
1 per cent per annum. This effect may appear small but it is not 
spread evenly over the period.
The third and final aim of the thesis was to explain the setting 
of policy. Although the biases in estimation from treating policy 
as predetermined in the wage equations appear to be minor, the incorporation 
of endogenous policy setting within the wage-price sub-sectsr of a 
macroeconomic model may fundamently affect its properties and further 
the decision to impose policy is seen not to be arbitary as is suggested 
by the economic literature. Using a modified reaction-function 
approach it is indeed possible to explain movements in the quantitative 
index of policy by movements in inflation and unemployment. The form 
of the inflation variable which enters the policy equation is the rate 
of change of inflation however, whilst the appropriate definition of 
unemployment is the deviation of unemployment from a
moving average of unemployment: thus persistence of high unemployment 
is discounted for policy purposes.
This could either imply a gradual change in the view of the 
empirical trade-off by the authorities or a change in the preference
function but it is not possible to distinguish between these alternative 
explanations. There is also some evidence that the authorities have 
reacted asymmetrically to changes in employment with increases in 
unemployment signalling an increase in policy pressure but with a decrease 
leading to no easing of policy. No such asymmetry or crisis explanation 
appears to hold for inflation. Both inflation and unemployment are 
found to have very similar effects on policy but there also appears 
to be considerable inertia in policy. A 1 per cent increase in the rate 
of inflation has an immediate impact of 0.4 percentage of points 
on policy but a long-run impact of over 3} points, whilst an increase 
in unemployment of a little under 100,000 would have a similar effect.
The overall properties of the wage model together with price, 
exchange rate and policy feedback reveal that whilst policy feedback 
modifies some of the responses of wages to exogenous shocks it is 
not sufficient to ensure stability of the system. In some cases policy 
feedback amplifies the effect of the exogenous shock, whilst in others 
it dampens the impact. The finding of a unit coefficient on
prices in a real wage resistance formulation has often been taken to 
imply an unstable solution under flexible exchange rates but the model 
developed here does not have this property. This partly reflects 
policy feedback but also the slow rate of real wage adjustment and the 
adoption of an exchange rate model which is not completely flexible 
to changes in competitiveness (indeed it is hard to find an empirical 
account of exchange rate behaviour which supports such a completely 
flexible exchange rate mechanism).
Finally it should be said that although the wage model adopted 
here is that of real wage resistance and thus to some extent the
1 0 .7
results are dependent on this description of empirical behaviour the 
research has more general relevance in that whatever wage model is adopted 
a quantity measure of policy and allowance for policy feedback are
essential features
APPENDIX A
CHRONOLOGY OF INCOMES POLICY
CHRONOLOGY OF INCOMES POLICY
1961 JULY Pay pause announced
Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes 
r e c o m m e n d e d  national policy on wages
AUGUST : Pay pause extended to workers covered by Wage 
Councils
NOVEMBER Pay pause guidelines broken by Electricity Council
1962 - FEBRUARY
- MARCH
- APRIL
- JULY
- NOVEMBER
Publication of White Paper (Cmnd.1626)
'Incomes Policy the Next Step', proposing a 
norm of 2-2} per cent
End of pay pause
Several wage councils asked to reconsider their 
awards but they refused to lower them
Government announces intention of setting up 
National Incomes Commission. This is approved 
by employers but not the unions
NIC established with norm of 2-2} per cent per 
annum
- DECEMBER NIC receives first reference
1963 - FEBRUARY
- APRIL
NIC declares 2—2i per cent norm to last for at 
least one year
NIC declares new norm of 3-3} per cent from 
October
1964 - OCTOBER
- NOVEMBER
- DECEMBER
Election of new Labour Government
Draft statement of intent on prices and incomes 
policy, NIC abolished
Final statement of intent agreed
1965 - FEBRUARY : New National Board for Prices and Incomes (NBPI)
proposed
- APRIL NBPI established
White Paper (Cmnd.2639) 'Prices and Incomes Policy' 
Bill proposed norm of 3-3} per cant
A.2
1965 - MAY : NBPI receives first three references
- NOVEMBER : White Paper (Cmnd.2808) "Prices and Incomes:
an Early Warning System" Proposes enabling 
legislation for delay of settlements
1966 - FEBRUARY
- JUNE
- JULY
- OCTOBER
- NOVEMBER
Prices and Incomes Bill published with legal 
penalties for violations
Delay up to one month - if referred to NBPI 
increase deferred until after the Report
Prices and Incomes Bill passed 
White Paper (Cmnd.3073) 'Prices and Incomes 
Standstill' announces a six-month freeze on 
wages and prices.
Cabinet announces activation of Part IV - the 
compulsory provision of the Prices and Incomes 
Act
White Paper (Cmnd.3150) on policy in the six 
months after the freeze, 'Prices and Incomes 
Standstill: Period of Severe Restraint'
1967 - JANUARY : Beginning of 'severe restraint' phase of policy
- MARCH : White Paper (Cmnd.3235) on policy after June.
'Prices and Incomes Policy after 30 June 1967'
TUC and CBI voluntary vetting replaces compulsory 
notification
- JULY : Further phase of restraint begins with TUC
vetting wage claims
- AUGUST : Part IV of the Prices and Incomes Act allowed to
lapse
1968 - JANUARY
- APRIL
3J per cent maximum announced for the year 
following July 1968
White Paper (Cmnd.3590) 'Productivity, Prices and 
Incomes Policy in 1968 and 1969' announces 12 months 
delaying powers
SEPTEMBER : TUC congress votes 7.7 million to 1 million 
for repeal of Prices and Incomes Act
1969 APRIL Reactivation of Part II of Prices and Incomes 
Act when 1967 and 1968 legislation expired 
(3 month delay)
A.3
1969 - SEPTEMBER : TUC congress votes for complete repeal of
Prices and Incomes Act, including wage-freeze 
powers and statutory Prices and Incomes Board
- DECEMBER : White Paper (Cmnd.4237) 'Productivity, Prices 
and Incomes Policy after 1965' proposes new 
ceiling of 2| - 4$ per cent. TUC rejects 
White Paper.
1970 - JANUARY
- NOVEMBER
TUC ends vetting
It is announced that NBPI to be wound up 
'N-l' policy starts
1971 - MARCH
- JULY
- NOVEMBER
NBPI finally wound up
period of CBI price restraint accompanied by 
holding back of nationalised industry prices
Miners overtime ban
1972 - JANUARY Miners strike
FEBRUARY Miners return to work
- MARCH 'N-l' policy accepted as finished
JULY CBI does not renew support for price restraint
- AUG/SEPT
- NOVEMBER
Talks between Government, TUC and CBI over £2 
pay limit break down
90 day standstill on pay and prices with possible 
extension for 60 days
(Counter-Inflation Act) (Cmnd.5125) 'A Programme 
for controlling Inflation: the First Stage' 
Government orders employers not to make pay offers 
until guidelines are announced
1973 - JANUARY
- FEBRUARY
- MARCH
White Paper (Cmnd.5205) 'The Programne for 
Controlling Inflation: The Second Stage' sets 
out norm of £1 per week plus 4 per cent for 
Stage 2 and establishes Price Comnission and 
Pay Board. Standstill extended by 60 days
Green Paper (Cmnd.5245) 'The Prices and Incomes 
Code, a Consultative Document*
Standstill ends
APRIL Stage 2 begins
A. 4
1973 - OCTOBER : proposals for Stage 3 announced
- NOVEMBER : Stage 3 begins
Miners' overtime ban
1974 - FEBRUARY
- MARCH
- JUNE
JULY
OCTOBER
DECEMBER
Miners' strike and 3 day week
General Election
Labour Party forms Government 
Miners accept pay rise
TUC backs voluntary wage restraint to 
follow lifting of statutory wage control
Pay Board ceased to exist
End of threshold arrangements
TUC guidelines for social contract published
1975 - JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
White Paper (Cmnd.6151) announces £6 per week 
limit from August
£6 per week limit begins
TUC congress approves pay policy
1976 - APRIL
- MAY
- JUNE
- JULY
- AUGUST
Chancellor promises tax cuts conditional on 
TUC agreement to norm of 3 per cent in Phase 2
proposals for Phase 2 to begin in August 
announced as agreed with TUC
White Paper (Cmnd.6507) 'The Attack on Inflation 
the Second Year' presents final terms for 
Phase 2
Phase 2 formally endorsed by TUC 
Phase 2 begins
1977 -
- AUGUST
More tax cuts conditional on pay agreement 
Phase 2 ends
GMAJvotes for return to unfettered collective 
bargaining
Phase 3 (Cmnd.6882) 'The Attack on Inflation 
after 31st July 1977' proposes maximum of 
10 per cent
A.5
1977 - SEPTEMBER i TUC votes in favour of committment not to 
re-open incomes policy settlements before 
they have run 12 months.
1978 - JULY White Paper (Cmnd.7253) 'Winning the battle 
against inflation* proposing 5 per cent settlements
- DECEMBER Parliament rejects discriminatory sanctions 
against companies breaking 5 per cent
1979 - JANUARY Policy relaxes under pressure of public sector 
strikes. Pay comparability exercise for public 
sector established (Clegg Commission). Government allows 
increases of up to £3.50 per week for those 
earning £70 or less
- FEBRUARY Joint statement between TUC and Government 
"The Economy, the Government and Trade Union 
Responsibility"; recognises failure of 
Phase 4 and sets target for less than 5 per cent 
inflation by 1982.
- MAY : Election of Conservative Government committed to 
removing any controls on wages but allow 'Clegg' 
committments to be honoured.

B.l
General Data
Note: In Chapters 6 and 9 seasonally unadjusted data are 
used;
In Chapter 8 seasonally adjusted data are used.
W : Wages and salaries per employee; £ per employee per quarter
P : Retail Price Index, 1975 ■ 1.0
U : Wholly unemployed excluding school leavers
r : Average retention ratio, defined as ratio of post-tax to
pre-tax personal income
GDP : GDP, output measure at 1975 prices
WP : World prices; defined as P*EXCH/COMP
where EXCH - dollar exchange rate;
COMP ■ index of price competitiveness
RSVS : Level of gold and foreign exchange reserve
Source for above data: Economic Trends Annual Supplement
Further definitions 
AlogP - logiPç/P^j)
AlogW - log(Wt/Mt
PCPI - 100* 0Pt-Pt.4)/*t_A
DPCPI - PCPIfc - PCPIfc_1
DLPA - log(l+IPAt/100)-log(l
price inflation as used in wage equation 
wage inflation
price inflation in policy equation
change in price inflation in policy equation
♦ IPA - announcement variable int-1/100 waga .quation
IPA - X*fc(- AIP4t+1 )
where AIP£+1is the actual change in the policy measure in t + 1 
X* - PR0P*Q where PROP is the standardised proportion of
B.2
workers settling in each quarter and Q is the proportion 
of the quarter during which the announcement was effective.
CATCH “ log(l *  AIP4* * PROP/lOO) policy catch—up variable in wage
equation
where AIP4* - A(IP4) for A(IP4)> 0 and AXP4* - 0 for A(IP4)< 0 
DU1 - Ut_1 - l/6
- deviation of unemployment from 6-quarter moving average, 
lagged by one quarter. Appears in policy equation
DUP0S1 - DU1 for DU1> 0
- 0 for DU1 <0
- positive deviation of unemployment from moving average, used 
in policy equation
RSVS - (RSVS/P) - (RSVS/P) x
- change in foreign reserves, appears in policy equation
LPGAP - deviation of real wages from a 12 quarter moving average of 
real wages, used in wage equation
Incomes policy variables
IP1 Real wage pressure of incomes policy; - wn- pfc-1 „
IP2 Real wage pressure of incomes policy less trend real wages
IP3 Real wage pressure of incomes policy adjusted for govt, attitude (GPS)
IP4 Real wage pressure of incomes policy adjusted for govt, and TUC
attitudes (GPS & TPS)
IPS As IP4 but uses strikes as index of TUC attitudes 
IPS Index of govt, and TUC attitudes
E. 4
IP3 - IPX * GPS
IPA - IPX * i ps
IPS - | (GPSi-TPS)
IPS - IPX * GPS * Strikes
Strikes *= no. of working days Xost Source DE Gazette
PoXicy dummies
DX X96X(3) — 1961(A) - 1, zero otherwise
D2 1962(1) - 1962(3) - 1, zero otherwise
D3 1966(3) - 1966(A) - 1, zero otherwise
DA 1967(1) - 1967(2) - 1, 1967(3) - 0.33, zero otherwise
D5 1967(3) - 0.67, 19.67(A) - 1968(1) - 1, zero otherwise
D6 1968(2) - 1969(A) - 1, zero otherwise
D7 1970(1) - 1970(A) - 1, zero otherwise
D8 1972(A) - 0.67, 1973(1) ■ 1, zero otherwise
D9 1973(2) - 1973(3) - 1, 1973(A) - 0.33, zero otherwise
DXO 1973(A) m 0.67, 197A(1) • 0.67, zero otherwise
DX1 1975(3) - 0.67, 1975(A) - 1976(2) - 1, 1976(3) - 0.33, zero otherwise
DX2 1976(3) - 0.67, 1976(A) - 1977(2) - 1, 1977(3) - 0.33, zero otherwise
D13 1977(3) m 0.67, 1977(A) - 1978(2) - 1, 1978(3)» - 0.33, zero otherwise
DXA 1978(3) m 0.67, 1978(A) - 1979(1) - 1, 1979(2) - 0.33, zero otherwise
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C.l
The Central Wage Norm 
Detaila of Policies from 1973 to 1978
(a) 1973 April to 1973 November "Stage 2”
The central wage norm conaisted of £1 p.w. plus 4Z of 
earnings. The average increase for the whole economy implied by 
this rule therefore depends on the structure of earnings. Using 
the New Earnings Survey for 1973 the distribution of earnings by 
type of worker is used to calculate the maximum entitlements under 
the policy. These are then weighted together to give the basic 
wage norm. Thus :
£1 + 4Z applied to:
lowest lower median upper highest meandecile quartile quartile decile
manual men £p.w. 1.98 2.19 2.46 2.78 3.13 2.52
Z 8.1 7.4 6.7 6.3 5.9 6.6
Non-manual £p.w. 2.06 2.32 2.71 3.24 2.96 2.92
Z 7.8 7.0 6.3 5.8 5.4 6.1
Manual women £p.w. 1.52 1.63 1.76 1.92 2.09 1.79
Z 11.6 10.4 9.3 8.4 7.7 9.1
Non-manual £p.w. 1.58 1.71 1.89 2.15 2.51 1.99
women Z 10.8 9.6 8.5 7.5 6.6 8.0
weighted average for whole economy "6.9
(b) 1973 November to 1974 July "Stage 3”
The basic norm consisted of 7 per cent or £2.25 with a limit 
of £350 p.a. (£6.73 p.w.). Threshold provisions are considered
separately. The same method of determining the whole eocnomy 
average as for Stage 2 is used following the New Earnings Survey 
results for 1974.
7Z or £2.25 p.w. applied to:
lowest lower median upper highest meandecile quartile quartile decile
manual men £p.w. 2.25 2.41 2.93 3.54 4.22
Z 7.8 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.1
non-manual £p.w. 2.25 2.63 3.40 4.42 5.82
men Z 7.4 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
manual women £p.w. 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.28
Z 14.3 12.0 9.9 8.3 7.0 10.7
non-manual £p.w. 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.33 2.96
women Z 12.9 10.9 8.6 7.0 7.0 9.6
weighted average for whole economy “ 7.9Z
Threshold provisions
Thresholds became due in the second quarter of 1974 (April). 
The entitlement was 40p. for each 1 per cent increase in the index 
above a level of 7 per cent compared with the level of October 1973. 
Implications for earnings are as follows:
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Thresholds
Earnings range Q.2 Q3 Q4
0.50p.w. 2.44 3.59
0-5 10.0 44.4 44.9
5-10 5.0 23.2 27.6
10-12 4.2 19.5 23.9
12-15 3.3 15.7 19.9
15-17 2.9 13.9 18.0
17-20 2.5 11.9 15.6
20-22 2.3 10.8 14.4
22-25 2.0 9.6 12.8
25-27 1.9 8 . 9 12.0
27-30 1.7 8 . 0 10.9
30-32 1.6 7.5 10.3
32-35 1.4 6 . 9 9.4
35-37 1.3 6.5 9.0
37-40 1.3 6 . 0 8.3
40-42 1.2 5.7 8.0
42-45 1.1 5.3 7.5
45-47 1.1 5.1 7.2
47-50 1.0 4.8 6.8
50-52 1.0 4.6 6.5
52-55 0.9 4.3 6.2
55-60 0.8 4.0 5.7
60-65 0.3 3.7 5.3
65-70 0.7 3.5 4.9
70-80 0.6 3.0 4.3
80-90 0.6 2.7 3.9
90-100 0.5 2.4 3.5
100-110 0.5 2.2 3.2
110-120 0.4 2.0 2.9
120-130 0.4 1.9 2.7
130-150 0.3 1.6 2.3
150-170 0.3 1.4 2.1
170-200 0.3 1.2 1.8
200-250 0.2 1 . 0 1.4
Men 1.2 5.6 8.1
Women 2.0 7.9 11.5
All 1.5 6.6 9.7
C.4 %
(c) 'Phase l 1 August 1975-July 1976
Basic norm £6 p.w. Calculations using NES Survey for 1975
Distribution of earnings 
Earnings % increase
range
(E)
0-10 60.0
10-12 50.0
12-15 40.0
15-20 30.0
20-22 27.3
22-25 24.0
25-27 22.2
27.30 20.0
30-32 18.8
32-35 17.1
35-37 16.2
37.40 15.0
40-42 14.3
42-45 13.3
45-47 12.8
47-50 12.0
50-55 10.9
55-60 10.0
60-65 9.2
65-70 8.6
70-75 8.0
75-80 7.5
80-85 7.1
85-90 6.7
90-95 6.3
95-100 6.0
100-110 5.5
110-120 5.0
120-130 4.6
130-150 4.0
150-170 3.5
170-200 3.0
200-250 2.4
250 or more 1.7
Average) Men 11.3%* Women 17.9%* All 13.8%

C.6
Public Sector Pay Settlements 1979 and the Wage Norm
Z employment ’
February LA manual 12 26
April HM. Forces 24.2 6
BR 12-13 13
May Civil Service clerical 25 10
P.0, workers 10 20
June Doctors and dentists 25 11
August Electrical supply workers 23(2 stages) 8
Police 13 i 3}
September Water workers 17 3
October Gas workers 17 5
December Miners 20 13
Z per annum
Private Public Norm
1979 2 15.1 17.1 15.7
3 14.5 14.1 14.4
4 17.2 19.2 17.8
Weight .711 .289 •
C.7
The Pay Board's estimate of the ex-post effect of exception» and 
additions to the basic pay norm 1972-74
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1973 1974
April- June- Sept- Dec- March- JuneJune Aug. Nov. March May
Equal pay
no. of settlements 
no. covered
220 V 1 388 515 245 759
(millions) i .6 1.2 1.0 0.7 • *
Pay Board estimate 
of effect' on'wages (Z) e • •• •• 0.3 0.3 0.3
i
no. of settlements 
no. affected
e e 150 193 e e
(thousands) e e 62 •• 818 e e
estimate of effect on
wages (Z) • * e e e e • • e e 0.4
pre-standstill agreements 
no. of settlements 154 58 34 127 141 44
n o . covered 
(thousands) 
average no. covered
1,041.8 487 831 1,702 1,005 460
(thousands) 
effect on wages
6.8 8.4 24.4 13.4 7.1 10.5
« ) • * • • e • e • • * • *
flexibility margin 
effect on wages (Z) . 0.5 0.6 0.6
Nov-Jun
343
880
Source Fay Board reports
C.8
Principal Public Sector settlements during 'n-1'
Z or £ p.w.
1970 November 6 Council workers 15Z (£2.50)
November 27 Miners (£2.37 -
December 3 University teachers 10Z
1971 January 12 Firemen 10Z
February 23 Civil service supervisors and
technicians 17Z
February 25 Policemen 11-22Z
March 9 Nurses and midwives 8JZ
March 11 Civil service cleaners 13Z
March 19 Gas industry - manual workers £2
April 14 ASLEF 9Z
April 15 Electricity power workers 9Z
May 11 Electricity - white collar workers £5.71-£6.73
June 7 Government clerical officers 10 - 20Z
June 10 Civil Servants, administrative
and executive staff 7 - 15Z
July 10 L.T. tube workers 8J-11Z
July 20 Teachers 10.8Z
July 23 Local authority white collar
workers 7-12Z
July 30 Industrial civil servants 8JZ
November 30 Local government manual workers 7.4-7.8Z
December 17 Police 6|Z
1972 January 24 Gas workers 8.2-9.1Z
February 3 Civil servants 7-7JZ
February 7 Electricity supply workers 8iZ
February 22 Nurses 8Z
February 25 Miners £4.50-£6
February 25 Post Office workers 8iZ
March 17 L.T busmen 8Z
May 22 Teachers 9.6Z

APPENDIX D ALTERNATIVE AGGREGATE MEASURES OF WAGES
(i) Index of average weekly earnings
This is based on a monthly enquiry into average earnings 
by the Department of Employment. It originally covered all 
industries in the production sector but few in the service sector.
A new series with wider coverage was introduced from January 1976 
(see D.E. Gazette, April 1976, p.350). The shortage of observations 
on this new series makes it impossible to provide a long-run analysis 
whereas the 'old' index provides a long run of both seasonally 
adjusted and unadjusted data.
The 'old' index is described in articles in the March 1967, 
July 1971 and May 1975 issues of the DE Gazette. Aggregate and 
industrial results are provided by this index which is compiled 
from all weekly and monthly paid employees irrespective of sex, 
occupational status or hours of work. The industries covered 
account for just over one-half of total GB employment. Major 
exceptions are postal services,distribution, insurance and banking, 
education and health, and public administration. The new series 
now includes information on distribution, insurance and banking, 
professional and scientific services, and public administration 
whilst fuller coverage is now available for agriculture, mechanical 
engineering, shipbuilding, paper and printing, construction, 
transport and comnunication and miscellaneous services. The 
series is current weighted and refers to GB only. Fuller details 
are given in Dean (1980).
(li) Index of basic weekly wage rates
This index measures the average movement each month in 
the level of full-time basic rates of wages or minimum entitlements 
fixed by a selection of national agreements and wage orders. The index 
has fixed (base) weights, the weights chosen reflecting the wage 
bill. The index refers only to manual workers whereas the monthly 
index of average earnings indicates both manual and non-manual 
workers. Industrial composition is given for this data and fuller 
details of coverage are given in Dean (1980).
(iii) Aberdeen wage settlements data
This data is described in Elliott and Shelton (1978) and 
is based on major wage settlements between 1950 and 1975. The 
information refers to manual workers only and is taken from the 
official information contained in Time Rates of Wages and Hours 
of Work and Changes in Rates of Wages and Hours of Work. Data is 
also available on settlement intervals and whether the increase 
was in hourly or weekly terms. The series differs from the 
official series of basic wage rates in that it is current weighted.
(iv) CEGP wage settlement data
This data is described in Coutts et al. (1976) 
and also refers to wage settlements for manual workers.
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(v) Average wages and salaries
This series is derived by dividing the total sum of 
wages and salaries paid in any given period by the numbers in 
employment. It covers the UK and is comprehensive of all 
workers. It is also possible to form industrial disaggregation 
(but only annually). The wage and salary data is to be found in
Economic Trends.
General issues
In terms of general policy considerations the most 
relevant wage variable is gross earnings per head since this is 
the magnitude that most directly affects labour costs. In 
aggregate this variable can be measured by combining data on wage 
and salary payments and the numbers of employees in employment.
A proxy for this measure, which is available on a more frequent basis 
and at a greater level of detail is the monthly inquiry into average 
earnings. This, however, is not comprehensive since it is based only 
on a sample and it does not cover all the sectors of the economy.
Average weekly earnings is, however, made up of basic weekly 
pay, overtime payments and other premia, and may be influenced by 
changes in hours of work. Incomes policy may operate only on basic 
rates or it may generally influence the components of earnings 
unevenly. Another alternative is the index of basic weekly wage 
rates or settlements but these only cover manual workers.
In econometric work on the labour sector it has been fairly 
common to interpret the difference between basic rates and average 
earnings as 'wage-drift' and to attempt to model changes in wage- 
drift in terms of changes in the level of demand, the explicit 
rationale being that overtime payments and other shift premia increase 
as the cyclical demand for labour rises. An alternative 
description which also relates drift to the level of demand is 
given by Sargan (1980) who posits that if earnings are high 
compared with the wage rate then activity is high and workers try 
to consolidate their temporary prosperity by incorporating the
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higher level of earnings into the basic wage rate. This approach 
has some relevance to the treatment of incomes policy since some 
policies (e.g. the thresholds of 1974) have initially influenced 
earnings rather than wage rates but have eventually affected wage 
rates in very much the same way. However, it still seems over- 
simplistic to treat divergences between rates and earnings as 
functions of pure economic variables since in aggregate this gap 
will reflect the composition of bargaining porcedures and even at 
the disaggregated level changes in the series may be influenced by 
changes in the pattern of bargaining. The conventional model of 
wage drift implicitly assumes multi-employer industry-wide pay 
bargaining. Brown (1981) argues that the character of these 
agreements has altered fundamentally, particularly in engineering 
and chemicals where minimum wage rates have ceased to be 'floors' 
(where the raising of the minimum affects everyone) but have become 
'safety nets' (where raising only affects the lowest paid).
Brown shows that multi-employer bargaining only accounted for 
27Z of employees in 1978 with single employer bargaining accounting 
for much of the remainder and with single employer bargaining 
increasing with the size of establishment. Thus the conclusion 
is that earnings are now much more amenable to control by management 
and negotiation leaving much less room for wage drift than it did 
it the 1960s. In any event, the composition of national aggrements 
(which is the variable measured by the wage rates index) is 
important since, whilst for large areas, particularly the public 
sector, national agreements account for almost the whole of 
standard weekly earnings, in others (e.g. engineering) changes in 
national rates may only have a small imnediate impact on actual 
earnings.

E.l
Seasonal dummies
Table 6.2
SI S2 S3
Equation (1) -0.0173** -0.0197** -0.0155**
(-3.2) (-2.7) (-3.4)
(2) -0.0179** -0.0224** -0.0172**
(-3.3) (-3.0) (-3.6)
(3) -0.0230** -0.0205** -0.0164**
(-3.6) (-2.6) (-2.8)
(4) -0.0089* -0.0209** -0.0213**
(-1.8) (-2.9) (-5.2)
(5) -0.0268** -0.0126* -0.0173**
(-4.1) (-1.7) (-2.8)
(6) -0.0237 -0.0176** -0.0164**
(-3.6) (-2.2) (-2.7)
(7) -0.0226** -0.00195** -0.0165**
(-3.5) (-2.5) (-2.8)
(8) -0.0221** -0.0179** -0.0159**
(-3.4) (-2.3) (-2.7)
(9) -0.0091* -0.0196** -0.0199**
(-1.8) (-2.7) (-4.7)
(10) -0.0246** -0.0231** -0.0189**
(-3.9) (-2.9) (-3.1)
(11) -0.0229** -0.0224** -0.0149**
(-3.6) (-2.7) (-2.6)
(12) -0.0250** -0.0275** -0.0185**
(-4.0) (-3.3) (-2.1)
(13) -0.0263** -0.0295** -0.0179**
(-4.3) (-3.5) (-3.1)
Table 6.3
(14) -0.0289** -0.0270** -0.0164**
(-4.0) (-2.1) (-2.3)
(15) -0.0289** -0.0239** -0.0170**
(-4.2) (-3.5) (-2.6)
(16) -0.0258** -0.0118* -0.0193**
(-4.1) (-1.7) (-3.3)
(17) -0.0286** -0.0213** -0.0180**
(-4.6) (-3.0) (-3.0)
(18) -0.0288** -0.0229** -0.0177**
(-4.6) (-3.6) (-3.6)
Policy dummies
Table 6.2 D3 D6 DIO D12 D13
Equation (2) -0.0231 -0.0093 -0.0425* - 0.0199 -0.0034
(-1.5) (-0.9) (-1.9) (-1.2) (-0.2)
D14
-0.0154
(-0.9)
E .2
Seasonal dummies
Table 6.4 SI S2 S3
Equation (19) -0.0279** -0.0103 -0.0198**
(-4.4) (-1.4) (-3.2)
(20) -0.0289** -0.0235** -0.0170**
(-4.2) (-2.1) (-2.4)
(21) -0.0288** -0.0216** -0.0174**
(-4.3) (-3.3) (-2.7)
(22) -0.0286** (-0.0240** -0.0139**
(-4.5) (-3.3) (-2.5)
(23) -0.0284** -0.0211** -0.0170**
(-4.6) (-3.4) (-2.8)
(24) -0.0284** -0.0213** -0.0183**
(-4.6) (-3.5) (-3.1)
Table 9.1
Wage equation (1) -0.0281* -0.0214** -0.0183**
C-4.6) (-3.5) (-3.1)
(2) -0.0284** -0.0216** -0.0183**
C-4.6) (-3.6) (-3.1)
(3) -0.0290** -0.0237** -0.0177**
(-4.7) (-3.8) (-3.0)
(4) -0.0291 -0.0235 -0.0177**
(—4.7) (-3.8) (-2.9)
Policy equation (1) 0.3202 0.8207** 0.1440
(0.8) (3.0) (0.4)
(2) 0.3144 0.8097** 0.1491
(0.8) (2.0) (0.4)
(3) 0.5360 1.1371** 0.1176
(1.3) (3.0) (0.3)
(4) 0.4953 1.2603** 0.1249
(1.2) (3.0) (0.3)
Price equation (3) -0.0225 0.1629 -0.2959
(-0.7) (0.6) (-1.1)
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